Lebanon and Syria’s enduring human smuggling dilemma

The issue of irregular migration from Syria into Lebanon has returned to the forefront of security discussions, amid reports that human smuggling networks have resumed parts of their activities along the two countries’ long and difficult-to-monitor border; this time through illegal crossings in northern Lebanon, particularly in Akkar.

While Lebanese authorities have not recorded an exceptional surge in crossings, limited operations continue through unofficial routes, highlighting the persistent challenges facing border control efforts.

A border difficult to control

The Syrian-Lebanese border stretches for approximately 330 kilometers and includes mountainous areas, agricultural land, valleys, and villages that are geographically and socially interconnected. These characteristics have historically facilitated informal movement between the two countries, making border management a complex security challenge.

Former Lebanese Member of Parliament (MP) and retired General Wehbe Katicha told The Beiruter that human smuggling has historically been connected to broader border dynamics. Coming from a border village himself, Katicha explained that informal crossings existed for years due to family ties, economic differences, and geographical realities.

According to Katicha, smuggling expanded significantly after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, particularly when many young Syrians sought to avoid military service or security pressure under the former Assad regime.

Meanwhile, Bachir Matar, the mayor of Al-Qaa, a Lebanese border town in the eastern Bekaa region, told The Beiruter that human smuggling has never completely stopped, although its intensity varies depending on circumstances on both sides of the border.

There has always been infiltration of individuals and smuggling operations.

Matar noted that activity fluctuates without a fixed pattern. According to him, smugglers rely on multiple crossing points, taking advantage of the absence of clear physical barriers in many areas.

Matar highlighted that one of the main obstacles is the geographical nature of the border around Al-Qaa, where there are no major natural barriers separating Lebanese and Syrian territory. He explained that valleys, plains, and the proximity of residential areas on both sides allow individuals to cross more easily, particularly through lands that have been illegally occupied or used as informal routes.

The economic incentives behind smuggling networks

Matar pointed to the economic structure surrounding illegal crossings. He explained that human smuggling has become a profitable activity for organized networks, with individuals paying smugglers around $50 to enter Lebanon illegally. According to him, the problem is that many individuals who are detained and returned can simply pay the same amount again and re-enter through another illegal crossing.

The problem is not only those crossing the border, but those organizing the operation.

This dynamic has transformed some border areas into environments where informal economies can challenge state authority. Matar warned that smugglers who operate openly and repeatedly without serious consequences can accumulate financial power, allowing them to influence and create pressure on decision-makers on both sides as well as weaken state control over border regions.

The danger is that an illegal economy develops along the border.

Security concerns beyond migration

The resumption of smuggling activity has raised concerns that illegal crossings may not only involve individuals seeking economic opportunities or attempting to reach Europe, but could also create security vulnerabilities.

It remains unclear how many people entering Lebanon irregularly intend to remain in the country and how many view Lebanon as a transit point toward Europe. In recent years, Lebanese authorities have repeatedly intercepted attempts to transport migrants by sea from Lebanon’s northern coastline toward European destinations.

However, uncontrolled border movement could potentially be exploited for other purposes. Katicha warned that weak border control could potentially facilitate the movement of weapons, ammunition, or individuals seeking to destabilize Lebanon; particularly given the presence of actors on both sides who may oppose current state-building efforts.

Matar also warned that the uncontrolled movement of people through illegal crossings creates risks beyond migration, particularly the possibility of weapons, ammunition, or unidentified individuals entering Lebanon. He argued that border chaos could be exploited by actors seeking to create instability, noting that authorities cannot always know who is crossing or what their intentions are.

Additionally, Matar raised concerns that illegal crossings could potentially be used to move individuals linked to extremist groups or armed networks, particularly during periods of political transition and uncertainty. According to him, instability along the border creates opportunities for actors who benefit from disorder.

Post-Assad transition and new border dynamics

The collapse of the former Assad regime has introduced new security realities along the border. While some aspects of cross-border movement have changed, the transition period has also created uncertainty.

Matar said that Syrian authorities have become more active in controlling certain types of movement but that illegal crossings remain possible. He argued that while the Syrian side has increased efforts to regulate certain activities, human movement remains difficult to control.

Katicha similarly stressed that both Lebanese and Syrian authorities need greater coordination. According to him, Syria’s security institutions are still undergoing reconstruction after years of state collapse, making comprehensive border control a gradual process. “Today they are starting almost from zero,” he said, arguing that improving border security requires time, technological resources, and stronger intelligence cooperation.

Institutional gaps and the need for stronger enforcement and coordination

Matar criticized weaknesses in legal and institutional coordination.

He pointed to what he described as insufficient deterrence against smugglers, arguing that individuals involved in organizing illegal crossings often return to their activities after limited penalties. In this context, he stressed the importance of identifying and prosecuting the Lebanese and Syrian networks behind smuggling operations rather than focusing only on those crossing the border. According to him, transporters, coordinators, and individuals facilitating illegal movement should face stronger judicial measures. He thus warned that short detention periods, limited fines, or quick releases allow smuggling networks to continue operating.

Moreover, Matar identified the absence of a unified database among Lebanese institutions as a major weakness. He explained that information related to Syrian nationals, residency status, security records, and legal procedures is distributed among several institutions, including municipalities and security agencies, without sufficient coordination.

Matar further argued that Lebanon lacks an integrated mechanism allowing authorities to immediately identify individuals entering or leaving the country illegally, increasing the possibility that people removed from Lebanon can return through the same networks.

On another note, and in relation to Al-Qaa particularly, Matar believed that the construction of stronger physical barriers could significantly reduce illegal crossings. He stated that installing high barriers, concertina wire, and large trenches could potentially decrease illegal movement by around 90%, reducing the burden on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), security agencies, courts, and municipalities.

However, he simultaneously highlighted that the LAF alone cannot address the challenge and that broader coordination between security institutions, municipalities, ministries, and judicial authorities is necessary.

As Syria undergoes a transitional period and Lebanon seeks to reinforce state authority, both countries face the need for greater coordination, stronger surveillance capabilities, and more effective legal enforcement. For border communities, which have carried much of the burden of instability and illicit activity, restoring security remains closely linked to rebuilding state control and preventing the emergence of parallel economies along the frontier.