The six pillars keeping Iran’s regime standing

Since the outbreak of the war between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other, one question has increasingly dominated the debate: could the conflict ultimately lead to the fall of the Islamic Republic? At first glance, the logic seems straightforward: if military pressure weakens the state and large numbers of citizens rise up, the regime could collapse. But history shows that the relationship between popular anger and regime change is far more complex.

Whether public anger alone can bring down a regime has long been debated by political theorists. More than a century ago, Italian political thinkers such as Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca challenged the belief that political power is ultimately exercised directly by the masses. According to their theory, known as elite theory, political power in all systems tends to be concentrated in the hands of a minority: a ruling elite that controls institutions, resources, and power.

From this perspective, the survival of a regime depends on whether the structures that allow the ruling elite to maintain power remain intact, and not on the intensity of public anger. Seen through this lens, the key question in Iran today is simple: have the fundamental conditions that sustain the Islamic Republic’s ruling elite begun to erode?

Elite theorists argued that regimes rest on several structural pillars. As long as these pillars hold, governments can often withstand significant unrest.

The first is the consent of the ruled. Repression alone is not enough for authoritarian regimes to survive, which is why they also rely on a degree of passive acceptance from society. Citizens may not actively support the system, but as long as most people continue to comply with its rules and institutions, the regime can function.

The second condition is the cohesion of the ruling elite. Stability requires that the groups controlling political, economic, and military power remain broadly united. When elites fragment into rival factions competing for authority, regimes become far more vulnerable to crisis.

A third pillar is the will of the elite to rule. Governing groups must retain the confidence and determination to exercise authority. If leaders begin to hesitate, doubt their legitimacy, or lose the resolve to enforce their rule, the system can quickly weaken.

Control over coercive institutions constitutes another critical element. The loyalty of the military, police, and security services is often decisive. Many revolutions succeed only when these forces fracture, defect, or refuse to repress unrest.

Elite theorists also emphasized the importance of renewal within the ruling class. Political systems that allow new individuals and factions to enter the elite are generally more adaptable. When elites become rigid and closed, they may lose the capacity to respond to social and political change.

Finally, regimes rely on some form of ideological legitimacy, in other words, a narrative that justifies their authority, whether through religion, nationalism, revolutionary ideals, or democratic claims. This narrative helps sustain the belief that the existing order remains valid.

When applied to contemporary Iran, these pillars reveal a system that is under pressure but remains resilient.

First, the consent of the ruled has weakened but has not disappeared. Electoral participation reflects declining public engagement: turnout in the 2021 presidential election fell to about 48.8%, the lowest since the 1979 revolution and barely increased to 49.7% in 2024. At the same time, surveys suggest that the regime retains a limited but durable social base. The American Enterprise Institute estimates that roughly 20–25% of Iran’s population constitutes the core constituency of the Islamic Republic, while survey data from the 2022 unrest (GAMAAN) suggests that a comparable share of the population (around 22%) has participated in street protests against the regime. This combination of a loyal minority and a largely apathetic majority explains how the regime continues to function despite declining legitimacy and periodic waves of social unrest.

Second, elite cohesion remains relatively strong. Although Iran’s ruling class contains different factions (ranging from conservative clerics to technocrats, and from hardliners to reformists), these groups broadly share an interest in preserving the Islamic Republic. Their rivalries rarely escalate into open struggles that threaten the survival of the regime.

Third, the will of the elite to rule remains firm. Key power centers, especially the IRGC and hardline political actors, demonstrate a strong determination to maintain authority. Their political, economic, and institutional interests are deeply tied to the continuation of the existing system. Even as American and Israeli strikes continue to hit Iran, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, keeps insisting that Iranians are not the kind to surrender.

Fourth, control over coercive institutions remains one of the strongest pillars of the Iranian regime. The loyalty of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij militia, and the broader security apparatus has been decisive in suppressing unrest during periods of protest. Unlike during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, when the army refused to fire on demonstrators and declared neutrality, Iran’s contemporary security forces have remained loyal and actively repressed protests, as seen during the January 2026 unrest.

Fifth, elite renewal in Iran exists but remains tightly controlled. New political figures, technocrats, and military actors occasionally rise within the system, yet access to power is largely restricted to individuals who demonstrate loyalty to the Islamic Republic. This controlled circulation is reinforced by the Guardian Council’s power to vet electoral candidates, which frequently disqualifies reformist or independent contenders. In isolation, such restricted elite circulation could weaken the regime by reducing its ability to adapt to political and social change. The continued strength of the other pillars has, however, prevented this rigidity from threatening the system’s survival.

Finally, ideological legitimacy has weakened but persists. While revolutionary ideals resonate less strongly among many citizens, the regime continues to mobilize religious, nationalist, and anti-Western narratives to justify its authority. These themes remain prominent in official discourse, particularly during the current confrontation with the United States and Israel, where references to martyrdom and resistance are used to frame the conflict in religious and historical terms.

Taken together, these six pillars suggest that the Islamic Republic faces significant social pressure but remains structurally resilient. Public legitimacy has clearly weakened and elite renewal remains limited, yet the other foundations of regime survival remain largely intact. Crucially, only one of these pillars lies primarily in the hands of ordinary citizens: the acquiescence of the ruled. The remaining pillars rest with the ruling elite itself. And as long as those elites remain united and the security apparatus stays loyal, widespread public anger alone is unlikely to bring about the fall of the Iranian regime, even in the context of the current war.