Hezbollah’s real objection: Beyond the agreement

Hezbollah has opposed the agreement signed in Washington between Lebanon and Israel under U.S. auspices by mobilizing its supporters to protest in the streets. The group argues that the deal fails to secure Israel’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanese territory or the return of Lebanese prisoners.

On the surface, Hezbollah’s objection is based on the substance of the agreement itself. The deal does not provide for Israel’s immediate withdrawal from the occupied areas, making it, in the party’s view, an agreement that falls short of restoring Lebanon’s full sovereignty and effectively accepts the continuation of Israeli occupation.

This position, however, raises questions about the consistency of Hezbollah’s rhetoric. The group had previously welcomed the inclusion of a Lebanon ceasefire within the broader understanding reached between Iran and the United States, portraying it as a major political achievement that served Lebanon’s interests. Yet the U.S.-Iran understanding likewise contained no commitment to an immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory or to the return of prisoners of war. Instead, it merely consolidated a ceasefire while Israeli forces continued to occupy approximately 600 square kilometers of southern Lebanon. Despite this, Hezbollah and its supporters staged no protests. On the contrary, the agreement was celebrated as a diplomatic success achieved by Tehran on Lebanon’s behalf.

This apparent contradiction raises broader questions about the criteria Hezbollah applies when evaluating agreements related to Lebanon. Are its positions determined by the actual content of such agreements, or by the party responsible for negotiating and concluding them?

A comparison of the two cases suggests that Hezbollah’s objection is driven less by the substance of the Washington agreement than by the identity of those who negotiated it. The arrangement reached by the Lebanese state with Israel under U.S. mediation includes a ceasefire and a mechanism for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory within what has been described as the “Pilot Zone.” By contrast, the Lebanon-related provisions of the U.S.-Iran understanding contained no comparable commitment, limiting themselves to formalizing a ceasefire while Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanese territory remained in place.

From this perspective, Hezbollah’s rejection of the agreement appears to stem not from what it delivers for Lebanese sovereignty, but from the fact that the Lebanese state led the negotiations and concluded the deal. The party is unwilling to allow Lebanon’s legitimate state institutions to claim a political achievement that could strengthen their authority and role, and it opposes the emergence of an independent Lebanese political track separate from Iran’s regional agenda.

Accordingly, Hezbollah remains committed to keeping Lebanon within Iran’s sphere of influence, viewing the country as a negotiating asset in Tehran’s broader regional calculations. Any success by the Lebanese state in reclaiming its role or securing sovereign gains through its constitutional institutions is therefore perceived as diminishing Iran’s influence inside Lebanon.

Within this framework, Hezbollah seeks to tie Lebanon’s future to regional developments involving Iran, effectively keeping Lebanese decision-making subordinate to Tehran’s strategic interests. At the same time, it refuses to recognize the Lebanese state and its institutions as the natural authority responsible for managing sovereign affairs and negotiating on behalf of the country.

Ultimately, if Hezbollah concludes that the liberation of occupied territory, the return of displaced residents to their villages in southern Lebanon, and the launch of reconstruction efforts can be achieved through the institutions of the Lebanese state, it is likely to obstruct that process by all available means. For the party, the central issue is not whether these objectives are achieved, but who receives credit for achieving them.

Hezbollah’s overriding priority remains preventing the Lebanese state from strengthening its legitimacy and authority while ensuring that Lebanon’s political decisions remain linked to Iranian influence. Consequently, any accomplishment secured by Lebanon’s legitimate institutions is viewed as a setback to the influence of Hezbollah and its allies, and is therefore rejected, even when it serves the interests of the Lebanese people.

For Hezbollah, preserving Iran’s influence in Lebanon takes precedence over all other considerations, including the costs borne by Lebanon as a whole, the south in particular, and the country’s Shiite community, which has long been the segment of society most directly affected by the consequences of the wars initiated by the party.