The wrong traits, the wrong system: Why Lebanon’s leaders fail

Personality Politics and Sectarian Power: How Lebanon’s Confessional System Relies on the Characteristics of Its Leaders

Lebanon’s confessional system is often described as an institutionalized balancing act; a political architecture designed to distribute power among its religious communities and prevent domination by any single group. But beneath that lies a deeper reality: the system functions (or malfunctions) not only because of its structural design, but because of the personalities, priorities, and bargaining styles of the leaders who embody it.  Institutions do not simply constrain leaders; instead, leaders often shape the institutions through personal authority. Understanding how the confessional system operates requires examining the characteristics of sectarian leaders and the patterns of interaction that bind them together.

Lebanon’s power-sharing formula is built on the assumption that each community possesses recognized representatives capable of articulating the interests of their sect. But these "representatives" are not produced by democratic selection alone. They emerge from elite families, militia-era legacies, business networks, clerical endorsements, and personal charisma.

Zaim-style politics dominates much of Lebanon’s leadership landscape, where leaders act as patrons who distribute resources and provide protection to their sect. Their authority is further reinforced by historical legitimacy, with many positions inherited or justified through past conflicts, civil war legacies, or resistance narratives that continue to hold political weight. In addition to this, these leaders operate as socioeconomic brokers, mediating access to hospitals, schools, and public sector employment, thereby sustaining networks of dependency that entrench their power.

Personal traits as drivers of inter-sectarian bargaining

Because Lebanon’s confessional system is built on constant negotiation, the personality of each leader, whether conciliatory, confrontational, pragmatic, ideological, or opportunistic, directly shapes how political deadlocks are resolved. Lebanese politics thus becomes a form of elite psychology, where political stability depends on the personalities in the room rather than rules on paper.

Lebanon’s major political events, from cabinet formation crises to presidential elections and security breakdowns, can often be traced to the personal relationships among political elites. Rivalries within the same sect frequently paralyze institutions even more than cross-sect tensions, revealing the extent to which individual competition shapes governance. At the same time, temporary alliances between leaders across sects can unexpectedly unblock political stalemates. Ultimately, the degree of trust among these key figures determines whether agreements are upheld or abandoned.

Interdependence: Leaders Need Each Other to Survive

Interdependence is perhaps the most paradoxical feature of Lebanon’s confessional system: while leaders publicly claim to defend their sect from others, they are structurally reliant on one another to survive. No sect can govern alone. A Maronite president cannot be elected without Sunni and Shi‘a approval; a Sunni prime minister cannot govern without support from Shi‘a and Christian allies; and Shi‘a leaders, despite their strong organizational bases, still require cross-sect acceptance to legitimize their influence. This built-in dependency forces political figures to build shifting cross-sect alliances, cultivate personal channels of communication even with rivals, and negotiate continuously behind closed doors to maintain a fragile balance. The system’s functionality rests on leaders managing these relationships over relying on constitutional frameworks.

Although the constitution sets out each office’s powers, it is unwritten understandings and informal pacts that shape most major decisions. The distribution of ministries, security appointments, electoral alliances, policy vetoes, and even the mechanisms for resolving national crises are governed by these informal bargains. This reliance on tacit arrangements places even greater weight on leaders’ personalities, further entrenching elite-driven politics at the expense of institutional governance.

Consociation democracy generating incompetent leaders

Makdisi and Marktanner (2009) argue that Lebanon’s consociation democracy has not succeeded in preventing the outbreak of prolonged civil conflict or recurring political crises. Rather than mitigating social and political divisions, consociationalism in Lebanon has reinforced the very inequalities it was designed to overcome, both vertically between social classes and horizontally across sectarian groups. The country’s persistent social segmentation has rendered it particularly vulnerable to internal conflict, a vulnerability further exacerbated by external interventions. Empirical evidence indicates that Lebanon exhibits extreme inequality relative to its level of democratic and economic development, and this inequality significantly contributes to the likelihood of armed conflict. The authors contend that moving toward a fully consolidated democracy, beyond the constraints of sectarian power-sharing, would help reduce the country’s conflict potential (Makdisi & Marktanner, 2009).

Furthermore, Salloukh (2024) highlights that Lebanon’s postcolonial and postwar elite deliberately instrumentalized consociationalism to capture state institutions and resources, thereby obstructing state-building and perpetuating sectarian politics. Unlike in classic European consociation experiences, the Lebanese sectarian elite monopolized the institutions and political economy of the state in the name of power sharing, denying the state any role in mediating interest groups. This strategy effectively blocked the possibility of de-pillarization and de-consociation, ensuring that sectarian divisions remained entrenched and central to political life.

Consequently, the leaders who benefited from Lebanon’s consociation arrangements shaped the political landscape in ways that normalized personalistic bargaining and embedding these character traits as enduring features of the country’s political heritage.

What kind of leaders does Lebanon need

If Lebanon were ever to move toward accountable and effective governance, it would require leaders who exhibit traits such as humility, courage, public-oriented conduct, and a form of patriotism that extends beyond sectarian boundaries. These characteristics are not merely idealized virtues but practical necessities for navigating a deeply divided political landscape. Humility allows leaders to reduce zero-sum behavior, accept institutional constraints, share decision-making, and recognize the limits of their mandate, thereby facilitating compromise and ensuring continuity in a consociation system. Courage involves the willingness to challenge clientelist expectations, resist pressures from internal sectarian networks or external patrons, and disrupt informal practices that obstruct institutional consolidation. Public-oriented conduct is equally essential, as it redirects attention toward strengthening state institutions rather than reinforcing personal or communal patronage networks. Patriotism, in this context, is expressed as a behavioral commitment to the state itself, prioritizing the durability of national institutions over the short-term gains of sectarian networks and resisting loyalty to foreign patrons or regional sponsors. Together, these traits represent the behavioral qualities necessary for institutional reform in a system that otherwise defaults to personalistic and sect-centric governance.

The issue is not that Lebanon merely “lacks good leaders.” Rather, the confessional system structurally encourages and perpetuates specific types of leadership traits that are incompatible with institutional reform. Leaders who might operate with humility, courage, or public-oriented behavior face an environment that penalizes these approaches.

Until the underlying system changes, the leadership profiles it generates will remain largely stable. Reform, therefore, cannot rely on individual transformation alone; it requires altering the structures that define what types of leaders can rise, survive, and govern effectively within Lebanon’s political landscape.