Trump’s war: From quick strikes to endless conflict

“Wars begin when you will, but they do not end when you please.” More than five centuries later, Machiavelli’s warning may prove especially true for Donald Trump. Having campaigned on ending “endless wars” and avoiding new military entanglements abroad, the U.S. president now risks becoming trapped in the very kind of prolonged conflict he once vowed to avoid.

His aversion to endless wars does not mean Trump has shied away from foreign escalation. During his first administration, he approved the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani on Iraqi soil and ordered missile strikes on Syria’s Shayrat Air Base. The start of his second term has followed a similar pattern: Washington has provided intelligence support enabling Ukrainian strikes deeper inside Russian territory, while U.S. forces have carried out a series of attacks on suspected cartel vessels in the Caribbean and the Pacific as part of a broader military campaign against narco-terrorists.

Rather than large-scale interventions, Trump has consistently favored limited, high-impact operations consisting of short strikes against specific targets designed to deliver a clear strategic message without opening the door to a broader war. The model is simple: American power is deployed swiftly, a decisive blow is delivered, and forces withdraw before the enemy can meaningfully respond. The result is a clean operation with limited casualties, triumphant headlines, medal ceremonies, and a story ready-made for Hollywood. The operation that captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January 2026 arguably represented the purest expression of that approach.

Unfortunately for Donald Trump, his excursion in Iran, for the moment, looks like the exact opposite of that model. What was supposed to be a quick decapitation strike followed by a massive uprising from the Iranian population has transformed into a slugfest where both sides attempt to batter the other into submission.

Ballistic-missile production sites, buried deep underground, must be targeted by B-2 bombers. But those sites are protected by air-defense systems, requiring F-35s to move in first and suppress them. Those air-defense batteries, however, are themselves under the coverage of long-range radars, forcing ships carrying Tomahawk missiles to move closer to the front to eliminate them. And once those ships are deployed, they too must resupply… and the cycle continues, all while under heavy Iranian bombardment.

Even with thousands of targets destroyed, each passing day pulls more resources into the conflict, more money is spent, and more lives are lost. Compounded by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the rise in oil prices, and their economic impact, it has become abundantly clear to Trump that this war needed to end yesterday.

Nevertheless, the Iranians are refusing to play ball. They have obstinately refused to surrender or accept defeat. Bombing after bombing, escalation after escalation, nothing seems to budge the regime from its position. They have made their choice: Total victory, or they will go down with Iran as it burns to the ground.

If Trump wants to end this war, he faces two options: retreat from the fight or break one of his core promises. Either “solution” would be politically disastrous ahead of the midterms and would seriously tarnish his reputation.

Yet, luck favors the bold, and boldness has always been one of Trump’s defining traits. It now appears that Trump may have an opportunity to have his cake and eat it too, and that opportunity is called Hezbollah.

A pivot toward confronting Hezbollah, even while scaling down direct operations against Iran, could allow Washington to claim a strategic victory without deepening the war with Tehran itself. Crucially, such a campaign would likely involve no American boots on the ground, with the United States limiting its role to intelligence support and targeted airstrikes. Israel already possesses the forces, intelligence networks, and operational experience necessary to carry out the bulk of any sustained confrontation with Hezbollah.

For Washington, the political optics of such an arrangement would be convenient. By avoiding a large American ground deployment, the White House could argue that the United States is not fighting Israel’s war but rather supporting an ally confronting a long-standing regional threat. At the same time, American coordination and leadership would underline the hierarchy of the alliance, presenting Israel as acting in concert with Washington rather than the other way around.

Recent events could also help shape the narrative. The shooting outside a synagogue in Michigan, allegedly linked to relatives of a Hezbollah commander, together with the enduring memory of the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, could be used to argue in Washington that confronting Hezbollah is not merely a regional matter but a question of American national security.

The Lebanese dimension could also work in Trump’s favor. It is hardly controversial that large segments of the Lebanese public resent the militia’s dominance and would view its downfall as a long-awaited liberation. Such an operation would come with the added bonus that it would allow Trump to cast himself as the unlikely savior who delivered it.

From Tehran’s perspective, the destruction of Hezbollah would undoubtedly be a strategic setback. Yet it would not necessarily translate into an immediate propaganda defeat. The Islamic Republic has historically demonstrated a remarkable ability to transform losses into narratives of sacrifice and resistance.

Should the organization suffer catastrophic losses, Iranian leaders could seek to reframe the event through a familiar ideological lens. Hezbollah could be cast as a martyr whose sacrifice ensured the survival of the Islamic Republic itself, a narrative deeply resonant within Shiite political theology, where martyrdom and eventual return remain central motifs.

Such a narrative might even serve a domestic purpose. In recent years, Iranian protesters have increasingly questioned why their country continues to devote vast resources to regional proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and elsewhere while many Iranians struggle with economic hardship at home. The loss of Hezbollah could allow the Iranian leadership to argue that those sacrifices were not made in vain, even as it potentially recalibrates its regional strategy.

A confrontation with Hezbollah could offer Trump a rare strategic convergence. Washington could claim a decisive blow against Iran’s most powerful proxy without deepening the war with Tehran itself. Israel would see its most dangerous northern adversary weakened. Many Lebanese would welcome the fall of a militia that has long dominated the country’s politics, while Iran could still frame Hezbollah’s destruction as a story of martyrdom rather than defeat. In such a scenario, nearly everyone would find a narrative to claim victory, except Hezbollah.

The Party of God should therefore hope its name proves prophetic, because against Trump, even divine protection may not be enough.