The shadow of 7 May: Could history repeat itself?

In the fields of Political Science and International Relations (I.R.), leaders and armed movements facing major external setbacks have often sought to compensate for their losses by redirecting pressure inward toward the domestic arena. This phenomenon is commonly associated with the concept of “diversionary conflict,” whereby external failures, military defeats, or declining strategic influence push actors to reinforce their position internally through escalation, mobilization, or the use of coercive force.

Today, following two devastating armed conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel (2023-2024 and 2026), growing speculation has emerged regarding the possibility of a renewed 7 May scenario in Lebanon. Therefore, these concerns raise critical questions not only about whether such a development is genuinely looming on the horizon, but also about the measures necessary to prevent Lebanon from descending once again into internal violence.

Is a new 7 May scenario emerging?

The aforementioned perception is driven by several key indicators which might contribute to igniting such internal strife and confrontation.

First, Hezbollah and its supporters have increasingly adopted hostile rhetoric toward their opponents. When reviewing social media platforms and media outlets affiliated with the aforementioned group, one could notice a systemic pattern of campaigns against domestic factions, political parties, as well as political and religious figures who disagree with Hezbollah and the Axis of Resistance’s line of thought and convictions; more recently, the Maronite Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rahi, President Joseph Aoun, and Prime Minister (P.M.) Nawaf Salam were targeted. These campaigns range from accusations of treason and espionage in favor of Israel and the United States (U.S.) to even implicit and explicit threats to forcibly overthrow the government and presidency entirely.

Second, given the massive territorial, material, and human losses that Hezbollah suffered from with its confrontations with Tel Aviv, the likelihood of internal escalation to compensate such damages has significantly increased. A significant portion of Hezbollah’s fighters has been killed, most of its senior commanders and leaders assassinated, thousands remain displaced, and over 50 towns and villages in southern Lebanon previously liberated after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in 2000 have fallen under Israeli occupation (with some being utterly destroyed altogether). Such drastic setbacks could incentivize the group to resort to violence and coercive means in the domestic scene against a government it perceives to be “hostile,” hoping to tip the balance in its favor once again; similar to what Hezbollah resorted to on 7 May 2008 following the 2006 July War.

Third, amidst the ongoing direct talks between Lebanese and Israeli officials, with the potential beginning of broader negotiations, Hezbollah appears keen on hindering and obstructing such efforts or any political trajectory that could undermine its traditional role. Creating internal instability would likely divert the Lebanese government’s attention away from the negotiation process while simultaneously weakening its bargaining position vis-à-vis Israel. This is especially concerning as political fragmentation and domestic polarization would undermine the coherence and credibility of the Lebanese negotiating team, which would in turn impact the outcome of these talks in favor of Israel. Such strategy was similarly adopted by Hamas in the 1990s as a means to break down the Israeli-Palestinian reproachment (culminating in the 1993-1995 Oslo Accords) between Tel Aviv and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.).

Taken together, these indicators signal that while no imminent domestic armed conflict is at hand, the prospects of Hezbollah attempting to reignite a new 7 May scenario in pursuit of political and strategic objectives remains a serious threat which must be confronted effectively.