How Hezbollah’s expanding presence beyond its traditional strongholds is raising questions about coexistence, civilian security and who holds authority over Lebanon’s decisions of war and peace.
Hezb’s expanding reach beyond its traditional strongholds
Hezb’s expanding reach beyond its traditional strongholds
The Lebanese Shiite population is concentrated mainly across three geographical areas: southern Lebanon and Nabatieh, the northern Bekaa, particularly Baalbek and Hermel, and Beirut’s southern suburbs. These areas also constitute the principal centers of Hezbollah’s political, social and military influence, although its networks and supporters extend well beyond them. According to demographic estimates cited by the European Union Agency for Asylum, Shiites account for approximately 30 percent of Lebanon’s population. The absence of an official census since 1932, however, makes it difficult to establish precise contemporary figures.
Hezb beyond traditional strongholds
A security source, speaking to The Beiruter on condition of anonymity, said Hezbollah’s presence is no longer confined to Beirut’s southern suburbs. Several party officials and figures relocated to other parts of Beirut and Mount Lebanon following the war, the source explained, contributing to a more visible presence in areas outside the party’s traditional strongholds. This includes mixed-sectarian neighborhoods where Hezbollah-linked networks and supporters have established or maintained a presence.
Qassem’s speech and displays of mobilization
The geographical reach of Hezbollah has come under renewed scrutiny following Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s November 11 Martyrs’ Day speech. Reaffirming his rejection of disarmament and defending the continuation of the party’s armed activities, Qassem adopted a defiant tone as pressure mounts on Hezbollah to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state.
The speech was followed by displays of mobilization among supporters, most notably a gathering in Maaisra, in the Keserwan district, where participants were heard chanting Hezbollah slogans. The incident drew attention because, although Maaisra has a local Shiite population, it is not a Shiite-majority town and is situated in a predominantly Christian region.
Such displays of partisan mobilization in areas outside Hezbollah’s traditional strongholds are bound to raise questions about the party’s intentions and its relationship with other communities. In a country where sectarian sensitivities remain deeply entrenched, projecting political influence through public demonstrations and partisan slogans can easily be perceived as an attempt to test local boundaries rather than encourage coexistence.
In this context, Lawyer and political analyst Louis Abou Charaf, speaking to The Beiruter, was particularly critical of Hezbollah’s presence and conduct beyond its traditional areas of influence.
“Hezbollah is foreign to Lebanon’s Shiite community, to the people of the South, and to Lebanon itself,” he said, describing the party’s political and military project as one imported from abroad. “Hezbollah is very clear about what it wants, and frankly, it is brazen about it.”
Abou Sharaf also recalled the positions of the late Sheikh Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine, who had urged Lebanese Shiites to integrate fully into Lebanese society, regardless of where they lived, and to coexist with the country's other communities. In his view, the scenes in Maaisra stood in direct contrast to that vision.
He argued that Hezbollah supporters chanting party slogans in a predominantly non-Shiite area could understandably be perceived as provocative. “Imagine the Lebanese Forces or the Kataeb entering the heart of Beirut’s southern suburbs to chant their party slogans. How would Hezbollah react? People in Maaisra have every reason to see this as a provocation. I find this kind of behavior unacceptable,” he said.
Abou Charaf further accused Hezbollah of undermining civil peace while simultaneously presenting criticism of its weapons as a threat to national stability.
“The moment anyone raises a sensitive issue, especially its weapons, it turns around and accuses them of threatening civil peace. Meanwhile, it is burning bridges with every other Lebanese in the country,” he concluded.
Historical geography of Shiite community
Political researcher and writer Dr. Daoud Rammal offered a broader historical perspective on the geographical distribution of Lebanon’s Shiite population, stressing the need to distinguish between the community itself and Hezbollah’s political and military structures.
According to Dr. Rammal, Jabal Amel, which historically encompasses extensive parts of southern Lebanon, remains the principal center of Shiite settlement, particularly in the districts of Tyre, Nabatieh and Bint Jbeil, as well as parts of Marjeyoun, Saida and Zahrani.
“In the Bekaa, Shiite communities are concentrated predominantly in Baalbek and Hermel, while Mount Lebanon is home to several Shiite villages, particularly in the Jbeil district,” Rammal added.
He further emphasized that this geographical distribution long predates Hezbollah and is rooted in centuries of historical, religious, social and economic developments. The marginalization of peripheral regions and the limited presence of state institutions also contributed to the emergence of movements demanding greater political representation and equality.
Where the community ends and Hezbollah’s influence begins
Mapping Lebanon’s Shiite population does not, in itself, provide a map of Hezbollah’s political or military control. The distinction is essential, particularly in a country where sectarian identity, political affiliation and organizational allegiance do not necessarily overlap.
The presence of Shiite communities in areas where they constitute a minority does not automatically translate into Hezbollah dominance. The central Bekaa, for instance, includes predominantly Christian and mixed areas that cannot be described as uniformly Shiite or under the party’s control. The same applies to Keserwan, Jbeil, Baabda and other religiously diverse districts of Mount Lebanon, where smaller Shiite communities coexist with other populations.
Conflating these communities with Hezbollah would overlook the diversity of political positions within Lebanon’s Shiite population and risk reinforcing the very divisions that the country has struggled to overcome.
Growing tensions within Shiite communities
Beyond the geographical distribution of the community, a more pressing issue is the growing friction between Hezbollah’s military activities and the interests of residents in areas where the organization operates.
Rammal warned that “when military equipment or activities are located within residential neighborhoods or near civilian infrastructure, the risks to residents increase significantly.”
“The deeper problem, however, lies in the transformation of Lebanese villages into arenas where local security considerations become intertwined with regional military calculations,” he added.
Recent incidents suggest that concerns about Hezbollah’s military presence are not limited to the party’s political opponents. In June, confrontations erupted in Baissariyeh, south of Saida, between supporters of Amal and Hezbollah over allegations that the latter were storing military equipment and rocket launchers in a residential area. A similar dispute emerged in Arab Salim in September, where residents voiced concerns that Hezbollah’s military activities could expose their town to Israeli retaliation.
These incidents point to a difficult dilemma facing parts of the Shiite community itself: how to reconcile the presence of an armed organization with the security and interests of civilians who have little say over decisions that could expose their towns to another military confrontation.
Growing challenge to state authority
The tensions are not confined to local disputes. In October, a truck carrying approximately 780 kilograms of explosives was intercepted at a checkpoint in Dahr al-Baidar. Hezbollah acknowledged ownership of the vehicle and its cargo and called for the release of those detained, setting off a political confrontation over the state’s authority to investigate cases involving the organization.
In a separate incident, young men on motorcycles reportedly attempted to obstruct an Internal Security Forces (ISF) patrol during a raid near the entrance to Beirut’s southern suburbs, prompting the army to intervene. Such episodes raise broader questions about the ability of state institutions to exercise their authority without encountering resistance from groups aligned with a powerful military and political organization.
Surely, the dispute surrounding Hezbollah extends far beyond its weapons or the negotiations with Israel. At its core lies a fundamental question: who has the authority to make decisions that determine Lebanon’s security and its future?
By refusing to discuss disarmament before an Israeli withdrawal, Qassem has effectively tied the fate of Hezbollah’s arsenal to conditions set by the organization itself, rather than to the authority and decisions of the Lebanese state.
For a country that endured 15 years of civil war, the implications are difficult to dismiss. Hezbollah supporters, like all Lebanese citizens, have the right to demonstrate and express their political views. But that right does not extend to intimidating opponents, obstructing legitimate state institutions or imposing a military doctrine on communities that may not share it.
The question, therefore, is not simply where Lebanon’s Shiite population lives, but whether Hezbollah is prepared to recognize that these communities, like every other part of the country, belong to a state with one legitimate authority over decisions of war and peace. Unless that principle is respected, the growing divide between the party’s military ambitions and Lebanon’s national interests risks becoming yet another source of internal instability.