The Middle East post Venezuela: Testing the NDAA’s regional priorities

The release of the United States’ latest National Security Strategy (NSS) offers a revealing window into how the Trump administration understands American power, priorities, and global engagement. While the document is global in scope, its treatment of the Middle East is particularly instructive, both for what it emphasizes and what it downplays. The US’s recent military operation against Venezuela showcases that the US NDAA is true to its word: the Western Hemisphere is the next US priority. But amidst the rapid and perplexing dynamics of the Middle East, can the US progressively move back?

Three shifts stand out. First, economic security is placed at the center of national power, with trade, investment, and commerce framed as strategic tools. Second, regional priorities are reordered, with increased emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, reflecting concerns over migration, narcotics trafficking, and expanding Chinese influence in Latin America. Third, the strategy moves away from the language of “great power competition” and instead uses the term “jockeying,” suggesting long-term management of rivals rather than constant confrontation. So, what does this mean for the Middle East?

The US and the Gulf

Washington’s engagement with the Middle East, particularly the Gulf, is becoming less about permanent military presence and more about economic leverage, technological integration, and selective defense cooperation. This evolution does not amount to disengagement. Rather, it reflects a recalibration in which economics and diplomacy increasingly carry the strategic weight once borne by large troop deployments.

The United States is actively encouraging its regional partners to diversify their economies beyond hydrocarbons while simultaneously channeling Gulf capital into American industries. Following MBS’s visit to Washington, Saudi Arabia pledged to invest $600 billion in the U.S. The UAE acquired advanced Nvidia AI chips and signed commercial agreements worth over $200 billion. Qatar, too, has positioned itself at the center of this emerging framework with $1.2 trillion in investments in commercial and defense deals.

Trade dynamics reinforce this transformation. While U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum affect certain Gulf exporters, the broader picture is more favorable for Gulf economies. Washington maintains a goods trade surplus with most Gulf states, shielding them from punitive tariffs, while U.S.–China trade tensions may actually expand Gulf market share in oil and liquefied natural gas exports to Asia. In this environment, Gulf energy producers remain economically relevant, even as the U.S. reduces its own dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

Taken together, the NDAA reveals a U.S. strategy that fuses defense policy with economic statecraft. Washington is not leaving the Middle East; it is reshaping how it exerts influence—favoring investment, technology, and conditional partnerships over enduring military footprints. For Gulf states in particular, the message is clear: future relevance will be measured less by hosting U.S. bases and more by how deeply they integrate into America’s economic and technological ecosystems.

However, the administration’s Gulf-centered economic vision is difficult to replicate elsewhere. Gulf states possess capital, stability, and institutional capacity that much of the region lacks. Syria remains insecure and fragmented; Egypt is heavily dependent on Gulf financial support. Israel, by contrast, is well-positioned for advanced technological and economic cooperation with the United States.

From the Middle East to the Western Hemisphere

The Middle East section of the NSS largely reflects existing U.S. policy trends rather than introducing major departures. It argues that the region no longer dominates U.S. foreign policy due to reduced American energy dependence, diminished great power competition, and progress against terrorism.

This assessment, however, may be overly optimistic. Iran remains a persistent and adaptive threat, and sustained U.S. pressure on all fronts remains essential. Declaring success too early risks enabling Iranian resurgence the moment pressure eases.

While the strategy credits Israel’s military strength and U.S. backing for rolling back Iranian influence, it assumes this progress allows Washington to “move on.” History suggests otherwise. Iran’s approach is long-term and patient, and repeated episodes of U.S. disengagement have created opportunities for Tehran to regain lost ground.

Can the Middle East be downplayed?

Iran has witnessed a sweeping wave of protests putting the regime on high alert. U.S. officials have warned Iran’s leadership that escalating violence against protesters could provoke a strong response from the United States, signaling potential pressure or intervention in support of the Iranian people. Iran’s close political alignment with Venezuela has also raised concerns, as U.S. actions in Latin America could serve as a precedent influencing Tehran’s calculation about negotiating with Washington to maintain power. Comparisons between U.S. approaches in Latin America and the Middle East highlight key differences: while Latin America is often treated as a strategic “backyard,” the Middle East presents far more complex geopolitical and security dynamics, with multiple conflict zones including Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Israel–Palestine frontiers. These developments reflect broader anxieties over a global trend in which powerful states increasingly act according to the principle of “might makes right,” heightening regional instability and raising doubts about the international system’s ability to uphold human rights and international law.

The document highlights new priorities reflecting a political disconnect with the Middle East.  Although the Trump administration has devoted substantial attention to the region, elements of its domestic base remain critical of prolonged engagement. The strategy appears designed to signal restraint and rebalancing, even if conditions on the ground continue to demand sustained involvement.

Although burden-sharing is a central theme of the NSS globally, the Middle East section itself is notably vague. It does not directly address U.S. military basing, nor does it explicitly call on regional partners to assume greater responsibility for shared security challenges. This ambiguity likely reflects political sensitivities, particularly regarding military assistance to Israel, which enjoys strong bipartisan support.

The strategy argues that U.S. engagement in the Middle East was historically driven primarily by energy dependence. This interpretation overlooks three enduring factors. First, Middle Eastern energy remains critical to U.S. allies, tying American security indirectly to regional stability. Second, the region’s geography, at the crossroads of global trade and transportation, continues to carry strategic weight. Third, the Middle East’s religious significance to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam sustains deep public and political interest in the United States.

These factors do not disappear simply because policy priorities shift.

Conclusion: A strategy of retrenchment or rebranding?

Navarro (2025), with the Middle East Forum, denotes the shortcomings of the US’s plan towards the Middle East. The plan highlights key focuses such as Iran’s missile arsenal, global shipping disruptions at the tail of the Red Sea, and the exposure of regional US bases, without providing a framework for dealing with them. According to him, “It acknowledges problems without compelling the operational outcomes required to solve them”.

This would suggest that a bigger role for the US’s partners is inbound. This could provide Iran with breathing room to regroup, a tactic the regime and its proxies have mastered to sustain their existence. The NDAA also gestures toward coalition-building, particularly through integrated air and missile defense and expanded security cooperation, by relying on bilateral agreements rather than formal institutionalism.

Will the Middle East ever not be a priority in the American perspective? It seems Trump’s plans for the world extend far beyond the Western hemisphere. Former presidents, even Donald Trump himself in his first term, have said that the Middle East will no longer be a priority for the USA. However, as the region remains volatile, the US always found itself, whether forcibly or willingly, at the forefront of Middle Eastern geopolitics. Trump’s ambition for his so-called “peace in the region” is far from achieved. Yemen remains at a crossroads, Iran’s protests are in full effect, Hezbollah’s disarmament remains contested, Syria is a hotspot, and Gaza’s security remains unresolved. These developments suggest that Trump’s reliance on regional partners might be overstretched and the region will continue to command U.S. attention, whether Washington intends it to or not.

Some of the issues trace back to the U.S. pivoting away from the Middle East under several administrations, which left ongoing “forever wars” unresolved. This region is not only currently the hottest spot geopolitically, but it is also a fault line in the changing global order. Whatever new international order emerges, its first effects will likely be visible here. A U.S. that is pivoting inward is seen as increasingly unreliable, which makes the situation more complicated for regional actors.