The Red Sea on the brink

As recent talks fail between the U.S. and Iran, the Houthis sit idle waiting for the moment to interfere. The Houthis’ missile and drone attacks on Israel last March did more than open another front in an already widening regional war. They revived one of the most serious fears in global trade and energy markets, namely that Yemen’s Houthi movement could again turn the Red Sea into a battlefield and threaten the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, just as Iran’s pressure on the Strait of Hormuz has already shaken the world economy. One chokepoint is under severe strain and the other may now be next.

The Bab al-Mandeb Strait sits at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, linking the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. It is one of the world’s critical maritime chokepoints, carrying approximately 10 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum liquids and 12% of global trade. It is also a key gateway for trade between Europe and Asia.

The Houthis have already shown that they can disrupt this corridor. From late 2023 through early 2025, they attacked more than 100 merchant vessels in the Red Sea and launched projectiles toward Israel, claiming to act in support of Gaza. Those operations forced shipping firms to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, sharply increasing shipping times, freight rates, fuel costs, and insurance premiums. In other words, the global economy has already seen a preview of what a disrupted Red Sea looks like.

Now the risk is far greater because the regional environment is much more compressed. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively constrained by the confrontation with Iran, some oil flows that would otherwise depend on Hormuz have already been shifting westward. That means the Red Sea is becoming an emergency alternative for Gulf exports. If Bab al-Mandeb were also seriously threatened, the room for adjustment would shrink dramatically.

This is why a militarized Red Sea would be so dangerous. It would not simply be a story of missiles and naval patrols. It would be a story of cascading vulnerability across shipping, energy, inflation, and geopolitical escalation. Maritime chokepoints are dangerous precisely because they concentrate risk. A relatively small actor with missiles, drones, mines, or anti-ship capabilities can impose huge costs on the global economy without needing to achieve total closure. It is enough to create uncertainty.

That dynamic was visible during the earlier Red Sea crisis. The U.S. Energy Information Administration found that a standard voyage from the Persian Gulf to the Amsterdam Rotterdam Antwerp hub via the Suez Canal took about 19 days. Rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope stretched that trip to nearly 35 days. Longer routes meant higher fuel expenses, fewer ships available for the same delivery schedules, and increased tanker rates.

The Bab al-Mandeb therefore matters not only to oil markets but to supply chains as a whole. If the Strait of Hormuz is closed and the Bab al-Mandeb becomes contested at the same time, the result would be a systemic global shock.

A more heavily militarized Red Sea would likely bring intensified American naval deployments, expanded escort operations, more surveillance assets, and possibly further strikes inside Yemen. Military protection can reduce some immediate threats, but it can also deepen long-term confrontations. The Houthis are not simply a local insurgency anymore but an armed actor with strategic geography and a proven willingness to use maritime disruption as leverage. Their missile launches toward Israel have already demonstrated range and intent.

A more dangerous possibility lies in the normalization of coercion at sea. If the Houthis are seen as successfully using maritime pressure to shape regional politics, other state and non-state actors may draw the lesson that chokepoints can be weaponized with relative efficiency. In that sense, the issue is not only whether Bab al-Mandeb can be protected in the short term. It is whether the Red Sea is evolving into a persistent arena of strategic blackmail, where trade routes are routinely leveraged as bargaining chips. Once that precedent takes hold, commercial confidence becomes much harder to restore.

The Red Sea is already crowded with military and strategic interests. The United States and the United Kingdom operate in the area, anchored by installations such as Camp Lemonnier (hosting around 4,000 personnel) and the nearby Chabelley Airfield drone base in Djibouti. The UAE has access to the Berbera Port and Air Base under a long-term lease, alongside the Perim Island Airfield in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. It also previously operated the Assab Air/Naval Base, developed with over $1 billion in investment. Russia has shown interest in expanding its regional footprint, including plans for a naval facility in Port Sudan. China depends heavily on the corridor for trade and energy flows, supported by its PLA Support Base in Djibouti that can host up to 2,000 troops. Therefore, what we have are competing powers in a very tight and crucial space. Reports are also suggesting that Saudi Arabia’s big NEOM project is being recalibrated to a port on the Red Sea, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz all together.

What the Houthis are banking on is that a shipping corridor does not need to be fully blocked to become strategically unusable. A handful of successful attacks, a spike in insurance costs, a naval clash, or a major strike on Gulf energy infrastructure could be enough to send markets into panic. Once Brent crude climbs well above $100 and stays there, the pressure spreads outward from Asia and Europe into the global economy. If prices were to increase and remain elevated, the risk of broader recessionary consequences would become much more serious.

The Bab al-Mandeb is narrow, exposed, and indispensable, something the Houthis and Iran understand. With Hormuz already under severe pressure, Bab al-Mandeb becomes the next line of stability.

Recent failures to reach a deal between Iran and the U.S. might force the Iranians to rely more on the Houthi card. Iran will use whatever deterrence it possesses, just as it has already done in the Strait of Hormuz. The latest Houthi attacks were a reminder that today, maritime chokepoints are becoming as strategically consequential as battlefields. And if the Red Sea is allowed to slide further into militarization, the world may soon discover that the closure of one strait is a crisis, but the destabilization of two is something much closer to global economic emergency.