The price of a silent summer

The tourism sector in Lebanon is no longer merely a seasonal activity; it has become one of the most significant indicators of the economy’s health and its ability to attract foreign currency and drive production and services. Any decline in tourism activity directly affects growth rates, employment opportunities, and businesses’ revenues, while impacting a wide range of economic sectors that are closely linked to tourism, making it one of the sectors most vulnerable to political and security instability

Between the hopes pinned on a tourism season capable of injecting billions of dollars into the economy and the reality imposed by security developments, expectations of recovery have faded, replaced by mounting losses and missed growth opportunities. Against this backdrop, the economic cost of the war continues to increase as one of the country’s main foreign currency-generating sectors declines, negatively affecting economic activity, employment opportunities, and the Lebanese economy’s ability to achieve growth.

“A negative shock”

Economic expert Nassib Ghobril explains to Nidaa Al Watan that “the tourism sector is not only suffering from the repercussions of the current war, but had already entered a downward trajectory following the outbreak of the first support war on October 8, 2023, after Lebanon had been heading towards an exceptional tourism year.”

He stresses that “2023 began with strong momentum. Activity was not limited to the summer season; rather, indicators pointed to Lebanon’s ability to attract tourists throughout the year, before the outbreak of the first support war created a negative shock that undermined confidence and led to an almost complete halt in tourism activity, with the exception of the return of expatriates during Christmas and New Year holidays.”.

He explains that “2024 began amid caution due to the continuation of the war, with tourism activity limited to the summer months. June and July recorded acceptable performance; however, the deterioration of the security situation at the end of July, followed by Israeli escalation starting in September, led to a complete paralysis of tourism activity until the end of the year.”

Ghobril notes that “2025 witnessed an improvement compared with 2024, with approximately 1.6 million visitors received, representing an increase of nearly 45% compared with 2024. However, this figure remained below Lebanon’s actual potential.”

He confirms that “tourism revenues reached around $5.6 billion in 2023, before declining to $4.7 billion in 2024 due to the war. They remained at similar levels in 2025 despite the increase in the number of arrivals, chic reflected a decline in average visitor spending.”

Dissipating hopes and expectations

Ghobril describes the expectations ahead of 2026 as “highly promising, as Lebanon was expected to witness an exceptional tourism season beginning with Eid al-Fitr, Easter, and Eid al-Adha holidays, and continuing throughout the summer, alongside the revival of business tourism through regional conferences. This was also expected to coincide with an exceptional wedding season, after a large number of expatriates postponed their wedding celebrations from the summer of 2025 to the summer of 2026, in the hope that conditions would stabilize.”

However, Ghobril points out that “the outbreak of the second support war shattered these expectations, as regional and local conferences were either cancelled or postponed indefinitely. The wedding season was significantly reduced, and all major festivals were cancelled, leading to the suspension of various projects that the tourism sector had been relying on.”

He confirms that “it is no longer realistic to expect tourism revenues to match the levels recorded over the past two years,” explaining that “visitors during the current season are mostly limited to expatriates arriving from neighboring countries, the Arab Gulf states, Africa, and Europe following the resumption of flights. Meanwhile, most expatriates residing in North America, Latin America, and Australia have cancelled their visits to Lebanon due to continued security uncertainty, while others have shortened their stays out of concern for returning to their jobs.”

Lost growth opportunities

Ghobril stresses that “the tourism sector remains the most affected by the war,” noting that “the Lebanese economy has lost significant growth opportunities. Expectations had pointed to growth of no less than 4% in 2026, while current estimates indicate a contraction ranging between 10% and 12%.”

He explains that “this means the loss of growth opportunities ranging between 14% and 16% during the current year alone, rising to around 26% when accounting for the missed opportunities in 2023 and 2024 alongside 2026.”

Ghobril adds that “the repercussions of the crisis are not limited to the tourism sector alone but extend to at least 12 economic sectors whose activities are directly linked to tourism activity.”

He also notes that “the travel and tourism sector provided between 380,000 and 400,000 permanent and seasonal job opportunities in 2025,” expecting “this number to decline sharply in 2026 due to the cancellation of weddings and festivals and the decrease in the number of visitors arriving in Lebanon.”

He further points out that “the renewed military confrontations between the United States and Iran in recent days, as well as Iran’s renewed targeting of Gulf countries, have led many expatriates to cancel their bookings to Lebanon, representing an additional blow to the tourism season.”

What about the measures?

Regarding the measures capable of limiting losses, Ghobril considers that “the key starting point lies in reaching an agreement that would bring the war to an end in a sustainable manner.” He stresses that “security and stability constitute the first pillar for restoring confidence.”

He adds that “this highlights the importance of President Joseph Aoun’s initiative to negotiate a sustainable halt to the use of Lebanon as a platform for other people’s wars, before moving on to address other issues, foremost among them infrastructure, traffic organization, and the cost of travel and accommodation.”

He believes that “the restoration of stability would return Lebanon to the regional tourism map in all its forms, whether business tourism, leisure tourism, eco-tourism, religious tourism, medical tourism, or cultural tourism.”

He cites “what Lebanon achieved in 2023, as well as the record tourism revenues that reached $9 billion in 2019.”

He confirms that “relying on domestic tourism, despite its importance in stimulating resorts, restaurants, and cafés, remains insufficient to compensate for the decline in inbound tourism, as it does not generate financial inflows from abroad. Tourism revenues represent the second-largest source of foreign currency after expatriate remittances, which reached around $6.5 billion in 2025, compared with tourism revenues of approximately $4.6 billion in the previous year.”

He points out that “the annual average of expatriate remittances reached $6.5 billion between 2002 and 2024, while the average tourism revenues amounted to $6 billion annually during the same period.”

Ghobril concludes by pointing to “the absence of effective government initiatives to reduce operational burdens on tourism businesses, such as eliminating the fee imposed on fuel, cancelling taxes and charges, and suspending customs tariffs on goods and services related to tourism.”

In conclusion, the prospects of Lebanon’s tourism sector appear to depend more on developments in the security situation than on any other factor. Restoring stability has therefore become a fundamental condition for revitalizing one of the country’s most important sectors for generating revenues, employment opportunities, and foreign currency, and for restoring its role as a driver of economic growth.