A moment Lebanon must not miss

After years of conflict, fragile stability, and persistent interference from external actors and armed groups such as Hezbollah, the country now faces what Robert Satloff calls “a genuine, though limited, opportunity for change.”

Satloff, executive director of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy -a leading nonpartisan think tank in Washington, D.C., focused on advancing U.S. interests and promoting peace and security in the Middle East through research and policy analysis- observes that “the vast majority of the people of Lebanon reject Iranian domination, reject Hezbollah’s claim to speak for the government and people of the country, and reject the idea that Lebanon should be a battlefield of conflict with Israel.”

For some, this moment means embracing peace with Israel; for others, simply ending the long-term cycle of war. “However one describes it, it is a dramatic shift,” Satloff told The Beiruter. He warns,

We would be remiss if we did not take advantage of this moment to build on this shift... it would be an enormous mistake and historic loss if we fail to take advantage of it.

For decades, Lebanon’s sovereignty has been undermined by the reality that “non-state armed actors, especially Hezbollah,” have operated outside the authority of the state. This contradiction -a nation with the trappings of government but without a monopoly on force- has made Lebanon vulnerable to recurring conflicts it neither controls nor chooses.

Satloff draws on his extensive engagement with regional issues from Morocco to Iran to underscore Lebanon’s enduring vulnerability. He argues that Lebanon’s predicament stems not only from foreign interference but also from a longstanding failure by its own leaders to confront Hezbollah’s military autonomy. Satloff warns that the present “opportunity is fragile” and urges that it should not be squandered.

The opening for change

Recent events have fundamentally shifted Lebanon’s political landscape. Satloff observes, “Because of the very significant Israeli military activity over the last two years, both before the 2024th cessation of hostilities and since the March 2nd [2026] launch of the current round of conflict, Hezbollah has been dramatically weakened.”

Although the group still maintains patronage networks and the ability to intimidate, its aura of invincibility has faded. This new reality has affected all segments of Lebanese society, including the Shia community, where frustration is rising as the costs of Hezbollah’s actions increase and its promises go unfulfilled.

Satloff believes this shift presents a unique opportunity for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): “One has to assume that this dramatic weakening of Hezbollah gives the LAF a far greater opportunity to do what is necessary to show its commitment to those principles of disarming and dismantling.” He calls for “far more visible display of active efforts to implement those commitments now.”

The framework agreement

Central to Satloff’s analysis is the June 2026 Trilateral Framework Agreement among the United States, Lebanon, and Israel. The framework is straightforward: progressive Lebanese disarming and dismantling of non-state armed actors, especially Hezbollah, will trigger progressive Israeli redeployment and withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Satloff is clear: “The deployment of the LAF is merely one component of the larger and more profound commitment to disarm and dismantle non-state armed actors, especially Hezbollah. That is the bargain.”

He is sharply critical of Lebanese officials who have substituted the mere presence of the army in the south for genuine action on disarmament. Satloff warns that relying on symbolic gestures instead of real, verifiable progress risks wasting Lebanon’s best chance in years to restore true national authority. As he puts it,

Lebanese officials have talked and acted far less frequently in recent weeks based on disarming and dismantling Hezbollah, replacing this with the idea that the deployment of the LAF itself fulfills Lebanon's core requirement in the Framework Agreement. That is not the case.

For Satloff, genuine implementation must go beyond declarations and involve measurable benchmarks. U.S. assistance to the LAF, he argues, should be “commensurate with the LAF's active implementation of those commitments,” not offered in exchange for promises or symbolic gestures. The true test of success is whether the Lebanese army is genuinely empowered to operate as the country’s only legitimate armed force.

The essential role of the United States

Satloff insists that sustained U.S. engagement is indispensable to any meaningful progress. “Without an agreed third party to serve as monitor and verifier,” he cautions, “I don’t think we’re going to get nearly as far, nearly as fast as this process has the potential to achieve.” His disappointment with recent American inaction is clear: “I do regret that over the last several weeks we have been too passive, in my view, in getting the parties to fulfill their responsibilities.” According to Satloff, only focused U.S. diplomatic efforts, military coordination, and political attention can ensure that commitments are honored and spoilers kept at bay.

He also emphasizes mutual accountability as critical for the framework’s success. The United States, he argues, must press both Lebanon and Israel equally to meet their obligations, as progress on Lebanese disarmament should be matched by Israeli actions. If either side falters, the agreement could lose credibility and risk empowering spoilers like Hezbollah. Satloff remains firm on Washington’s decisive role: “If the United States is fully and deeply engaged and if we use our unique position to press both parties to fulfill their commitments in the framework agreement, then the framework agreement will succeed. It will not succeed if we don’t play that role.” The consequences of failure, he warns, are severe: “Failure would be costly. Hezbollah could reconstitute, Iranian influence could recover, and another Israel-Lebanon war could become only a matter of time.”

Marginalizing Iran’s influence

Satloff regards Hezbollah as a key instrument of Iranian regional strategy rather than a genuine pillar of Lebanese sovereignty. He suggests that Iran’s leverage in Lebanon is closely tied to Hezbollah’s military independence from the Lebanese state.

Should the framework agreement succeed in dismantling Hezbollah’s armed structure, Iran’s strategic influence in Lebanon would sharply decline, reducing Lebanon’s exposure to Tehran’s regional ambitions.

As Satloff puts it,

The successful implementation of the framework agreement will render Iran's role in Lebanon diminished, marginal, and eventually irrelevant.

A cautious path forward

Satloff adopts a pragmatic stance on the future of Lebanese Israeli relations, acknowledging that deep emotional, political, and historical challenges remain. He contends that peace does not require sweeping or immediate agreements but should begin with the practical goal of ending Lebanon’s role as a stage for repeated regional conflict. Whether some Lebanese support full normalization with Israel or seek to end hostilities, Satloff sees a shared desire to move beyond being used for the ambitions of outside powers.

His approach is incremental: “I walk before I run, I run before I ski,” and he cautions against unrealistic expectations: “let's do things properly, let's build on opportunities and achievements, and, hopefully, there's a very bright future for this relationship. But I don't want to gild the lily, as we say.” For Satloff, the immediate priority is to marginalize and dismantle “these terrorist groups that plague both countries,” and create the foundation for a new relationship.

The real test of sovereignty

Ultimately, Satloff’s assessment is both a warning and a call to action. He stresses that Lebanon faces “an unusual moment” and warns, “We would be remiss if we did not take advantage of this moment to build on this shift... it would be an enormous mistake and historic loss if we fail to take advantage of it.” Without decisive steps and sustained engagement, he cautions that the opportunity could be lost and the risks of renewed conflict and outside interference would rise.

He frames Hezbollah’s legacy as a barrier to Lebanese aspirations, arguing that if Lebanon is to “turn the page and start a whole new chapter,” it must do so by marginalizing Hezbollah and with the determined involvement of the United States and its partners.

Satloff emphasizes that success depends on American commitment: “It's a bit of a chicken and egg issue here. If the United States is fully and deeply engaged and uses its unique position to press both parties to fulfill their commitments in the framework agreement, then the framework agreement will succeed. It will not succeed if we don’t play that role.”

He is candid about the risks of hesitation, stating, “I do regret that over the last several weeks we have been too passive, in my view, in getting the parties to fulfill their responsibilities in the framework agreement. And I would like to see us be more active and engaged on this.”

For Satloff, the stakes could not be higher: “It would be an enormous mistake and historic loss if we fail to take advantage of it.” Lebanon’s future, he insists, hangs in the balance—this is not a chance to be wasted.