Who is financing Syria’s return?

When reports surfaced earlier this month that JPMorgan was working alongside Gulf lenders on a proposed $7 billion financing package to support infrastructure projects in Syria, the  proposed deal became one of the clearest indications yet that international commercial finance was beginning to return to the country after years of isolation. Days later, French President Emmanuel Macron became the first major Western leader to visit Damascus since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Accompanied by senior executives from leading French companies, his visit underscored that governments are competing not only for diplomatic influence in post-Assad Syria, but also for a role in its economic recovery.

The challenge facing Syria is enormous. The World Bank estimates the country's reconstruction needs exceed $216 billion, making foreign investment central to President Ahmed al-Sharaa's economic agenda. Yet attracting capital is only the beginning. The greater test will be whether Syria can build the institutions, financial system and private sector needed to sustain it.

Positioning for reconstruction

Much of the recent attention on Syria's economic reopening has focused on the proposed $7 billion financing package, but the announcement is significant for reasons beyond its headline figure.

According to Bloomberg, the proposed financing package would support projects undertaken by Qatar's Power International Holding, a Qatari-based conglomerate founded by Syrian-Qatari entrepreneurs Moutaz and Ramez Al-Khayyat. Rather than funding those projects directly, banks are expected to syndicate the loan, spreading the risk among multiple lenders while Qatar National Bank acts as the principal guarantor.

For David Butter, an associate fellow at Chatham House specializing in Syria's political economy, the package represents an important milestone precisely because it reflects commercial finance rather than humanitarian assistance.

"This transaction represents the first significant financing facility extended in support of a post-Assad development initiative," he told The Beiruter.

At the same time, Butter cautions that the flurry of announcements should not be mistaken for evidence that reconstruction is already underway.

Memoranda of understanding signal intent, but infrastructure projects still require years of planning and regulatory approvals, and lenders must believe they can generate commercial returns.

"When you ask what is actually happening day-to-day inside the Syrian economy and what is genuinely driving growth, there's still something of an information desert," he said.

There is simply not enough reliable public information to explain how the economy is functioning beneath all of these headline announcements.

Although widely portrayed as financing Syria's reconstruction, the reported borrower is Power International Holding rather than the Syrian government, meaning lenders are financing a private company responsible for specific infrastructure projects.

Butter said the identity of the borrower changes how the transaction should be understood. Rather than evaluating Syria's economy as a whole, lenders are assessing the commercial viability of individual infrastructure projects. Whether the financing ultimately succeeds will depend on whether those investments generate sufficient returns to repay the loan.

A new investment map

The financing package is only one part of a broader realignment of foreign investment in Syria.

Speaking to The Beiruter, Samir Aita, president of the Circle of Arab Economists, said the emerging investment landscape illustrates both the opportunities and the limitations of Syria's economic reopening. While President Ahmed al-Sharaa's government has simplified investment procedures and sought to attract private capital, many of the largest opportunities remain concentrated among a relatively narrow group of investors.

Energy has attracted some of the largest commitments. Power International Holding has secured contracts spanning electricity generation and natural gas infrastructure. In June 2026, the Syrian Petroleum Company signed an agreement with U.S.-based ConocoPhillips and energy company Novaterra to develop multiple gas fields and increase production from existing sites. Chevron also signed a memorandum of understanding in February 2026 with Power International Holding and the Syrian Petroleum Company to explore offshore energy opportunities in the eastern Mediterranean.

Other investors have targeted sectors expected to underpin a broader economic recovery.

Kuwait's telecommunications operator Zain secured a 20-year license in late June to operate in Syria, acquiring a 75% stake in MTN Syria's existing network, infrastructure and operations, while the Syrian government will hold the remaining 25%. Further investment has been concentrated in northern Syria, where Turkish and Syrian-Turkish business networks have expanded manufacturing, warehousing, logistics and cross-border commerce following years of economic integration during the conflict.

According to Aita, however, the success of Syria's investment strategy will be measured less by the number of agreements announced than by how many ultimately become completed projects.

“A further concern is the pattern of high-profile MOU announcements that have subsequently failed to translate into concrete commitments,” Aita said.

This dynamic erodes investor confidence and risks undermining the credibility of the government's economic reform agenda.

For international lenders, credibility is built through completed projects and predictable rules, not ambitious announcements. Ultimately, attracting capital depends on building an economy investors are willing to trust.

Investment follows institutions

Reconstruction creates two distinct investment questions.

The first is commercial. Will a power plant generate enough electricity to earn revenue? Will an airport attract sufficient passenger traffic? Will a logistics corridor carry enough freight to justify the investment?

The second is institutional. How are disputes resolved? Can profits be repatriated? Will contracts still be honored five years from now?

Butter argues that the commercial questions are unavoidable.

"People look at Syria and see a country that has suffered years of war and underinvestment,” he said.

There is clearly enormous reconstruction potential, but no one is going to commit substantial capital unless they believe they'll be repaid.

For Aita, that confidence depends as much on institutions as economics.

Since taking office, al-Sharaa's government has presented Syria as a market-oriented economy open to private investment. It has simplified parts of the administrative process for businesses, established bilateral business councils with foreign partners and promoted investment opportunities through the Syrian Investment Authority. The U.S. State Department-backed Investor's Handbook, published in April 2026, similarly describes a country attempting to replace comprehensive sanctions with an investment framework centered on foreign ownership, simpler investment procedures and incentives for strategic projects, while acknowledging that limited access to international banking services and regulatory uncertainty remain significant obstacles.

Aita argues those reforms do not yet answer the questions international investors ask before committing long-term capital. Syria has yet to publish much of the financial information investors rely on, while the rules governing privatizations, major licenses and contract awards remain insufficiently transparent.

Butter, meanwhile, believes the discussion should not focus exclusively on foreign investment. It must also consider the domestic actors who will ultimately participate in Syria's reconstruction.

"When we think about external investors, it's equally important to ask which Syrian actors will actually participate.  What constitutes the Syrian public and private sector today?" he asked.

Years of conflict reshaped Syria's business landscape. Some companies relocated abroad, others survived through informal networks, and many sectors became disconnected from the formal banking system. As reconstruction begins, investors are evaluating not only projects, but also the businesses, institutions and partners with whom they will ultimately be investing.

Rebuilding an economy, not simply infrastructure

Among the institutions investors will ultimately rely on, none may be more important than Syria's financial system.

Syria's banking sector entered the post-Assad period severely weakened by sanctions, inflation and financial isolation. Aita argues that wartime practices have further reinforced reliance on cash-based transactions rather than rebuilding formal financial institutions, citing the expansion of the Sham Cash payment platform as one example of how informal financial systems continue to influence economic activity.

Major infrastructure projects require banks that can process international transfers, extend credit and maintain relationships with foreign financial institutions. Without them, even legally permissible transactions become slower and more expensive.

Syria's continued inclusion on the Financial Action Task Force's list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring further complicates that process. While grey-list status does not prevent investment outright, it encourages international banks to apply enhanced due diligence before establishing correspondent banking relationships, making many institutions reluctant to re-enter the Syrian market.

Following its first staff mission to Damascus in more than 15 years in November 2025, the International Monetary Fund said rebuilding Syria's economy would require stronger public financial management, rehabilitation of the banking system and improvements in central bank capacity. The World Bank's June 2025 Macro-Fiscal Assessment similarly concluded that Syria's financial system continues to face "immense challenges" that restrict economic activity.

"At the most basic level, Syria simply needs to rebuild," Butter said.

What the country needs most is effective financing for small businesses. That may not be particularly glamorous from an investment perspective, but it is Syria's immediate priority.

He argues Syria's greatest economic asset remains its tradition of entrepreneurship. If macroeconomic stability improves and financing becomes available, thousands of small manufacturers, workshops and family businesses could expand far more quickly than large infrastructure projects.

For Aita, the sectors attracting the most foreign capital are not necessarily those most critical to Syria's broader economic recovery.

While much recent investment has focused on energy, telecommunications and large infrastructure, he argues that Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors remain significantly underdeveloped despite their long-term importance to employment and exports.

The result is a paradox. Foreign capital is beginning to return, yet many of the sectors capable of generating broad-based employment still lack the financing, regulatory certainty and institutional support needed to recover.

For al-Sharaa's government, the next phase of Syria's reopening will be judged by whether banks reconnect with the international financial system, procurement becomes transparent, contracts are awarded competitively and small businesses can borrow, hire and expand.

Syria has attracted investors' attention. Now it has to earn their confidence.