Why Pakistan could bring the U.S. and Iran together

With a potential second round of U.S.–Iran negotiations on the horizon, one question stands out: why have the two sides entrusted Pakistan with the task of mediation, and can it continue to bring the two sides together?

In April 2026, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced that Pakistan had brokered a ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Islamabad’s emergence as a mediator was rooted in years of careful positioning, maintaining its relationship with Washington while also cultivating ties with Tehran. Pakistan’s proximity to Iran, its Shia population, its energy vulnerability, and its reliance on Gulf allies all made neutrality both a necessity and a strategic asset.

Whether this episode produces lasting peace or only a temporary pause, it demonstrates that Pakistan has begun to leverage its geography and diplomacy to rebuild global prestige at a time when it desperately needs both.

Geography playing its part

Pakistan’s geographic position has always forced it to manage its relationship with Iran carefully. The two countries share a 900-kilometer border, which makes Iran simultaneously a neighbor, a potential conduit for energy, and a persistent security concern. That border has long been porous to militancy and smuggling, especially in the Balochistan region. Pakistan cannot afford instability on its western flank, particularly while also managing tensions with Afghanistan to the north and India to the east.

This geographical constraint has historically kept Pakistan from taking hard sides in regional conflicts. During the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, for instance, Islamabad maintained neutrality despite pressure from Washington and Arab states supporting Saddam Hussein. President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s refusal to join either camp helped preserve relations with Tehran.

The same balancing instinct resurfaced in the present crisis. When U.S. and Israeli strikes killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in February 2026, Pakistan initially condemned the attack but avoided directly blaming Washington.

Why Pakistan had to Play this role

Pakistan’s economy, critically dependent on imported energy, was buckling under surging oil prices after the Strait of Hormuz was closed by the conflict. A prolonged blockade could have triggered fuel shortages and economic implosion in a country already struggling with inflation and debt. Additionally, Pakistan’s ability to mediate provided it with international relevance and clout. For years Pakistan had been overshadowed by India and viewed as a trouble-prone security state rather than a responsible global actor. Hosting the U.S. and Iran in Islamabad flipped that narrative; for once, Pakistan was not the problem but the solution.

Furthermore, Islamabad maintains working ties with a plethora of states such as the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and China. Stuti Bhatnagar of UNSW Canberra described Pakistan as “situated quite centrally in this conflict, geographically as well as geopolitically.”

Other traditional mediators, like Oman and Qatar, struggled to play the same role. Qatar, for instance, faced attacks on its energy infrastructure during the war and lacked close ties with Saudi Arabia or China. As analyst Mansoor Ahmed of the Australian National University told SBS News, Pakistan had “goodwill with all the main players at the same time, enhanced strategic leverage, and direct stakes in ensuring that the conflict doesn’t really escalate.”

Its defense pact with Saudi Arabia gave it access to Gulf decision-makers; its shared border gave it insight into Iran’s internal dynamics; and its improving relationship with Washington gave it credibility with the Trump administration. The defense pact between the two states provides another reason why Pakistan seeks a swift end to the conflict. Under the terms of the agreement, an attack on Saudi Arabia would obligate Pakistan to come to its defense and vice versa in a structure similar to NATO’s Article 5. Consequently, if Iran were to resume attacks on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan would be compelled to intervene in accordance with its treaty commitments.

Personalities make diplomacy

The U.S. agreed to Islamabad’s mediation largely because of political ties with President Donald Trump. When Trump returned to office in January 2025, Pakistan moved quickly to align with him, joining the so-called Board of Peace initiative and even nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize following a brief India–Pakistan ceasefire.

Central to this relationship was the personal rapport between Trump and Pakistan’s powerful army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir. Trump publicly lauded Munir as “an exceptional human being” and hosted him in Washington. His earlier cooperation with the U.S., including Pakistan’s capture of the Abbey Gate bombing suspect in 2025, had built credibility in Trump’s eyes. When Islamabad offered to mediate between Washington and Tehran, Trump trusted the message because he trusted the messenger. Munir was in near-continuous contact with U.S. Vice President JD Vance, envoy Steve Witkoff, and Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi as the framework came together on April 6. Munir and Sharif personally appealed to Trump to halt his “final strike order,” with less than two hours remaining before what Trump described as the destruction of Iran’s “civilization.” At the same time, Munir had cultivated ties with Iranian counterparts by maintaining a consistent message of restraint. During the March escalation, he met Shia leaders in Rawalpindi and warned against sectarian violence inside Pakistan.

What the mediator role means for Pakistan’s future

Pakistan’s mediation marks the country’s return to relevance, reminiscent of its secret role in facilitating Henry Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in 1971, another behind-the-scenes mediation that changed global history. It strengthens the narrative that Pakistan can act as a responsible regional mediator capable of balancing Islamic solidarity with pragmatic statecraft. Wasay Mir (2026) with The National Interest notes that even if negotiations collapse, “Pakistan still walks away with enhanced credibility and stronger relationships with both Washington and Tehran.”

When both Washington and Tehran accepted Islamabad’s invitation, it indicated that Pakistan’s years of cultivating strong relationships had borne fruit.