Why peace with Israel could be different for Lebanon?

Lebanon and Israel have spent decades trapped in a relationship defined by armed conflict and mutual suspicion. As discussions about a possible political settlement gain attention, an important question remains: could reconciliation between the two countries be socially easier than their political history suggests?

It would be naïve to suggest that hostility towards Israel is not present in Lebanon. Successive wars, occupation of the South and the unresolved Palestinian question have left deep wounds. Some political forces go beyond opposing Israeli policies and reject Israel’s very existence, most prominently Hezbollah and political circles aligned with it.

However, Lebanon’s international commercial networks, extensive diaspora, and diverse social and professional communities offer a different perspective on how relations might evolve under changed political circumstances.

Changing attitudes, unresolved divisions

Lebanon’s changing economic and security realities have brought the question of peace with Israel into a new phase of public discussion. A survey by Lebanese research firm “Information International” in April and May 2026 found that nearly 49% of respondents supported a peace agreement with Israel, up from around 25% in August 2025. Support for normalization also rose, from 13.2% to more than 30%.

These figures do not necessarily indicate enthusiasm for closer relations with Israel, nor do they establish a consensus in favor of normalization. They may instead reflect a growing willingness among some Lebanese to consider alternatives to continued conflict. The distinction matters: support for a peace agreement does not necessarily imply acceptance of Israel, approval of its policies, or a willingness to develop broader social and economic relations with Israelis.

Lebanon remains deeply divided. While some may view a settlement as a means of achieving security and stability, others approach relations with Israel through historical grievances and ideological opposition. The survey figures therefore reflect a changing debate, not a national consensus.

Peace without normalization: Egypt and Jordan

Lebanon would not be the first country to establish peace with Israel. Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco have made peace with Israel. Egypt signed a peace treaty back in 1979, while Jordan followed in 1994. Both established diplomatic relations and developed practical cooperation with Israel.

Yet neither relationship has produced broad social normalization.

In Egypt, despite decades of formal peace and security cooperation, relations between the two societies have remained limited. Cooperation has often concentrated in government institutions and strategic sectors rather than extending into everyday social life.

Jordan presents a similar picture. The countries cooperate on security, water and other practical matters, but public opposition to normalization remains substantial.

Arab Barometer’s 2021-2022 surveys found that only 5% of respondents in both Egypt and Jordan supported normalization with Israel. These figures illustrate the distance that can remain between a government’s diplomatic commitments and public attitudes.

The lesson is not that formal peace inevitably fails to produce social engagement, but that diplomatic agreements alone cannot generate it. Where political grievances remain unresolved and contact between ordinary people is limited, relations can remain largely confined to governments and strategic interests.

Could Lebanon follow a different path? Its political and ideological divisions make the outcome uncertain, although its diaspora networks, multilingual population, and internationally oriented economy could create channels for contact beyond official diplomacy.

These connections would not necessarily translate into public support for normalization, but they could give a future peace agreement a social and commercial dimension that has remained limited in Egypt and Jordan.

A country built on commerce and services

Lebanon has a long tradition of international commerce, entrepreneurship, and connections with foreign markets. Its economy has historically depended on services, tourism, and professional expertise, while the diaspora has extended Lebanese commercial networks across continents.

A peaceful regional environment could open opportunities in several sectors. Israel has competitive industries in agricultural technology, water management, cyber-security, and medical technology. Under different political circumstances, complementary expertise could create opportunities for both sides.

These possibilities should not be mistaken for guaranteed economic gains. Nevertheless, economic complementarity alone cannot overcome ideological opposition, unresolved territorial disputes, or the absence of public confidence. Even if formal peace created new commercial opportunities, their actual scope would depend on whether political and social conditions allowed them to develop.

Religious heritage and cultural tourism

Tourism could offer another dimension of a different relationship.

If political circumstances were to change, Lebanon’s historical and religious heritage could attract interest from Israeli visitors. Jewish heritage sites, including Beirut’s Maghen Abraham Synagogue, could also form part of a broader conversation about Lebanon’s historical diversity.

Conversely, Lebanese visitors could explore Israeli historical and religious sites if travel became legally permissible and politically acceptable. For many Lebanese, particularly those interested in biblical history, such sites could hold cultural and religious significance. Travel could also allow people from Lebanon and Israel to discover aspects of each other’s lives rarely visible through political reporting.

The obstacles remain

Lebanon’s 1955 boycott legislation restricts commercial dealings with Israel. Changing this framework would require political and legal decisions, not simply private business initiatives.

Security is an even greater challenge. Unresolved territorial disputes, the presence of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory, Hezbollah’s weapons and ideology, and the question of the Lebanese state’s authority over armed groups all complicate the prospects for a lasting settlement.

The experience of Egypt and Jordan is instructive: diplomatic recognition and practical cooperation do not necessarily translate into public acceptance. Lebanon would need to address the sources of conflict rather than assume that commercial benefits alone could overcome them.

A different model?

Trade and tourism cannot erase decades of conflict on their own. The question is whether a credible political settlement could create the conditions in which Lebanese and Israeli begin to encounter one another beyond the familiar narratives of war and hostility.

For Lebanon, the challenge would be to turn peace from an agreement signed by governments into a relationship that ordinary people can choose to explore. That would require more than economic incentives: it would require security, political legitimacy, and public confidence. Only then will it become clear whether Lebanon’s social and commercial networks can help turn a political settlement into a meaningful peace.