Are we closer or farther away from elections?

For months, postponing Lebanon’s parliamentary elections appeared to be the most likely scenario. Political discourse revolved around technical delays, perhaps a two-month deferral, or even a full one-year extension of parliament’s mandate. Recently, however, the conversation has shifted. Momentum is building around holding the elections on time, without delay or extension.

Behind the scenes, intensive consultations have reportedly taken place between President Joseph Aoun and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, as well as between Aoun and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. These discussions appear to have strengthened the prospect of elections being held in May. Public statements by both Berri and Geagea have further fueled expectations that the constitutional timetable will be respected.

Yet a pivotal question remains unresolved: under which law will the elections be conducted?

The controversy centers on the unimplemented provisions of the so-called “16th district,” a reform designed to allocate six parliamentary seats exclusively to Lebanese citizens voting from abroad. To date, the necessary implementing decrees have not been issued, creating both legal and constitutional ambiguity. In practice, this has revived discussion of reverting to the framework used in the 2022 elections, allowing registered expatriates to vote for all 128 members of parliament in their respective home districts, rather than limiting them to six diaspora-designated seats.

Given the administrative hurdles surrounding the 16th district, a return to the 2022 formula increasingly appears to be the most feasible path forward.

This shift raises an important political question:

what has changed in the position of the so-called “Shiite duo,” particularly Speaker Berri, who previously insisted on restricting expatriate voting to six seats and resisted efforts to repeal the 16th district provision?

Part of the answer lies in the numbers. Registration rates among expatriates have declined compared to previous cycles, largely due to confusion over the applicable legal framework and uncertainty surrounding voting procedures. At first glance, lower registration might suggest diminished diaspora influence in the upcoming vote.

A closer look, however, reveals a more nuanced picture. A significant proportion of registered expatriates are believed to support the Shiite political camp, easing concerns that prevailed in 2022 when overseas results leaned heavily toward opposition forces. This recalibration may have reduced the perceived political risk of allowing expatriates to vote for all 128 seats, paving the way for a more flexible stance.

But numbers alone do not explain the recalculation. For Hezbollah, the imperative of holding elections extends beyond electoral arithmetic. Amid shifting domestic dynamics and sustained regional and international pressure, the party has a vested interest in renewing its popular mandate within the Shiite community. Elections offer an opportunity to reaffirm its political legitimacy, and, by extension, the legitimacy of its strategic choices, including the contentious issue of its arms, a central pillar of its doctrine.

In this light, the convergence of improved electoral math and broader political considerations helps explain the Shiite duo’s apparent openness to restoring full expatriate voting rights.

For his part, President Joseph Aoun has taken a clear stance in favor of holding elections on schedule, rejecting any scenario that would lead to postponement. From the presidential palace in Baabda, the issue is not merely procedural. With only one year elapsed since the beginning of his term, the elections represent an early test of the administration’s credibility. Even a technical delay could be interpreted domestically and internationally as a retreat from constitutional commitments.

The president’s support for granting expatriates the right to vote for all 128 MPs aligns with the pledges he made in his inaugural address, particularly his commitment to strengthening the role of the Lebanese diaspora in national political life. Limiting expatriates to symbolic representation would contradict that vision. Ensuring their full participation reinforces the principle of partnership between residents and the global Lebanese community in shaping national decisions.

The position of the Lebanese Forces is equally consistent with its long-standing rhetoric. The party has repeatedly emphasized the importance of adhering to constitutional deadlines, whether for parliamentary, municipal, or presidential elections, arguing that timely electoral cycles should be the norm in Lebanon’s political life, not a rare achievement. From its perspective, any deviation from constitutional schedules entrenches damaging precedents and further erodes public trust in state institutions.

Recent polling suggesting a rise in support for the Lebanese Forces adds a layer of political incentive to this principled stance. A timely election could translate into a larger parliamentary bloc, aligning constitutional advocacy with tangible political gain.

Despite the growing chorus in favor of on-time elections, it would be premature to consider the matter settled. Lebanese politics rarely moves in straight lines. The landscape remains volatile, more akin to a fluctuating stock market than a fixed calendar, susceptible to sudden shifts driven by domestic maneuvering or external shocks.

Beyond internal disputes over electoral law, the broader regional environment looms large. The trajectory of negotiations between Iran and the United States, in particular, could cast a long shadow over Lebanon. Given the deep interconnection between regional files and domestic balances of power, any dramatic turn, whether toward detente or escalation, would reverberate quickly on the Lebanese scene.

A major military escalation involving Iran, especially if it were to extend to Hezbollah, would almost certainly bring the prospect of postponement back to the forefront, this time under the banner of security necessity. In such a scenario, constitutional timelines could once again yield to the exigencies of events on the ground.

For now, Lebanon’s electoral path rests on a delicate equilibrium: an internal push toward respecting constitutional deadlines counterbalanced by external variables that could upend calculations overnight. Whether the country will indeed go to the polls on time remains an open question, one that hinges not only on domestic consensus, but on the unpredictable currents of a turbulent region.