The regional stakes of Ethiopia’s renewed war

Four years after the Pretoria Agreement ended Ethiopia’s Tigray war, large-scale fighting has returned to the country’s north.

On 23 September, Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) forces seized airports in Tigray and attacked federal positions in neighboring Afar and Amhara. Addis Ababa described the operations as a major offensive, while Tigrayan authorities said they had entered a defensive war. The renewed fighting came only days after seven armed groups formed the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, seeking to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government.

The composition of the alliance alone shows how radically Ethiopia’s war map has changed. It includes the TPLF and the Amhara Fano National Movement, whose forces fought on opposite sides between 2020 and 2022. Deep territorial disagreements remain between them, particularly over Western Tigray, but both are now confronting Addis Ababa.

That reversal inside Ethiopia is unfolding alongside an equally transformed regional landscape, meaning any new war would begin under very different conditions from the conflict that ended in 2022.

Eritrea: the first external fault line

No relationship has changed more dramatically since the previous war than the one between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

When fighting began in Tigray in 2020, Eritrean forces entered the conflict alongside Ethiopia's federal army. Today, Addis Ababa and Asmara regard each other with growing suspicion.

The Pretoria Agreement that ended the Tigray war in November 2022 excluded Eritrea despite its participation in the fighting. Relations subsequently deteriorated further as Ethiopia revived the question of access to the Red Sea, particularly through the Eritrean port of Assab.

In February, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos formally accused Eritrea of occupying Ethiopian territory and supporting armed groups inside Ethiopia, while also saying Addis Ababa remained willing to negotiate issues including access through Assab. Eritrea rejected the accusations as false and has repeatedly objected to Ethiopian rhetoric surrounding sea access.

Those accusations have gained new significance with the formation of the Alliance for Survival. Addis Ababa says its members had already been cooperating with Eritrean financial backing, which Asmara denies. Some of those relationships predate the alliance: Eritrea previously trained and armed Amhara Fano forces during the Tigray war, while recent analysis has pointed to contacts involving Eritrea and armed groups now participating in the coalition.

Germany's Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) warned in July that renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia could draw Eritrea and Sudan into a wider regional crisis, while Chatham House has separately identified Ethiopia's pursuit of maritime and potentially naval access as a source of growing tension between Addis Ababa and Asmara.

Tigray therefore sits beside two unresolved disputes at once. Its northern frontier touches Eritrea, while Assab has become central to Ethiopia’s search for more secure access to the Red Sea. If fighting expands, those political and armed connections provide one route through which an internal Ethiopian conflict could again acquire an Eritrean dimension.

Sudan: two wars along one frontier

Ethiopia’s western border presents a different risk.

Sudan is already fighting a civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, while relations between Addis Ababa and the Sudanese military have deteriorated. The countries also retain an unresolved territorial dispute over the fertile al-Fashaga region.

Connections between Sudan’s war and Ethiopian armed actors already exist. A Tigrayan formation known as Army 70 has operated inside Sudan alongside the SAF, while Ethiopian authorities fear Sudanese territory could provide personnel or supply routes to Tigrayan forces if fighting over Western Tigray intensifies. Chatham House has also documented Tigrayan fighters operating alongside Sudanese government forces.

The frontier is already transmitting tensions in both directions.

In May 2026, Sudan’s military accused Ethiopia of allowing drones attacking Sudanese targets to operate from Bahir Dar airport. Sudanese officials cited information recovered from a downed drone; Ethiopia rejected the allegations as baseless. The UAE, which Sudan also accused of involvement, likewise denied the claims, which have not been independently verified.

Western Tigray borders Sudan and remains disputed between Tigrayan and Amhara actors. Its location gives the Sudanese frontier immediate operational importance if the fighting expands, particularly for the movement of personnel, supplies and armed groups.

The risk would extend beyond conventional spillover. Ethiopia’s northern war and Sudan’s civil war could increasingly become connected through the same borderlands, armed networks and supply corridors.

Egypt: from the Nile to the Red Sea

For Egypt, renewed Ethiopian warfare would begin while its central dispute with Addis Ababa remains unresolved.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was inaugurated in September 2025, but Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia still lack a binding agreement governing its long-term operation. Cairo wants guarantees covering water releases, drought management and coordination with downstream states. Ethiopia maintains its right to use the Blue Nile for development and argues that the dam benefits the region through electricity generation and regulation of river flows.

For Egypt, the issue remains fundamental because the country depends overwhelmingly on the Nile for its freshwater supply. Cairo’s concern has consequently shifted from whether the dam will be built to how it will operate for decades to come.

Egypt’s concerns now extend eastward as well.

Cairo increasingly treats the Red Sea and Horn of Africa as part of its national-security environment. Egyptian officials have argued that Red Sea security arrangements should remain under the control of its littoral states and have opposed a military role for non-coastal countries.

That position bears directly on Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. Addis Ababa says it seeks negotiated access to the sea, while Egypt distinguishes commercial port access from participation in the Red Sea’s military and security architecture.

Egypt and Eritrea expanded cooperation in maritime transport and infrastructure in 2026, including discussions surrounding the development of Assab and Massawa. Egypt has also repeatedly emphasized support for Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Assab consequently carries different strategic meanings for all three states. Ethiopia sees it as one possible route toward reducing its dependence on Djibouti. Eritrea regards it as sovereign territory. Egypt views the surrounding coastline as part of the Red Sea security system linking Bab al-Mandeb to the Suez Canal.

Renewed fighting would therefore affect Egypt on both fronts. Prolonged instability could further complicate efforts to reach a durable arrangement over the GERD, while any deterioration between Ethiopia and Eritrea would raise the stakes around Assab and the wider Red Sea security balance.

The Gulf and Red Sea security

Across the Red Sea, the stakes are different but equally significant.

The United Arab Emirates maintains a substantial strategic partnership with Ethiopia encompassing investment, development, economic cooperation and regional security. In January, Abu Dhabi and Addis Ababa reaffirmed their commitment to each other’s peace, security, territorial integrity and economic interests, while stressing regional stability and peaceful efforts concerning Sudan.

Ethiopia’s stability therefore matters directly to long-term Emirati economic and diplomatic engagement across the Horn.

Saudi Arabia has longstanding ties with both Ethiopia and Eritrea and previously played an important diplomatic role between them, hosting Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki for their 2018 peace agreement in Jeddah.

Riyadh’s interests also extend across the Red Sea itself. Saudi Arabia has promoted cooperation among littoral states and places considerable importance on secure shipping, energy infrastructure and regional connectivity. Those concerns have become particularly visible as instability around Yemen and Bab al-Mandeb has placed growing pressure on maritime traffic.

Renewed instability on the African shore would place further pressure on a maritime corridor already strained by insecurity around Yemen and Bab al-Mandeb, reinforcing the strategic importance of Saudi and Emirati engagement in the Horn, where their investment, diplomacy and regional partnerships help support stability, strengthen connectivity and secure Red Sea trade.

The risks of the conflict now extend beyond Ethiopia’s borders. A prolonged war could draw neighboring states and existing regional disputes more directly into a conflict that has already altered alliances and security calculations across the Horn and the Red Sea.