Turkey and Israel: The dilemmas of influence in Syria

The Middle East, and Syria in particular, is undergoing a historic transformation not seen since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the early twentieth century. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rise of a transitional government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa were not simply a change of leadership in Damascus. They amounted to a political earthquake that shattered long-standing regional balances.

At the heart of this volatile moment lies the Turkish–Israeli relationship, now one of the most complex and sensitive regional files, especially inside Syria. After decades of fluctuation between a “strategic alliance” in the 1990s and diplomatic tension in more recent years, Ankara and Tel Aviv have entered a phase of direct friction and competition for influence.

Syria is no longer a secondary arena for the Iranian-Israeli conflict. It has become a frontline where two competing doctrines collide. Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine views southward expansion as an existential requirement for national security. Israel’s “Iron Wall” doctrine, by contrast, treats any permanent military presence by a major regional power along its northern border as an unacceptable threat.

From alliance to rupture

Historically, Turkish-Israeli relations were never emotional. They were built on hard security and geopolitical interests, which began to erode as Turkey’s identity changed with the rise of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP).

In the 1990s, Turkey, then under secular military guardianship, and Israel, seeking partners in the Islamic world, shared an interest in countering the regime of Hafez al-Assad. Damascus supported the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and facilitated Iranian influence from Syria into Lebanon. Israel viewed Turkey as a buffer against both Syrian and Iranian power, believing that Turkish and Israeli security were closely linked and that a weakened Syria benefited both.

With Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rise to power, Ankara adopted a new foreign policy based on “strategic depth” and “zero problems” with its Arab and Islamic neighbours. This shift required distancing Turkey from Israel and drawing closer to Bashar al-Assad’s Syria.

The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident marked a decisive break. Israel was transformed in the Turkish political imagination from a partner into a perpetrator after nine Turkish activists were killed when Israeli forces boarded the Mavi Marmara, part of the Freedom Flotilla seeking to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza.

The 2023 Gaza war ended any remaining prospects for rapprochement. Erdoğan went beyond condemnation, adopting rhetoric aligned with Hamas, severing trade and diplomatic relations in November 2024, and describing Israel as a terrorist state.

Syria as the main arena

During the Syrian war, Ankara and Jerusalem briefly shared an interest in removing Assad and weakening Iran, partly through parallel engagement with Moscow. But once the regime effectively collapsed at the end of 2024, deep divisions emerged.

Turkey seeks a Syria that functions as a strategic backyard: free of Kurdish organisations, aligned with Turkish regional interests, and governed by a leadership loyal to Ankara. To that end, Turkey moved quickly to fill the military vacuum by signing defence agreements with the interim government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, including plans to rehabilitate sensitive military infrastructure.

Israel viewed these steps as crossing red lines. Its preferred outcome is a border-stable Syria with no strong army and no foreign military influence, Iranian or Turkish, while keeping southern Syria as a buffer zone.

Turkey began transforming Syrian military airfields into strategic hubs serving two goals: combating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the east, and creating a balance with Israel that would limit Israeli air dominance.

Intelligence assessments indicate that Ankara planned to deploy medium-range air defence systems at the T-4 airbase to establish an air shield over central Syria, restricting Israeli operations. The base was also intended to host armed drones such as the Bayraktar Akıncı and TB2, whose range and precision would place Israel’s borders within reach in minutes.

Turkey also began preparing the Tadmur (Palmyra) military airport, located near major oil and gas transport routes, signalling leverage over the economic resources of the new Syrian government. Technical and military teams were dispatched to assess damage and install early-warning radar systems.

In northern Aleppo, Turkish forces converted Menagh Airport near Azaz into an advanced military base, upgrading runways and building hangars for helicopters and drones. Its proximity to the Turkish border made it relatively secure.

Israel responded before these plans could be completed. The Israeli Air Force carried out strikes on airbases and military sites potentially usable by Turkey, particularly T-4, delivering clear messages that it would not tolerate a Turkish version of Iranian influence. The equation became explicit: any radar or air defence system activated in Syria would be destroyed.

Beit Jinn and proxy warfare

Beyond airbases, the November 2025 Beit Jinn incident exposed a deeper layer of conflict involving proxy warfare and Islamist networks. Israeli special forces carried out an operation inside Syrian territory in the town of Beit Jinn near the Golan Heights, aiming to arrest or eliminate a cell planning attacks against Israel.

The operation resulted in 13 deaths, including civilians and fighters, and left six Israeli soldiers wounded. According to available information, the group involved was not a random jihadist cell, but a Lebanese-Syrian network linked to the Islamic Group, the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel argues that the group exploited the collapse of the Syrian state to revive cells in border villages, benefiting from local support and conservative religious environments.

Turkey’s connection to this file is primarily ideological. Under AKP rule, Ankara positions itself as the leading regional patron of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamic Group in Lebanon and Syria shares this ideological affiliation and views Erdoğan as a symbol of a broader Sunni political project. However, there is no conclusive evidence that Turkish officers directly command these cells.

Ankara condemned the Israeli raid as a war crime and a violation of sovereignty, reinforcing Israeli perceptions that Turkey acts as a political sponsor for such groups and uses international legal language to shield its proxies.

“The enemy of my enemy”

One of the region’s most striking paradoxes emerged when Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem called on the “Islamic nation” to support resistance in Lebanon, clearly hinting at a potential Turkish role as a regional counterweight to Israel. These appeals came as Iranian support faced logistical constraints due to disrupted routes in Syria and a naval blockade.

Ankara responded swiftly. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared that Turkey stands with Lebanon and would not accept continued aggression. From Turkey’s perspective, Hezbollah’s ongoing operations serve its interests by tying down Israeli forces and preventing Israel from reshaping Syria or threatening Turkish positions there.

Turkey is also attempting to fill the vacuum left by Iran, presenting itself as a regional “big brother” that transcends Sunni-Shia divisions. While direct military support is unlikely, Israel has accused Turkey of allowing cash transfers through its airports to Beirut, facilitating funding for Hezbollah and Hamas via the Turkish financial system and cryptocurrencies, and turning a blind eye to smuggling networks operating through Syrian territory.

Possible paths forward

Amid escalating tensions, Russia, despite its declining influence in Damascus, is attempting to act as a safety valve. Moscow understands that a full-scale Turkish–Israeli confrontation in Syria would destroy what remains of its interests, including its bases in Hmeimim and Tartus.

Russia is therefore working with Damascus on a new security framework that would revive and expand the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. Leaks suggest a proposal aligned with US-led talks between Damascus and Jerusalem, dividing southern Syria into multiple security zones, some fully demilitarised, banning heavy weapons and military aviation across areas including Daraa, Suwayda, and parts of the Damascus countryside, under joint Russian-Israeli monitoring.

Moscow also proposes deploying Russian military police along the Golan border to prevent Islamist groups or Turkish proxies from approaching the fence. Israel has cautiously welcomed this idea, preferring a controlled Russian presence to chaos or a politicised Turkish one.

Three main scenarios now appear likely. The first is escalation and attrition, widely considered the most probable, as no actor is willing to relinquish its gains. Indicators include continued Israeli airstrikes, territorial advances, and rising Islamist activity in southern Syria.

The second is a cooling phase driven by Russian and American mediation, imposing new rules of engagement to prevent a wider war.

The third is a negotiated arrangement allowing Turkish presence in Aleppo and Idlib in exchange for strict guarantees clearing central and southern Syria of strategic capabilities such as missiles and drones. Turkey may accept such a deal to prioritise the Kurdish issue and secure political or economic concessions elsewhere.

The illusion of reconciliation

Any talk of reconciliation or a return to the former Turkish–Israeli alliance borders on fantasy under the current leadership. The ideological divide and deep mistrust, especially after the Gaza war and Turkey’s support for Hamas, mean that any rapprochement would be tactical and temporary, not strategic.

Post-Assad Syria is reshaping the map of influence in the Middle East. Turkey, seeking to revive its regional stature, now faces Israel, which is fighting to preserve its existential military edge. The struggle is no longer about who governs Damascus, but about who controls Syria’s land and skies. Between Ankara’s ambitions, Tel Aviv’s security fears, and fragile attempts at containment, Syria and the wider region remain hostage to power calculations that could spiral out of control at any moment.