Who owns the minds of Lebanon’s children?

Source: Nida Al Watan

The loyalty of Hezbollah’s social base has long been questioned by other Lebanese, with critics arguing that it promotes a culture of death over the instinct for life and places Iran’s interests above Lebanon’s. This loyalty led many to examine how this environment was formed. The recent war revealed a striking image on Lebanese screens from displacement schools: some students in Lebanon had never seen the Lebanese flag in their lives and could not draw it. They were, reportedly, students from Hezbollah-affiliated schools.

Students who attend sectarian Lebanese schools may develop a religious or sectarian identity, but they do not necessarily adopt an ideological allegiance to another state at Lebanon’s expense. This differs, according to critics, from students who begin at the age of three to absorb ideological ideas and affiliations that extend beyond Lebanon’s borders in Hezbollah’s Al-Mahdi and Al-Mustafa schools: Lebanese citizens carrying a Lebanese identity while belonging to the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih in Iran.

This systematic process of shaping the minds of Hezbollah’s parallel state is overseen by two associations that serve as the foundation for its continuation: the Islamic Education Foundation, which includes Al-Mahdi schools, and the Islamic Religious Education Foundation, which includes Al-Mustafa schools. These schools openly teach allegiance to Wilayat al-Faqih in both political and religious terms, which critics argue contradicts the Lebanese Constitution. They join Al-Qard Al-Hassan Association among Hezbollah-affiliated organizations that have exceeded their official notification frameworks, while their licenses have not been withdrawn to date.

But before examining the licenses of these associations, questions arise over the Ministry of Education’s licenses for these schools and why they have not been withdrawn. Questions also remain over the role of the Educational Center for Research and Development in monitoring curricula and optional religious education, which critics describe as a loophole exploited by sectarian schools in general and Hezbollah-affiliated schools in particular.

How did this ideological project continue for decades under the state’s supervision, creating political loyalty among Lebanese children in favor of Iran under Lebanese state licenses and absent oversight? And how did Hezbollah-affiliated teachers enter public schools amid what critics described as the Ministry of Education’s failure to regulate even practices taking place in other private schools, through what is known as the “implemented curriculum” and the “hidden curriculum”?

Reinforcing Lebanon’s sectarian system

Many may remember a video that circulated last year showing girls at a school in Tripoli describing Christmas as a “holiday for non-believers.” This was only one example among many religious educational practices adopted by numerous private schools.

Sources within the Ministry of Education acknowledged that religious education in schools had become a “field of educational chaos,” with many complaints having reached the ministry about teachers using their personal religious beliefs to promote their own religious groups, even during classes unrelated to religious education, taught by science or humanities teachers. Complaints also include religious teachers promoting extremist ideas that may reach the point of inciting against those who do not share their beliefs. Such teachings, critics argue, undermine civil peace and coexistence.

Lebanon’s private education sector has long served as an entry point for sectarian parties and religious groups seeking to reinforce sectarian identities in a country built on a sectarian political system and sectarian parties.

In this context, Lebanese University citizenship professor Dr. Ali Khalifeh described education in Lebanon as a form of “hidden federalism,” similar to personal status laws. He argued that the disorder surrounding religious education can reach the point of violating the Lebanese Constitution itself, holding the Ministry of Education responsible for abandoning its regulatory role in this area.

Article 10 of the Lebanese Constitution states that:
“Education is free insofar as it does not conflict with public order, violate morals, or undermine the dignity of any religion or sect. The rights of communities to establish their own private schools shall not be affected, provided that these schools comply with the general regulations issued by the state concerning public education.”

In this way, the Lebanese Constitution links freedom of education to the directives of the Ministry of Education. “However, the Ministry of Education does not issue instructions, meaning it has abandoned its role in this field, while the freedom of religious communities to provide education does not mean allowing chaos,” Khalifeh added.

Why  are Hezbollah’s schools considered different?

Article 9 of the Lebanese Constitution states that “freedom of belief is absolute, provided that it does not violate public order.” However, according to Khalifeh, the issue in Al-Mahdi and Al-Mustafa schools is not only religious allegiance but also political loyalty, which he said was directed toward the Supreme Leader (Wali al-Faqih).

The religious education disorder found in some private schools cannot, according to Khalifeh, be compared with Hezbollah-affiliated schools. He argued that these schools do not stop at sectarian education but move toward ideological formation and mobilization, ultimately reinforcing the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and building an affiliation with a state outside Lebanon.

In his book Hezbollah’s Children, Khalifeh described Hezbollah’s schools as “sites of jihad and mobilization.” The book examines what he described as the upbringing of children who are “born in Lebanon and die for Iran” through a process of “brainwashing.”

According to Khalifeh, ideological education begins at the age of three and continues until the age of eighteen. He discussed what he described as the teaching of Wilayat al-Faqih, along with concepts of extremism and violence. He also referred to textbooks used in Hezbollah schools that include images of fighters carrying weapons in Islamic education materials.

These books also rely on what is known as “education through role models,” presenting figures for children to follow, most notably Ali Khamenei and Qassem Soleimani. The content of the education, according to Khalifeh, extends beyond religious teachings and includes a comprehensive political project. Wilayat al-Faqih is presented as a “general authority,” while the state is described, according to Hezbollah’s political thought, as the state of the Supreme Leader, the state of the Imam of the Age and his rightful deputy, the Wali al-Faqih.

Asked about Lebanon’s place in Hezbollah’s curriculum, Khalifeh argued that the belief that governance belongs to God rather than humans leaves no room for the idea of a civil state or a republic whose authority derives its legitimacy from citizens.

Khalifeh concluded that these books contain “no seed of civil thought or national education.” Lebanon, its anthem, symbols and culture are not absent from this upbringing for tens of thousands of Lebanese children, but he argued that they were overshadowed by the presence of the anthem Salam Ya Mahdi (“Peace, O Mahdi”).

From this perspective, Khalifeh linked this early education to later readiness for fighting and death, arguing that children’s minds had undergone, in his words, “complete brainwashing,” while their sense of Lebanese belonging had disappeared.

“Teacher Training” and the entry into public schools

According to Khalifeh, the educational institutions affiliated with Hezbollah do not base their ideological content on the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council as a Lebanese religious reference. Instead, both Al-Mustafa and Al-Mahdi schools openly rely on concepts drawn from the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the “Structural Transformation Document” issued by Iran’s Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution.

The Human Resources Department at the Islamic Religious Education Foundation is responsible for selecting religious education teachers in Hezbollah schools. Khalifeh said that the foundation subjects teachers to an examination followed by a training course to ensure their understanding of the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and their ability to transmit it to children.

The issue, according to Khalifeh, does not stop at Al-Mahdi and Al-Mustafa schools. He said some of these teachers are also sent to public schools, “under the watch of the Ministry of Education.”

In practice, he argued, Hezbollah uses its influence in areas under its control, particularly in southern Lebanon, to pressure public school administrations and impose affiliated teachers. These teachers receive salaries from school funds and teach religious classes that reinforce allegiance to Wilayat al-Faqih.

Curricula and the absence of educational oversight

According to Khalifeh, religious education in Lebanon as a whole is marked by disorder, extending from Catholic schools to Protestant and Islamic schools. However, he distinguished between the general disorder of religious education and what takes place specifically in Hezbollah schools, which he argues goes beyond sectarian education toward weakening attachment to Lebanon through imported curricula that reshape a child’s identity toward something outside the country.

While basic mathematics and science textbooks are taken from the Lebanese curriculum, Khalifeh argued that the issue lay in how they are implemented inside the classroom.

He distinguished between three levels of curriculum: the written curriculum, the implemented curriculum, and the hidden curriculum.

The written curriculum in subjects such as mathematics and science is the official state curriculum. However, in the implemented curriculum, a mathematics teacher may provide an example involving two trees, or replace it with an example involving two Husseiniyas or two weapons.

The most dangerous type of curriculum, according to Khalifeh, is the hidden curriculum (Hidden Curriculum), which appears when a teacher’s personal beliefs and orientations influence how the official curriculum is delivered.

Regarding Hezbollah schools specifically, Khalifeh gave the example of the state’s absence through the concept of “care.” The official civic education curriculum may link this concept to the role of the state and the Ministry of Social Affairs, while a teacher in Hezbollah schools may present it instead as “the care of the Wali al-Faqih for the fighters.”

Khalifeh held the Educational Center for Research and Development responsible for failing to regulate religious education. He argued that the center could have established a unified framework for religious culture, or proposed one textbook for Christianity and another for Islam, setting minimum standards for the content taught to students. Instead, he said, it had withdrawn from all initiatives and provided nothing, leaving the field open for every political or religious group that owns schools or universities to teach whatever it chooses.

As a result, he argued, the issue is no longer simply educational disorder, but rather an official failure that has allowed the erosion of educational and national sovereignty.

Education: Authority without enforcement

Sources at the Ministry of Education explained that, legally, the decree licensing private schools clearly requires schools to teach the Lebanese curriculum, or one of the curricula approved and recognized in Lebanon.

Regarding textbooks linked to the Lebanese curriculum, schools must either use books issued by the Educational Center for Research and Development, meaning official state textbooks, or book series published by private publishing houses after receiving approval from the center and ensuring that their content matches the official curriculum. Schools are not permitted to use other textbooks outside this framework.

Religious education in Lebanon is optional. Traditionally, religious authorities provide religious education teachers to public schools according to the dominant sect in each area.

These teachers use textbooks approved by the same religious authorities. For example, Dar al-Fatwa determines the books and topics taught in Islamic religious education classes, and the same applies to Christian and other religious authorities.

Private schools, however, benefit from the lack of regulation surrounding religious education to introduce their own content. In Hezbollah-affiliated schools, according to ministry sources, Iranian influence appears throughout the educational system. “The root of the problem begins with this loophole,” the sources said. “They first enter through optional religious education, and this is one of the main gaps.”

The sources attributed the responsibility for this issue to the Ministry of Education. Every school has a license holder, whether an individual, an association or an institution with legal personality.

If a school is affiliated with an association, that association must have received official notification from the Ministry of Interior, have a clear internal system and declared objectives. If the association engages in activities that contradict its stated objectives, intervention is expected.

The sources distinguished between promoting the culture of a particular country and strengthening a citizen’s allegiance to another state. If it is proven that an institution has exceeded acceptable limits and promoted cultures that contradict Lebanese society, the Ministry of Education should issue a warning and require it to stop practices that conflict with proper national education.

If the school does not comply, the Ministry of Education has the right to request the closure of the school or withdraw its license. It may also address the Ministry of Interior and argue that the association overseeing the school, in the case of Al-Mahdi and Al-Mustafa schools, the Islamic Education Foundation and the Islamic Religious Education Foundation, has exceeded the powers and objectives on the basis of which it received official recognition.

At that point, the official notification could be withdrawn and the association dissolved. This could open a wider discussion regarding other sectarian and religious schools that may have little interest in reforming this area, as every political party and religious group in Lebanon has its own private schools.

The Government and the weapon of ideology

The preparation of an entire social environment around allegiance to Wilayat al-Faqih may be, according to critics, as serious a challenge as Hezbollah’s weapons, which they argue undermine the establishment of the Lebanese state.

The question now is whether the Ministry of Education will take serious action under a government that has decided to confront Hezbollah’s military arsenal, while still allowing what critics describe as its ideological arsenal to continue through schools that graduate Lebanese citizens affiliated with Wilayat al-Faqih, despite the role of the Lebanese state in protecting them from ideological indoctrination.