Why Lebanon needs a Sadat moment

Today, in the aftermath of two devastating armed conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel (in 2023-2024 and 2026), as well as amidst a fragile ceasefire and ongoing direct, high-level talks between Lebanon and Israel, one can find clear parallels between Beirut and Cairo.

This compels us to undergo a deeper and more rigorous reassessment of the historical role of former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s, thus raising a fundamental question: how should Sadat’s legacy be interpreted, particularly in light of the current Lebanese context?

Drawing parallels between Egypt and Lebanon

Several notable parallels can be identified between the Egyptian context of 1973 and the Lebanese landscape in 2026.

First, the majority of the Lebanese population and its leaders have come to realize the futility of war as a means to achieve their country’s vested interests; in this regard, it is worth noting one of Carl von Clausewitz’s most famous saying

War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.

The recent armed conflicts have inflicted utter ruin and severe humanitarian and economic damages (including massive displacement), as well as prompted the return of Israeli occupation over large swaths of southern Lebanon; approximately 55 villages and towns (comprising around 500 square kilometers). Therefore, just as Egypt and Sadat understood the vanity of pursuing military confrontation with Israel, the costs of continued conflict with little to no gains have reinforced the need to explore alternative strategies within Lebanon as well.

Second, the issue of territorial recovery has reemerged as a central concern. Unlike Egypt in 1973, Lebanon had previously achieved Israeli withdrawal in 2000 (putting aside the controversial and unsettled land border dispute between Lebanon, Syria, and Israel regarding the Shebaa Farms, Kfarchouba Hills, and Nkheileh village as well as the 13 contentious land border points between Lebanon and Israel). Today, however, as Beirut approaches direct talks with Tel Aviv, the “land for peace” formula will most probably emerge in any negotiations between the two; similar to how Cairo recovered its occupied Sinai Peninsula from Israel through a negotiated political settlement.

This, in of itself, would not be considered as a sign of weakness or capitulation, provided that Lebanon ensures that it undergoes any negotiations based on safeguarding the country’s sovereignty, security, stability, and interests; which might entail going to great lengths to secure such benefits. The latter was explicitly proclaimed by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun during his televised address on 17 April 2026, stating that

I am ready to go anywhere necessary to liberate my land, protect my people, and save my country.

Third, Lebanon must leverage its relationship with the United States (U.S.) to secure its claims and interests effectively. A critical lesson from Egypt’s experience is the centrality of Washington as a mediator. In addition, as Washington often intervenes after a crisis erupts, the recent military confrontations have provided Beirut with an opportunity to benefit from renewed American interest and engagement in the Lebanese file. The U.S. has already demonstrated its capacity to facilitate agreements, as seen in the 2022 Lebanon-Israel maritime deal; whereby the former managed to secure Line 23, which was more favorable to Beirut than Line 1 which Tel Aviv pushed to adopt. While Washington’s alignment with Israel is undeniable, its regional interests and strategy create space for mediation. However, the latter can only yield the intended results if matched by internal coherence and well-defined national objectives, which entails comprehending how to successfully benefit from the American leverage over Israel to Beirut’s own convenience.

Map depicting Lebanon and Israel’s overlapping maritime border claims (Lines 29 and 1, respectively), the US Ambassador Frederic C. Hof’s proposed line, and the ultimately agreed-upon Line 23 under the 2022 maritime agreement.

After outlining this comparative analysis, a closer examination of the historical sequence of events that led Egypt to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War becomes essential to understanding how such considerations shaped its strategic choices in practice.

The road to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

Following the Six-Day War (5-10 June 1967), Egypt faced a profound strategic and psychological impasse. Israel’s occupation of the Sinai Peninsula compromised Cairo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as deprived it of its dignity and prestige; all while diplomatic initiatives repeatedly failed.

When Anwar Sadat assumed power in 1970 after the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, he inherited this deadlock. Immediately, Sadat recognized 3 realities:

- First, Egypt lacked the capacity to achieve a decisive military victory over Israel, thus rendering war futile.

- Second, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) was either unwilling or unable to fulfill Cairo’s crucial demand of restoring its occupied territories.

- Third, the U.S. was the sole power capable of delivering Egypt’s territorial and security needs. Sadat’s strategic brilliance lay in his recognition that Washington, not the Moscow, held the decisive leverage over Israel.

In response, Sadat decided to embark on a bold and novel strategic realignment for the devastated nation. On 18 July 1972, he went on to evict his Soviet military advisors, deeply souring relations with Moscow and shifting the latter’s center of gravity towards Damascus, Syria. Simultaneously, he sought to establish a dialogue with the White House, as he came to understand that Washington possessed considerable influence over Israel. This task included notable Egyptian figures, such as intelligence chief, Ahmad Ismail, and a close advisor to Sadat, Dr. Mohammad Hafez Ghanem.

From the onset, the Egyptians made clear to the Americans that they are keen on retrieving their lost territories and could not afford any stall. Ismail even informed U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger, on 25 February 1973 that Egypt was “moving on its own” and was willing to pursue phased agreements with Israel notwithstanding other Arab countries (namely Syria and Jordan). This was reiterated by Dr. Ghanem,

We believe it should be achieved by stages, by phases. And when we try to imagine the procedure, it can be either by an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement as a point of departure or both a Jordan-Israel and Egypt-Israel settlement going together.

However, as Dr. Kissinger failed to take Egyptian rapprochement seriously, the White House remained hesitant to utilize its weight and influence in these negotiations, and Israel expressed no interest in any compromise or political settlement, Sadat decided to prepare and go to war, believing that only a controlled military confrontation could alter the strategic equation. War indeed broke out on 6 October 1973 (known as the “Yom Kippur War,” the “October War,” or the “Ramadan War”), in coordination with Syria, and lasted until United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) Resolution 338 was adopted on 22 October 1973 and separate ceasefire agreements were signed between Israel and both Egypt and Syria on 11 November 1973 and 31 May 1973, respectively.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War as a diplomatic instrument

Egypt’s journey from the battlefield of 1973 to the peace treaty of 1979 was neither easy nor inevitable. Instead, it was the product of strategic calculation, where war served diplomacy, and diplomacy was anchored in great-power mediation.

Despite resorting to a military standoff, the Egyptian president’s objectives were quite limited. Rather than seeking total victory against Israel (given Cairo’s capacity constraints), Sadat aimed to break the perception of Israeli invincibility, restore Arab and Egyptian confidence, and force international intervention (specifically American). The initial Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal and the Bar Lev Line (a fortified line constructed by Israel along the eastern flank of the aforementioned canal) achieved a significant psychological and strategic breakthrough.

Although the conflict ultimately evolved into a military stalemate, with a slight Israeli military advantage on the ground, it nevertheless created a crisis of sufficient magnitude to draw the U.S. into active mediation, thereby breaking the diplomatic deadlock that had persisted since 1967. Sadat’s calculations aligned with that of Dr. Kissinger, who was keen on averting an Israeli defeat while simultaneously seeking to prevent Egyptian humiliation (in a manner that would facilitate subsequent peace negotiations, under U.S. auspices solely). Indeed, he told Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in February 1974 that only war would trigger an effective American diplomatic initiative; which Sadat comprehended and acted accordingly.

From battlefield to the negotiating table (1974-1979)

After the war, Dr. Kissinger initiated “shuttle diplomacy,” brokering the Sinai Disengagement Agreements between Egypt and Israel from 1974 to 1975. These incremental steps were not ends in themselves, but rather helped reduce tensions and built trust, while also institutionalizing the U.S. role as mediator.

Sadat, however, had his sight on a comprehensive and enduring political settlement from the very beginning. In an unprecedented and ambitious move, he delivered a speech to the Egyptian parliament on 9 November 1977, saying that Israel

will be stunned to hear me tell you that I am ready to go to the ends of the earth, and even to their home, to the Knesset itself, to argue with them, in order to prevent one Egyptian soldier from being wounded.

Indeed, after only 10 days (on 19-21 November 1977), Sadat became the first ever Arab leader to travel to Israel and address its Knesset, initiating a path toward peace. This overture culminated in the signing of the Camp David Accords on 17 September 1978, ultimately leading to the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace signed on 26 March 1979.

United States President Jimmy Carter congratulates Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin as they shake hands on 26 March 1979 on the north lawn of the White House, Washington D.C., after signing the historic U.S.-sponsored peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.

Having effectively terminated the state of war between the two parties, the treaty formalized a “land for peace” arrangement, whereby Israel agreed to withdraw fully from the Sinai Peninsula, while Egypt recognized Israel and normalized relations. For Cairo, the treaty achieved its primary objective of recovering Sinai. For Israel, it removed the largest Arab military threat. For the U.S., it enhanced its influence in the Middle East and secured a stable regional order aligned with its Cold War (1945-1990) interests.

The cost of peace and the enduring legacy of Sadat

Sadat ultimately paid the price of his approach and vision. Egypt faced temporary isolation within the Arab world (as it was suspended from the League of Arab States, and the latter’s headquarters was subsequently moved from Cairo to Tunis, before being finally readmitted in May 1989). Furthermore, on 6 October 1981, Sadat was assassinated by members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (led by Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli) during a military parade in Cairo.

Nonetheless, his strategy remains a landmark in Middle Eastern diplomacy. It demonstrated the potential for dialogue and negotiation, even between long-standing adversaries, to resolve critical disagreements and reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the region. His efforts, though controversial, recovered the country’s lost territories (achieved on 25 April 1982) and paved the way for a lasting peace between Egypt and Israel. His successors, be it Hosni Mubarak, Mohammad Morsi (who was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood), and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi never attempted to overturn the peace agreement, recognizing the treaty’s durability and importance for Egypt’s national security, stability, and interests. This prompted Dr. Kissinger to note in his “The White House Years,”

He [Sadat] had the boldness to go to a war no one thought he could sustain; the moderation to move to peace immediately afterward; and the wisdom to reverse attitudes hardened by decades.

United States Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger meets with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat on 7 November 1973 during his visit to Cairo.

To conclude, the lesson for Lebanon is not to replicate Egypt’s path, but to grasp its underlying logic: effective negotiation requires a combination of leverage, strategic clarity, and external mediation from credible and capable actors. Without these elements, diplomacy risks remaining trapped in the same stalemate that Cairo sought, and ultimately managed, to overcome. For as Egyptian President Sadat once asserted,

Any peace not built on justice and on the recognition of the rights of the peoples, would be a structure of sand which would crumble under the first blow.