Syria's rebrand meets its test in Yemen

When Ahmed al-Sharaa landed in Riyadh last Wednesday, his second visit to the Saudi capital in less than a month, he left with a defence cooperation agreement between the two countries' defence ministries and more than $403 million in Saudi concessional loans for energy, housing, health and infrastructure.

Under al-Sharaa, Damascus is trying to rebrand itself to the world. Back in August, Washington removed Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, a designation in place since 1979. A country long listed as a state sponsor of terrorism now wants to be seen as a state that conducts state-to-state relations rather than the state-to-proxy relations that defined the Assad era. But Saudi Arabia's escalating war with Yemen's Houthis is turning that rebrand into a test, and Damascus may not be able to stay on the sidelines.

Riyadh was al-Sharaa's first foreign destination as president in February 2025. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman brokered his first meeting with Donald Trump that May, and Saudi lobbying helped lift international sanctions. The result was 47 investment agreements worth about $6.4 billion in July 2025, a package in February covering telecoms, a joint airline and a new airport, and now last week's loans.

Under Bashar al-Assad, Syria was a node in Iran's regional network, a corridor for weapons to Hezbollah, and a host to allied militias. Al-Sharaa has tried to replace that model with formal agreements between governments. The ministry-to-ministry defence deal signed in Riyadh is the clearest example yet.

The Yemen dilemma

In October, as Houthi missiles and drones struck Saudi airports and infrastructure, Reuters and Axios reported that Riyadh had asked Damascus to send troops. Al-Sharaa's media adviser denied any request was made, and Syrian officials insist the country's priority is reconstruction.

A US official told Reuters that a Syrian show of support could increase Saudi financial assistance. For a country this dependent on Saudi money, continued aid and investment may come to depend on how much Syria contributes to the war in Yemen.

A similar situation unfolded in 1990 when Hafez al-Assad sent troops to Saudi Arabia to join the US-led coalition against Iraq. They never saw combat, but, as Joshua Landis of the University of Oklahoma told Amwaj Media, they bought Syria goodwill in the Gulf and in Washington. For now, Damascus seems to be seeking a similar middle path. Both governments have avoided public commitments on combat troops in Yemen, focusing instead on defence and training cooperation.

Since then, the reports have multiplied and so have the denials. Lebanon’s Al-Modon, citing a source familiar with the visit, claimed around 1,500 Syrian fighters had already arrived in the kingdom, though it was unclear whether they were there to defend Saudi territory or as a first step toward Yemen. Last week, AFP quoted Yemeni officials saying Syrian troops were in Yemen and thousands more could follow. Sources at Syria’s defence and interior ministries, and a senior Yemeni defence official, denied this to MBN, and SANA quoted a Syrian diplomatic source saying the agreements with Riyadh are limited to training and military consultations. Reuters has confirmed that dozens of Syrian military personnel have travelled to Saudi Arabia to train Saudi and Yemeni units. Both governments have avoided public commitments on combat troops in Yemen, focusing instead on defence and training cooperation.

A double-edged sword

Since taking power almost two years ago, al-Sharaa has worked to keep Syria out of regional conflicts, most visibly by declining to move against Hezbollah in Lebanon despite US pressure. His reasons have not changed. Syria is still rebuilding after nearly 14 years of civil war, its army is being assembled from former rebel factions, and al-Sharaa is still consolidating his authority at home.

Joining the fight against the Houthis would put Syria back in the sights of Iran's allies. A campaign against the Houthis could also be read by Syria's minorities as a sectarian project, undercutting efforts to rebuild trust at home.

All of this comes while Israel continues to breach Syrian sovereignty. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) documented that Israeli forces still hold territory in the southwest seized after Assad's fall, and incursions into Daraa and Quneitra continued last week. A Syria stretched by a war on the Arabian Peninsula would be even less able to respond.

Turkey and the Mecca pact

Ankara has been al-Sharaa's staunchest backer, and last week the Turkish parliament ratified the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan by 279 votes to 119. Signed in August, the pact's first article commits members to use "all necessary means" against threats to one another's territorial integrity, language that echoes NATO's Article 5.

Damascus has been courting all three members. In August, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Asaad Hassan Al-Shaibani travelled to Islamabad, the first visit to Pakistan by a senior Syrian minister in 19 years, and said Syria was weighing whether to join the grouping. Furthemore, al-Shaibani told the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain that discussions were under way on Syria joining. "Syria will stand beside all of the Gulf countries," he said. Egypt is weighing membership too, and the Houthi threat is increasingly the common ground drawing these states together.

For Syria, joining would deepen its commitment to Saudi Arabia's war and bind it more tightly to Turkey, whose expanding role in Syria Israel treats as a threat. In August, Israel struck near the Abu al-Duhur airbase south of Aleppo, a move widely read as a message to Ankara. The closer Damascus moves to the pact, the more it risks being cast as an adversary by Israel, at a time when Israeli forces are already operating on Syrian soil.

Opportunity and danger

The Houthi war therefore presents Syria with both an opportunity and a danger. Helping Riyadh could secure the aid and investment al-Sharaa's recovery depends on, and confirm Syria's new image as a reliable state partner. But it could also overstretch a country that remains fragile at home, invite retaliation from Iran's allies, and sharpen the confrontation with Israel.

For now, al-Sharaa is trying to show solidarity without sending soldiers. How long Riyadh accepts that, and whether Syria signs on to the Mecca pact, may decide how far its rebrand can go.