Negotiations' narrow margins

After the outbreak of the war, the Lebanese Cabinet convened on March 2 and issued a decision banning Hezbollah’s military activities. Yet the fate of this decision quickly mirrored that of the August 5 resolution: it was effectively shelved, with no tangible implementation on the ground, reflecting a lack of executive will to confront the party’s military structure.

This move was followed by an initiative put forward by President Joseph Aoun calling for direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. The proposal appeared to be an attempt to contain a war triggered by Hezbollah in support of the Iranian regime and in retaliation for the assassination of Ali Khamenei, with the aim of preventing a broader escalation and limiting the risks and repercussions for Lebanon, particularly for the Shiite community.

It is true that this initiative failed to gain meaningful traction with either the United States or Israel, a response that fundamentally reflects a divergence in how the root of the problem is understood. The crisis is not seen as stemming from the absence of direct negotiation channels, but rather as being intrinsically linked to Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal, which is viewed as the decisive factor in the conflict equation.

This position draws further weight from the Lebanese state’s performance in recent months, which has offered little reassurance regarding its ability to address this issue or reclaim sovereign decision-making. Announced measures have largely remained theoretical, without translating into concrete executive steps, undermining the credibility of any negotiation proposal not grounded in tangible shifts in the internal balance of power.

Against this backdrop, calls for direct negotiations appear, in the eyes of the concerned parties, to lack practical foundations, particularly in the absence of a clear pathway toward placing all arms under state control. Current indicators instead point to a continuation of the same pattern, with the state still hesitant to take decisive executive action, rendering any negotiation process likely to remain largely symbolic, incapable of producing a fundamental shift in the existing reality.

An additional factor has further weakened the perceived seriousness of the initiative in Washington and Tel Aviv, namely the nature of the delegation expected to conduct the negotiations. Available indications suggest that Joseph Aoun was moving toward forming a delegation based on sectarian representation, bringing together Christians, Shiites, Sunnis, and Druze, in an approach that reflects Lebanon’s entrenched power-sharing logic more than it does the formation of a cohesive, specialized negotiating team.

This approach raises serious questions about the delegation’s effectiveness and its ability to handle complex and sensitive negotiations that require technical expertise and a unified sovereign decision-making authority, rather than a traditional balance of communal representation. Addressing a political and security moment of such gravity demands moving beyond narrow domestic considerations in favor of a national approach grounded in competence and decisiveness.

Accordingly, adopting sectarian representation as the primary criterion for forming the delegation, rather than expertise and efficiency, risks weakening Lebanon’s negotiating position and reinforcing the perception that the state remains captive to its traditional mechanisms, even when faced with existential crises that require exceptional approaches.

Even under these conditions, shaped by sectarian considerations in forming the delegation, the negotiation initiative failed to materialize. In effect, it was derailed internally before ever reaching Israel or the United States. Nabih Berri openly opposed Shiite representation in the delegation, a stance that was echoed by Walid Jumblatt, who refrained from nominating a Druze representative.

This internal deadlock not only obstructed the formation process but also underscored the depth of political divisions and the limits of Lebanon’s ability to make an independent sovereign decision. Rather than proceeding with the formation of a delegation commensurate with the gravity and complexity of the moment, Joseph Aoun retreated under the weight of these objections, particularly that of Nabih Berri, a key ally of Hezbollah.

In sum, this political scene offers yet another indication that Lebanon’s political authority continues to operate within narrow margins, constrained by complex internal balances and conditions imposed by Hezbollah, ultimately limiting its capacity to take initiative and make decisive choices at a moment of profound national risk.