Turkey and Israel: Tension redrawing the balance of Influence in Gaza and Syria

As attention shifts to “day-after” arrangements in Gaza, tension between Turkey and Israel has climbed to levels unseen in more than a decade and a half, despite their intertwined economic and security interests. Ankara is seeking a prominent role in the post-war regional landscape. At the same time, Tel Aviv rejects any Turkish military involvement inside the Strip, a stance the Israeli foreign minister affirmed hours ago: “We will not allow Turkish forces in Gaza under any pretext”.

These opposing positions bring back into focus a checkered history between the two countries: from Ankara’s recognition of Israel in 1949, to close security cooperation in the 1990s, to the breakdown of trust after the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, and then to recurring rifts with each war in Gaza. The relationship has oscillated between cautious cooperation and open antagonism.

The Turkish political analyst and writer Mohammed Zahid-Gül argues that Ankara’s position on military participation in Gaza “is often misunderstood”, explaining that Turkey is not seeking to deploy combat troops to the Strip because “the Trump peace plan is practically inapplicable and lacks a genuine vision for the day after in Gaza”.

Zahid-Gül says: “Talk of Turkish participation arose within American scenarios and at Trump’s request. But the question is: what exactly would be asked of Turkey the day after? Would it be expected to disarm Hamas or confront it militarily? That is illogical and contradicts Turkey’s principled stance”.

He adds that Ankara is ready to support any genuine, lasting peace project, but it will not be part of a plan that is “fragile and illogical”. He views Israel’s objection to a Turkish role as reflecting a contradiction within the international approach, stressing that “Turkey will not engage in any arrangements that fail to guarantee a just and comprehensive peace”.

Zahid-Gül also notes that the current war of words between Ankara and Tel Aviv “is nothing new”, seeing it as part of domestic political messaging in both countries: “Netanyahu uses escalation with Turkey to rally the Israeli public ahead of elections, just as Erdoğan has used pro-Hamas rhetoric at home calling its fighters ‘mujahideen’ or ‘heroes of the War of Independence’. These are electoral messages more than strategic positions”.

By contrast, Jerusalem-based political analyst Majdi Halabi says Israel has settled its position on the presence of Turkish forces in Gaza. Ongoing deliberations indicate that if Ankara participates at all, “its role would be confined to the periphery or contact zones, not inside the Strip itself”.

Halabi adds: “The United States is keen for Turkey to have some role, but not a security or military one, rather an economic and developmental role. Washington prefers Ankara to contribute to reconstruction, not to security enforcement”.

According to Halabi, Ankara may trade away its security ambitions in Gaza for “a substantial share of reconstruction projects”, given Turkish firms’ significant expertise in construction and infrastructure.

Turkey will seek contracts financed mainly by Gulf states and the European Union, recognizing that this path is more effective and stable than entering into a security or military clash with Israel.

He concludes that the economic file will gradually substitute for political escalation, allowing Turkey to leave its mark on reconstruction. In contrast, security files remain in the hands of the United States and Arab partners.

Syria: an extension of tension and a theatre of security calculations

Experts agree that the Turkey–Israel dispute is not confined to Gaza; it extends to the Syrian arena, where their interests intersect in complex ways.

According to Mohammed Zahid-Gül, Israel’s expanding role in Syria “is generating broad tension”, not only between Tel Aviv and Ankara, but across the region. He adds that the region faces “a new reality: with Russian and Iranian roles relatively receding, the Syrian theatre has effectively come under the influence of three principal players, the United States, Turkey, and Israel, each with a different agenda.”

He argues that Israel seeks to “keep Syria weak and divided”. At the same time, Turkey aims to “build a stable, strong Syrian state capable of maintaining security within its territory”. This, he says, has made the Turkish Israeli rift “deeper than ever no longer merely political or ideological, but primarily security- and military-related”.

Zahid-Gül points out that Israel rejects any Turkish military presence in Syria, something Ankara views as a threat to its national security because “Syria is Turkey’s soft underbelly and directly affects its security and economic interests”. He rules out a direct military confrontation between the two countries yet insists that “understanding without a comprehensive peace plan is impossible”, since Turkey “will not accept a divided Syria or one dominated by groups linked to Israel”.

From the Israeli side, Majdi Halabi sees an internal split in Tel Aviv over Turkey’s role in Syria:

“Israel’s security establishment does not view the Turkish presence as an immediate threat and believes it can be managed through quiet channels, whereas the political leadership fears Ankara seeks to fill the Iranian vacuum in Syria, raising long-term strategic concerns”.

He says attempts are underway to revive old channels through informal mediation: “There were preliminary talks in Baku, and they are expected to resume soon in Ankara or Tel Aviv, with U.S. mediation, to delineate spheres of influence and stabilize balances within Syria”.

Halabi notes that some Israeli circles speak of an undeclared division of influence: “Israeli sway in the south, Turkish sway in the north, while Damascus and its environs fall under Arab political influence like Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari in particular”.

He adds that Israel views the current Syrian regime as a “transitional phase”, and that any forthcoming shifts in Syria’s power structure will push Israel toward broader coordination with Turkey, “not out of affection for Ankara, but as part of a balance-of-power calculus vis-à-vis Iran and Russia”.

A fragile balance and open-ended bets

Between the Turkish and Israeli positions, the United States remains the actor allocating roles and setting boundaries. According to Western diplomatic sources, Washington is working on a three-part formula for Gaza: U.S. political and security oversight; Qatari funding and humanitarian aid; and Egyptian operational coordination through the crossings.

Turkey, meanwhile, finds itself in the position of a “marginalized actor” invited to take part in reconstruction but not decision-making. Israel seeks to cement its role as the dominant regional power, leveraging support from U.S. President Donald Trump.

Ultimately, the current crisis shows that the rift between Ankara and Tel Aviv has moved beyond rhetoric into a broader reconfiguration of influence in the Middle East. Gaza is no longer just a battlefield, nor is Syria merely a front line; both have become mirrors of a contest of wills -between a rising Turkey and an Israel anchored on the American defensive line- at a time when the map of the region is being redrawn once again.