Iran’s dual grip: Military and political power in Lebanon

Following the ceasefire agreement, Iran acted quickly to reinforce its footprint in Lebanon. More than one hundred officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were dispatched with a clear mission: to restore Hezbollah’s military and security apparatus. Their role, however, extends well beyond reconstruction, reaching into direct command and control, underscoring Tehran’s determination to assert decisive influence over the group’s structure and operations.

Iran’s expanding military footprint in Lebanon

This reality became increasingly visible when Hezbollah opened a front in support of Iran, reportedly in retaliation for the assassination of Ali Khamenei. In response, Israel carried out targeted operations that eliminated a number of these IRGC officers inside Lebanon, an escalation that exposed the extent of Iran’s embedded military role.

For the Lebanese state, this situation proved deeply embarrassing, placing it in an untenable position domestically and before both Arab and international audiences. The decision to request the departure of IRGC officers from Lebanese soil thus became unavoidable, less a decisive policy shift than an attempt to preserve a semblance of state authority. This was followed by a more consequential step: declaring Iran’s ambassador in Beirut persona non grata.

Notably, Hezbollah’s reaction to the demand that IRGC officers leave Lebanon was far more restrained than its response to the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador. The distinction likely reflects the party’s reading of both measures and their probable outcomes. The first appeared closer to a symbolic gesture, a political statement designed to save face rather than a decision the government was prepared or able to enforce. From Hezbollah’s perspective, it seemed destined to join a long list of unimplemented resolutions, much like those issued on August 5, 2025, and March 2, 2026.

The second decision, however, targeting Iran’s ambassador, carried immediate executive weight. It represented a clear diplomatic escalation with Tehran, making it far more sensitive and consequential in the eyes of Hezbollah.

Nabih Berri and the political cover of Iranian influence

A sharp reaction from Hezbollah was therefore entirely predictable, given its organic ties to the IRGC. Yet what stood out was not the party’s stance as much as the positioning of Nabih Berri. Berri chose to align himself openly with Hezbollah and the IRGC in opposition to a decision issued by the Lebanese state itself. In doing so, he revived longstanding questions about the duality of his role: a pillar of the Lebanese state on one hand, and, at critical moments, a political ally of Iran’s regional project on the other.

In truth, this stance is not new in Berri’s political trajectory. At every pivotal juncture, he has consistently appeared more inclined to defend the IRGC’s strategic vision than to uphold the responsibilities of his official position or the imperatives of Lebanese national interest.

For years, Berri has skillfully cultivated the image of a “tie-wearing” Shiite statesman, a contrast to Hezbollah’s more hardline leadership, capable of bridging divides between the Shiite community and other Lebanese factions, as well as engaging constructively with Arab and international actors.

But decisive political moments leave little room for ambiguity. They demand clarity, and, in doing so, they reveal underlying allegiances. A closer reading of Berri’s record shows that such moments have repeatedly exposed his role as a political defender of Iranian influence in Lebanon.

From obstructing presidential elections and government formation, to providing political cover for Hezbollah’s wars, to the military involvement of the Amal Movement in the events of May 7, 2008, his positioning has remained firmly anchored within the orbit of Iran’s strategic project.

Today, Lebanon faces one of its most perilous phases, both for the Shiite community and for the country as a whole. The IRGC’s role has become more direct and less concealed, extending beyond proxies to openly shape conflicts and instability across the region, from the Gulf to Lebanon itself. Yet once again, Berri has chosen the same position: offering political cover to a military system effectively managed by the IRGC. This is not a situational choice, but the continuation of a longstanding alignment.

Within this framework, Iran’s influence in Lebanon appears as a dual structure. It is not confined to the military dimension embodied by Hezbollah, but extends into a parallel political system, headed by Berri, that provides legitimacy, protection, and channels of communication between the military apparatus and both the Lebanese state and the broader international community.

Iran’s dual system in Lebanon

In the final analysis, Berri’s “tie” is more than a stylistic detail. It is part of a carefully crafted political image, marketed to Arab and international envoys as the face of “moderate” Shiite leadership in contrast to Hezbollah’s militancy. Yet this apparent dichotomy does not necessarily reflect a genuine divergence. Rather, it suggests a functional division of roles.

What appears as a difference in tone, between pragmatism and confrontation, ultimately masks a convergence in strategic choices. Viewed through this lens, the two sides resemble not opposing forces, but complementary instruments within a single trajectory, one whose rhythm is set by the IRGC, orchestrating its network of influence through both hard and soft power alike.