The unfinished battle for Lebanon’s judicial independence

Judicial independence has long been an aspired goal that Lebanese yearned to achieve. Its significance stems from being a fundamental necessity for rebuilding public trust in state institutions as well as restoring confidence among Lebanese and the international community alike.

In this context, the adoption of the Law on the Organization of the Judicial Judiciary in 2025 was presented as a major step toward strengthening the separation of powers, limiting political interference, and guaranteeing greater autonomy for judges.

However, the reform effort suffered a major setback after the Constitutional Council annulled the law in February 2026, ruling that it violated constitutional requirements related to the consultation of the Supreme Judicial Council.

To better understand the reasons behind the law’s annulment and the required necessities in any future legislation to ensure the independence of the judiciary, The Beiruter reached out to former President of the Supreme Judicial Council Dr. Ghaleb Ghanem.

Constitutional Council annulment: A question of procedure and separation of powers

According to Dr. Ghanem, the main reason behind the Constitutional Council’s decision was not an assessment of whether the articles of the law were appropriate or effective, but rather the failure to respect a constitutional requirement during the legislative process.

The Constitutional Council determined that the final version of the law had not been properly submitted to the Supreme Judicial Council for its opinion before being adopted. The Council considered this consultation an essential procedural requirement because the legislation directly regulates the organization of courts, judicial careers, and the functioning of judges.

Dr. Ghanem explained that during parliamentary discussions, it was indicated that the Minister of Justice had contacted the Supreme Judicial Council, with the assumption that the judiciary had therefore been consulted. However, he argued that this approach raised a fundamental constitutional problem.

“The Supreme Judicial Council is one entity, and the Minister of Justice is another entity,” he explained. “When the Supreme Judicial Council is represented by the Ministry of Justice, this means that the judiciary is being represented by the executive authority.”

For Dr. Ghanem, this issue directly relates to the principle of separation of powers, since the judiciary cannot be represented by an institution belonging to the executive branch when discussing legislation concerning judicial independence.

The principle of separation of powers was not respected.

The Constitutional Council ultimately concluded that the consultation requirement was not merely a procedural formality, but rather a constitutional safeguard aimed at protecting judicial independence under Article 20 of the Constitution.

A long legislative process marked by amendments and controversies

The judicial independence law did not emerge suddenly. According to Dr. Ghanem, the draft went through several stages before reaching Parliament and the Presidency of the Republic.

He explained that the original version was not prepared directly by the Ministry of Justice but by an external body, before being coordinated with Lebanese institutions and international actors. The initial draft attempted to introduce broad concepts related to modernization, democracy, transparency, and judicial reform.

However, Dr. Ghanem argued that the first version was too extensive and did not sufficiently correspond with Lebanon’s judicial reality.

The law attempted to include too many ideas and too many provisions.

He explained that reform concepts must be adapted to the existing institutional structure and practical requirements of the Lebanese judiciary.

Over time, the draft was modified following observations from several stakeholders, including the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Judicial Council, and parliamentary committees. These discussions gradually transformed the text into a more realistic version, although several legal and structural problems remained.

After Parliament approved the law, it was referred to President Joseph Aoun. Following a review by legal and constitutional advisers, several observations were raised, leading to the law being returned to Parliament for reconsideration before being approved again. It was subsequently challenged before the Constitutional Council.

The law’s positive elements: Greater judicial participation and financial autonomy

Despite its annulment, Dr. Ghanem highlighted that the law was not entirely unsuccessful and contained several positive provisions.

One of its main reforms concerned the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council. The legislation sought to increase the role of elected judges within the Council, reducing the dominance of members appointed directly through political authorities. According to Dr. Ghanem, this reflected the spirit of the 1989 National Accord Document, which called for greater participation by judges in selecting members of their governing body.

The law increased the role of elected judges.

The law also introduced a mechanism for judicial appointments based on discussion between the Supreme Judicial Council and the Minister of Justice. If no agreement could be reached, the Supreme Judicial Council would have the final authority.

However, Dr. Ghanem stressed that the effectiveness of this mechanism depended on the independence of judges themselves. “If judges become divided or influenced by external factors unrelated to the interests of the judiciary, the situation could become worse than before,” he warned.

Another positive element was the establishment of a five-year term for permanent members of the Supreme Judicial Council, as well as provisions intended to strengthen financial independence by giving the Council greater authority over court administration and judicial needs.

Shortcomings: Ambiguity, excessive challenges, and institutional imbalance

At the same time, Dr. Ghanem identified several weaknesses in the legislation.

One major concern was the excessive reliance on elections and committees. While democratic participation is important, he argued that judicial systems must primarily prioritize competence, experience, and professional performance.

He also criticized provisions that could weaken the authority of the Supreme Judicial Council by allowing lower bodies to intervene if the Council failed to take certain decisions.

Another concern involved expanding the ability to challenge decisions issued by the Supreme Judicial Council, including matters related to judicial evaluations and internal judicial procedures. According to Dr. Ghanem, excessive intervention by administrative courts could undermine the independence of the judiciary’s highest governing institution.

He further questioned whether Lebanon’s political class was genuinely prepared to accept an independent judiciary. “The issue is not only about the law,” he said, stressing that legal reform must be accompanied by political will and judicial responsibility.

Beyond legislation: The role of judges in protecting independence

For Dr. Ghanem, judicial independence cannot be guaranteed solely through constitutional provisions or legislative texts.

Lebanon needs a clear legal framework, financial independence for courts, and institutional guarantees. However, he argued that the ultimate responsibility lies with judges themselves.

An independent judiciary requires judges capable of making decisions without political pressure and defending the authority of their institution. “The issue is not about titles, symbols, or appearances,” he said. “Independence must be guaranteed by laws and protected by judges.”

The decision is ultimately in the hands of judges.