When militias rule, treaties fail: Revisiting the May 17 agreement

The memory of the 17 May 1983 agreement remains one of the most controversial episodes in Lebanon’s modern political archive. Its significance today does not derive from defending or condemning the agreement itself, but from the structural question it forces us to confront: What conditions must exist for Lebanon to negotiate any agreement on its behalf, and who possesses the legitimate authority to do so?

The period in which the agreement was negotiated illustrates the problem with stark clarity. Lebanon in 1982–83 was a state formally engaged in diplomacy while, in reality, large parts of its territory and decision-making capacity were controlled by foreign armies and domestic militias. Israeli forces occupied broad areas of the country; Syrian troops controlled others; Palestinian organizations operated autonomously; and Lebanese militias exercised parallel authority in their respective zones. In such an environment, the Lebanese state entered negotiations that it could neither fully enforce nor fully defend, precisely because it lacked exclusive control over force and territory. This moment underscores a lesson that remains relevant: no state can enter binding negotiations when multiple armed actors operate outside its authority, and no agreement can succeed unless the state alone holds the monopoly of legitimate force.

By 1982–83, Lebanon was experiencing the cumulative effects of a war shaped increasingly by regional dynamics. The Israeli invasion of 1982 produced far-reaching consequences: the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut in September 1982 and from Tripoli by December 1983, the first direct military confrontation between Syria and Israel since 1973, the collapse of much of Syria’s air force within days, and a shifting political balance by shrinking the PLO and Syrian political influence that enabled the election of Bashir Gemayel; and after his assassination, his brother Amine; to the presidency. These regional developments brought the major powers back into the Lebanese arena: the United States sought a comprehensive settlement, the Soviet Union strengthened its support for Syria, and a multinational force was deployed in Beirut to stabilize the situation.

It was in this environment that Lebanon, Israel, and the United States undertook 35 negotiation sessions in Khalde, Kiryat Shmona, and Netanya. Through American shuttle diplomacy, first led by Philip Habib and later by Secretary of State George Shultz, the agreement attempted to engineer a synchronized withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces while restoring Lebanese sovereignty. The agreement included a twelve-week Israeli withdrawal, the establishment of a Security Region with defined Lines A and B, mechanisms for integrating local armed units into the Lebanese Army, restrictions on heavy weapons, and the creation of a Joint Liaison Committee with U.S. participation to supervise implementation.

Phases of the Negotiations: A Step-by-Step Attempt at a Settlement

The negotiations passed through three main phases, each revealing deeper structural weaknesses:

1.     Phase One (December 1982 - January 1983): Defining the Framework

This phase focused on outlining basic principles: withdrawal, security arrangements, and normalization. Lebanon insisted on sovereignty, while Israel emphasized security guarantees. The Americans; still hoping to maintain strategic balance with Syria; attempted to reconcile incompatible demands but avoided direct confrontation with Damascus.

2.     Phase Two (February - March 1983): Formulating the Security Arrangements

This was the most technically complex stage. Discussions centered on the “Security Region,” Lines A and B, and the modalities of Israeli withdrawal. Israel pushed for broad security prerogatives in the South, effectively seeking a long-term influence through local militias. Lebanon, seeking to avoid any sovereignty derogation, tried to limit security cooperation to monitoring and information-sharing.
The gap was never bridged.

3.     Phase Three (April - May 1983): Final Bargaining and the Last-Minute Annexes

When negotiations reached their final stage, Israel insisted on written guarantees linking its withdrawal to the simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian forces. The U.S., under pressure to deliver a diplomatic success, crafted ambiguous formulations; most notably, the secret annex between Washington and Tel Aviv that committed the U.S. to securing Syrian withdrawal.
This annex, hailed by Israel as a victory, was the fatal flaw. Lebanon was negotiating the withdrawal of one occupying army, only to discover that a second occupying power held veto power over implementation.

Whether these terms were ideal or flawed is a separate debate. What matters analytically is that the state remained the only recognized negotiating authority. The Cabinet had already approved the contents of the agreement on 14 May 1983 and authorized the head of the Lebanese negotiating delegation, Dr. Antoine Fattal, to sign it when appropriate and to seek Parliament’s opinion. Parliament later granted the government the authority to conclude the treaty in its 14 June 1983 session, where 65 MPs voted in favor, 2 opposed it, 4 abstained, and 19 were absent. Finally, the presidency ratified the agreement - an unusual alignment of constitutional institutions during a period of fragmentation.

Why the Agreement Failed: Structural and Political Dynamics

Scholars and observers highlight several additional factors for failure:

The U.S. over-promised and under-delivered. Washington assured Israel that it could pressure Syria into withdrawing but lacked both the tools and the willingness to confront Damascus militarily.

Syria held the decisive veto. From the first day of the negotiations, Syria declared that any agreement excluding Damascus was illegitimate. Hafez al-Assad mobilized every political and military lever; from the PSP to Amal; to ensure the treaty’s collapse.

Yet the agreement contained a structural weakness: the secret annex tying Israeli withdrawal to Syrian withdrawal. This “built-in paralysis” rendered the agreement virtually impossible to implement, since Syria categorically refused any arrangement equating its presence in Lebanon with that of Israel. As soon as the agreement was signed, Damascus moved to consolidate its influence militarily and politically.

On the ground, Syrian-aligned militias such as Amal and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) mobilized to undermine state authority and block implementation. The PSP–Amal offensive of 1983–84 weakened the Lebanese Army, fractured the government, and made it impossible for Beirut to enforce the agreement’s security requirements or control the designated zones in the South. At the same time, Israel entrenched its “security belt,” further complicating the state’s ability to assume exclusive authority.

Another decisive development was the bombing of the Multinational Force on 23 October 1983, which killed 299 American and French servicemen and precipitated the U.S. withdrawal in early 1984. With the departure of its primary sponsor, the agreement lost the external backing necessary for its implementation. By March 1984, the agreement was formally abrogated, and Lebanon returned to a fragmented political landscape shaped by competing militias, declining state authority, and rising Syrian dominance.

The collapse of the May 17 agreement therefore represents more than the failure of a diplomatic document. It reveals the consequences of attempting to negotiate national agreements in the absence of unified territorial control and exclusive state authority over armed force. Lebanon could not implement the treaty because it did not possess the means to do so: not militarily, not politically, and not territorially. As a result, decisions of war and peace have often been driven by regional agendas rather than Lebanese national interest, while the human and economic costs continue to fall on Lebanese civilians.

Lesson Learned

The lesson learned from May 17 is thus clear and structural, not political: disarming all militias, eliminating parallel armed structures, and re-establishing full state authority are not ideological positions; they are prerequisites for any enforceable agreement. Without this foundation, Lebanon remains a venue for regional bargaining rather than a sovereign actor capable of shaping its own future.