The uprising that awakened Lebanon but failed to deliver change

On 17 October 2019, thousands of Lebanese citizens took to the streets across the country in one of the largest popular mobilizations in Lebanon’s modern history. Triggered initially by a proposed $5 tax on WhatsApp calls, the protests quickly expanded into a nationwide rejection of years of political mismanagement, economic decline, corruption, and a failing state. Under the slogan “All of them means all of them,” demonstrators demanded the departure of the entire political establishment and the creation of a new system based on accountability and reform.

Seven years later, however, the legacy of the uprising remains contested. While October 17 succeeded in breaking barriers of fear, creating new political discussions, and challenging traditional power structures, it failed to achieve its central objective of transforming Lebanon’s political system. Instead, some figures and groups that emerged from or benefited politically from the protest movement entered Parliament during the 2022 elections, raising questions about whether the uprising produced meaningful change or merely reshuffled parts of the political landscape.

For three young Lebanese interviewed by The Beiruter, the uprising represented both a historic moment of awakening and a missed opportunity.

A movement without a political roadmap

While Joseph Khoury recognized the economic and social grievances behind the protests, he believed the movement lacked a clear ideological foundation and was uncertain about its ability to produce meaningful results. He also criticized what he considered contradictions between the concept of a revolution and the peaceful nature of the demonstrations.

I did not feel that I belonged to the revolutionary mindset.

For Khoury, the only concrete achievement of October 17 was the resignation of Prime Minister (PM) Saad Hariri’s government shortly after the protests began.

For a government to fall because of people taking to the streets, that is an achievement in Lebanon.

However, he considered that moment the end of the uprising’s effectiveness rather than the beginning of a larger transformation. “After the government resigned, I felt the uprising lost its direction,” he noted.

His doubts increased after the 2022 parliamentary elections, when candidates affiliated with the protest movement won seats as independent representatives. Khoury argued that their subsequent performance reinforced his belief that the movement had not produced the political alternative Lebanon needed and was hoping for.

A moment of mobilization without a clear direction

For Jad Sleilaty, who participated in the October 17 protests, the uprising’s greatest strength was also one of its greatest weaknesses: its spontaneity.

October 17 was very random, both positively and negatively.

On the positive side, he argued that the movement created a rare public space where Lebanese from different backgrounds could meet, exchange ideas, confront political divisions, and bring together perspectives that had long remained within private discussions.

According to Sleilaty, the protests allowed a previously fragmented society to begin transforming its frustrations into political ideas. However, he believed that the movement failed to develop these ideas into a unified political project.

October 17 did not produce a political project, a goal, or a group.

He argued that Lebanese society was not prepared at the time to create an organized alternative capable of replacing the existing order.

The uprising’s legacy remains uncertain, Sleilaty said. It succeeded in laying foundations that could eventually contribute to political change, but it failed in the short term because the country’s political reality remained largely unchanged.

Although the 2022 parliamentary elections brought new independent candidates into Parliament, Sleilaty argued that traditional political forces maintained influence through their established networks and relationships. The faces of power may have changed partially, he said, but many of the mechanisms that shaped Lebanese politics remained intact.

The skepticism of those who watched from outside

Alaa Kanso, who did not participate in the October 17 uprising, viewed the latter’s demands with skepticism from the beginning. While acknowledging the legitimacy of public anger over Lebanon’s deteriorating economic and social conditions, he questioned the movement’s political foundations.

October 17 was not convincing to me in terms of its political project and its slogans.

For Kanso, one of the main weaknesses was the slogan “All of them means all of them,” which he considered too broad and unable to distinguish between different political actors and levels of responsibility. “You cannot hold all political forces responsible in the same way,” he said, highlighting the need to identify specific responsibilities rather than treating the entire political class as one entity.

He also pointed to the fragmentation among opposition groups as a major reason behind the movement’s failure. According to Kanso, different groups participated in October 17 with completely different objectives: some viewed it as a socioeconomic uprising, others as a movement against the president, while others saw it as an opportunity to challenge Hezbollah’s weapons.

As a result, Kanso asserted that

the movement succeeded in uniting people against the existing reality, but failed to unite them around a common alternative and what should come next.

Nevertheless, Kanso acknowledged that October 17 achieved important social and political effects, particularly by expanding freedom of expression and breaking the psychological barrier of fear among citizens. However, he argued that mobilizing people against an existing system is different from building a replacement for it.

A legacy still defined by contradictions

Seven years after October 17, the uprising remains one of Lebanon’s most significant moments of popular mobilization, followed by 14 March 2005. It changed public discourse, challenged traditional political narratives, and encouraged a new generation to engage in political life.

Yet, unlike the Cedar Revolution, which sought and succeeded in achieving the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in April 2005, the October 17 uprising failed to translate its demands into tangible political outcomes. Its central promise, replacing Lebanon’s political system with a more accountable and representative model, remains largely unfulfilled.

The uprising’s history remains defined by this contradiction: it succeeded in bringing Lebanese citizens together against the status quo, but it failed to create the unified vision necessary to replace it. As Lebanon continues to face political and economic challenges, the question remains whether October 17 was a failed revolution or the first step toward a transformation that has yet to materialize.