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Neutrality: Lebanon’s way out of the regional trap?

Neutrality: Lebanon’s way out of the regional trap?

Lebanon’s neutrality debate examines whether positive neutrality can protect sovereignty, preserve regional ties and address Hezbollah’s military role.

By Joe Hammoura | November 11, 2026
Reading time: 6 min
Neutrality: Lebanon’s way out of the regional trap?

Lebanon had repeatedly paid heavy price for regional conflicts and rivalries it could neither control nor escape. From the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Syrian war and the Iran-Israel confrontation, competing regional alignments have undermined its stability and sovereignty.

Against this backdrop, neutrality has returned to the political debate. While its supporters see it as a mean of protecting independence and strengthening state authority, its opponents questions its compatibility with Lebanon’s Arab identity, regional responsibilities, and security needs.

 

Between permanent and positive neutrality

Neutrality does not necessarily mean isolation. Permanent neutrality generally refers to a state’s commitment to remain outside military conflicts between other countries while retaining the right to defend its territory. Switzerland and Austria offer different historical examples of this approach, although their political and security circumstances differ considerably from Lebanon’s.

Lebanese advocates have increasingly prompted the concept of ‘Positive Neutrality,’ which emphasize active diplomatic engagement rather that withdrawal from international affairs. It seeks to preserve Lebanon’s relationships with the Arab world and the international community while preventing its involvement in regional military confrontations.

Speaking to The Beiruter, Dr. Wissam Maalouf, founder and president of the Lebanese Center for Strategic Planning (LeClips), argue that Positive Neutrality should be understood as “a mechanism for protection and engagement, not for isolation.” He envisions Lebanon playing a constructive role in mediation, humanitarian diplomacy, international law, and peacebuilding, while grounding its foreign policy in human rights and the rule of law.

This distinction is important. Neutrality, as its Lebanese proponents describe it, does not mean abandoning legitimate causes or remaining silent in the face of aggression. Rather, it seeks to distinguish diplomatic positions from military involvement in conflicts between regional powers.

 

A divided political landscape

The political debate over neutrality does not follow a completely straightforward sectarian or partisan division. The Lebanese forces and Kataeb have repeatedly advocated keeping Lebanon outside regional conflicts and placing strategic decisions under state authority.

Other political forces have expressed support for keeping Lebanon away particular regional confrontations without necessarily endorsing permanent neutrality as a constitutional doctrine. This distinction matters: opposing involvement in specific war does not automatically mean supporting a comprehensive neutrality policy.

Hezbollah’s military capabilities and regional relationship with Iran, meanwhile, represent one of the central challenges to the proposal. The party’s commitment to resistance and its regional strategic role raise questions about whether Lebanon can remain neutral while a powerful domestic actor retains independent military capabilities and participates in regional conflicts.

Tony Hanna, founder and coordinator of the Lebanon Neutrality Gathering, argues that neutrality should not become the project of a particular political camp. “Neutrality should not be a project of a party, a sect, or a political axis, but a project that brings all Lebanese together,” he told The Beiruter.

For Hanna, the objective is to ensure that Lebanon’s national interests, rather than the calculations of regional powers, determine its strategic decisions.

 

The Hezbollah question

Despite their different approaches, both interviewees acknowledge that neutrality cannot be fully implemented without addressing the relationship between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah’s military role.

“It is impossible to achieve effective and sustainable neutrality while a military or political decision exists outside states institutions,” Hanna explained.

He nevertheless distinguishes between launching a national neutrality project and fulfilling all the conditions requires for its implementation. He believes dialogue and constitutional preparation can begin before the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons is resolved.

However, postponing the neutrality process in the hope of reaching an understanding with Hezbollah is neither a practical approach nor necessarily in Lebanon’s national interest. Previous rounds of national dialogue among Lebanese political forces have failed to persuade the Party to reconsider its regional involvement and its strategic alignment with Iran.

Maalouf similarly argues that Lebanon cannot afford to postpone the entire process until all domestic and regional conflicts disappear. He proposes a three-phase roadmap: an inclusive national dialogue initiated by the President of the Republic, the adoption of its conclusions as government policy, and eventually parliamentary legislation and constitutional amendments.

This introduces an important dimension to the debate. Neutrality cannot mean imposing obligations on Lebanon while disregarding its right to defend its sovereignty against external aggression. Any sustainable arrangement must address both the question of armed authority inside Lebanon and the protection of its internationally recognized borders.

 

Neutrality remains an elite debate

Perhaps the most reveling aspect of the two interviewees concerns the limited popular reach of the neutrality proposal.

Despite years of discussion among political figures, intellectuals, religious leaders, and researchers, neutrality has not yet developed into a broad-based national movement.

Hanna believes this is partly because neutrality has traditionally been presented as a political and constitutional concept rather than a project connected to citizens’ everyday concerns.

Maalouf identifies a similar problem, pointing to widespread misunderstandings of Positive Neutrality and the perception that it represents isolationism or abandonment of Lebanon’s Arab identity. He also highlights entrenched political interests and the absence of sustained public outreach.

Both believe that the discussion must extend beyond intellectual and political circles to universities, professional associations, civil society organizations, local communities, partisans, and young people.

Yet an important challenge remains: how can neutrality advocates convince citizens that it would provide greater security, particularly when some communities consider existing military arrangements essential to their protection? This requires credible security guarantees and a convincing demonstration that the state can protect all Lebanese.

 

From aspiration to implementation

Even without comprehensive political agreement, Lebanon could begin taking measures to reduce its exposure to regional conflicts. These include strengthening the principle that decisions of war and peace belong to constitutional institutions, preventing the use of Lebanese territory to threaten other countries, maintaining balanced diplomatic relations, and reinforcing the Lebanese Army’s ability to protect the country’s borders.

Such measures would not constitute full neutrality, but they could establish a foundation for a broader national discussion.

Hanna believes the coming years should focus on building a cross-sectarian coalition, preparing a clear constitutional framework, and engaging political forces that remain skeptical of the proposal. Maalouf, meanwhile, emphasizes the importance of initiating national dialogue and translating its conclusions into institutional policy.

Ultimately, Lebanon’s neutrality dilemma reflects a deeper struggle over the nature of its state and its position in the Middle East. Switzerland and Austria demonstrate that neutrality can become a durable foreign-policy framework under particular historical and institutional conditions. Lebanon, however, faces a different challenge: reaching an internal understanding of sovereignty in a country where political and military calculations remain closely connected to regional rivalries.

The question is therefore not simply whether Lebanon should declare itself neutral, but whether its political leadership and society can agree that the country’s strategic decisions must be made by its own institutions, with the capacity to protect every citizen and defend its territory. Without that agreement, neutrality risks remaining an attractive political aspiration for elites rather an achievable national policy.

    • Joe Hammoura