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The question of Oil alliances

The question of Oil alliances

United Arab Emirates’s exit from OPEC signals growing fractures in the global oil alliance.

By Josiane Hajj Moussa | April 30, 2026
Reading time: 7 min
The question of Oil alliances

After 65 years, the UAE's departure from OPEC exposes a fractured alliance and a world reordering its energy loyalties.

On September 14, 1960, five oil-producing nations gathered in Baghdad and signed into existence the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela formed the group with a single, defiant objective: to wrest pricing control of the world's most strategic commodity from the Anglo-American conglomerates the so-called Seven Sisters that had set it unilaterally for decades. The founding was not merely commercial. It was an act of sovereignty. New states, decolonizing and asserting permanence over their natural resources, codified that assertion in OPEC's 1968 Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy.

Sixty-five years later, that declaration is fraying. On May 1, 2026, the most consequential single departure in the organization's history the United Arab Emirates exits OPEC, effective immediately. Its annual oil revenues contributed $77 billion to the cartel's $455 billion collective total, roughly 17 percent of the whole. No member has ever left carrying so much weight.

 

The long grievance

The UAE's exit did not arrive without warning. Abu Dhabi's production ceiling had been fixed at 3.4 million barrels per day under the current output policy agreement, while its capacity stands 4.85 million barrels per day. The UAE always believed it can produce and sell more. OPEC had already commissioned a U.S. firm to reassess member production capacities ahead of a planned Vienna ministerial meeting, a process expected to produce revised quotas with the UAE as a primary beneficiary. Abu Dhabi chose not to wait.

"In recent years, the UAE was actively increasing its ability to produce. It also says it is seeking to sell as much oil as possible in the coming years driven by the assessment that global reliance on oil is likely to decline over the next 30 to 50 years." Senior Energy Markets Analyst, Bachar El-Halabi, exclusively to The Beiruter

In an exclusive interview with The Beiruter, a senior energy markets analyst explained that the departure was the product of a long-running internal debate within the UAE about whether OPEC membership continued to serve its strategic interests. "Discussions have consistently centered on a fundamental question," El-Halabi said whether to remain within a production bloc and accept collective constraints yet outsized influence on markets, or to pursue an independent oil policy suited to the UAE's own economic timeline.

That timeline is shaped by a forward-looking calculation: with global oil demand expected to decline over the next three to five decades, the priority is to avoid being left with reserves stranded. The strategy selling larger volumes now, even if at lower prices, and reinvesting revenues across a growing domestic and international portfolio reflects what El-Halabi describes as "a relatively advanced diversified economic position within the region."

 

Politics beneath the economics

The move carries a political dimension that no amount of economic framing fully obscures. El-Halabi points to deepening tensions between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh a relationship, in his words, "that has become increasingly complex." The UAE's decision to pursue its oil policy independently, even as it is publicly cast in terms of output and revenue maximization, is inseparable from that deteriorating bilateral dynamic.

It also reflects a broader institutional moment. El-Halabi situates the exit within a global landscape in which multilateral bodies like the United Nations, NATO and others are "increasingly struggling to perform their roles effectively," contributing to a wider drift toward independent national agendas. For the UAE, OPEC's collective leverage, once tied to both market management power and Gulf diplomatic alignment, no longer outweighs the costs of constraint.

 

The Hormuz factor

The timing, however, was not entirely of Abu Dhabi's choosing. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz  a direct consequence of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict has created the most severe supply disruption since the 1973 embargo. An estimated 7.5 million barrels per day of Gulf output has been shut in. OPEC+'s projected surplus capacity for 2026 stands at just 1.20 million barrels per day, far short of what would be needed to compensate.

Under normal market conditions, the UAE's departure might have triggered significant volatility speculation about a supply flood, concerns about cartel cohesion, sharp price movements. The Hormuz disruption muted all of that. "The closure was not the cause of the decision," El Halabi told The Beiruter, "but rather a condition that enabled it to occur with limited immediate consequences." The disruption already present in global energy markets allowed the UAE to step away without becoming the source of instability itself.

The numbers tell a stark story. OPEC controls 79.5 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and accounts for 38 percent of global production, generating $455 billion in annual export revenues as of 2025. The UAE alone contributed $77 billion of that total 17 percent of the cartel's collective earnings making its departure the single largest revenue withdrawal in OPEC's history. Against that backdrop, the organization enters 2026 severely exposed: the Hormuz closure has shut in an estimated 7.5 million barrels per day of Gulf output, while OPEC's projected surplus capacity stands at just 1.20 million barrels per day a buffer too thin to absorb the disruption, let alone replace what Abu Dhabi took with it.

 

Who follows?

The question now hanging over Vienna is whether the UAE has opened a door. Analysts have identified Kazakhstan with persistent Ver production at the Tengiz field driven by contractual commitments to international oil companies as the likeliest next candidate. The senior energy markets analyst is cautious. "Kazakhstan would not leave OPEC+ unless Russia were to do so," he said, noting that both countries have yesterday reaffirmed their commitments to the group. No clear indicators of imminent departure exist though, as he adds, such scenarios "cannot be entirely ruled out over the longer term."

What happens to the UAE's production quota remains unresolved. Redistribution is not straightforward: many OPEC members, particularly Gulf producers and Iraq, cannot absorb additional allocations due to existing constraints. Increasing supply beyond demand would drive prices down an outcome no producer welcomes. OPEC's upcoming ministerial meeting will be closely watched for any formal policy signal.

 

After the exit

OPEC held 62 percent of global market share in the mid-1970s. By 1985, that figure had collapsed to 37 percent, the consequence of overproduction, the global consumer shift away from hydrocarbons, and Saudi Arabia's decision to flood the market with cheap oil after years of acting as the cartel's sole production disciplinarian. The parallel is uncomfortable for Riyadh. Saudi officials have been swift to publicly downplay the UAE departure. Privately, the calculus is considerably more fraught: if the discipline of the cartel's second-largest producer is gone, OPEC's ability to sustain price floors through collective restraint weakens materially.

Meanwhile, the United States producing 13.51 million barrels per day in 2026 and insulated from the Gulf crisis by its shale infrastructure continues its quiet structural gain. El Halabi notes that Washington could benefit from any factors that contribute to lower prices once market conditions stabilize, consistent with what former President Donald Trump described as an "energy dominance" agenda. Policies toward Venezuela and Iran, he notes, form part of that broader approach.

The organization born in Baghdad as a declaration of sovereignty over natural resources now confronts a different reckoning: whether the sovereign interests of its remaining eleven members are still best served by acting in concert or whether, in an era of energy transition, closed straits, and regional fracture, each nation is better positioned to act alone. The full impact of the UAE's exit, El Halabi cautions, "will take time to unfold." But the direction of travel is no longer in doubt.

    • Josiane Hajj Moussa
      Deputy Chief Editor at The Beiruter
      News & documentary producer with 17 years in Lebanon, known for strong editorial judgment, field coordination, and impactful human-centered storytelling.