October 7 and the strategic collapse of political Islam

The events of October 7, 2023 marked a decisive turning point in the trajectory of Political Islam, in both its Sunni and Shiite forms, triggering profound transformations that struck at the core of these two currents.

Hamas stands out as the clearest point of convergence between the two. Ideologically, it belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood school of thought; politically and militarily, it has become an integral part of the axis led by Iran, particularly within what has come to be known as the “Unity of the Fronts” project.

This slogan, “Unity of the Fronts,” was not merely a media label. It evolved into an operational framework that pushed Iran’s regional allies to widen the scope of confrontation. Hezbollah opened a front along Lebanon’s southern border; the Houthis did the same from Yemen; and Iranian-linked Iraqi groups launched rockets and drones, before these attempts receded under international warnings, political pressure, and the complexities and sensitivities of Iraq’s internal landscape.

At the same time, the role of forces and organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be overlooked. Their activity was not limited to political and media mobilization. In some arenas, cross-border military-style actions emerged from Lebanese territory, most notably involving the Lebanese Islamic Group. In parallel, the Muslim Brotherhood worked to mobilize street protests in several Arab and international capitals, with a particularly visible presence in major cities such as London and Washington. There, it played a central role in organizing demonstrations and attempting to influence public opinion and decision-makers.

On the margins of this scene, it is essential to revisit another pivotal moment in the convergence and complementarity between Sunni and Shiite Political Islam: the period known as the “Arab Spring.” At that moment, as the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power in Egypt and Tunisia and expanded its political and popular influence across several Arab countries, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, hastened to celebrate and redefine the moment, arguing that what was unfolding was not an “Arab Spring,” but an “Islamic Spring.”

With the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, Hamas and behind it, Iran in particular pushed escalation with Israel to its furthest limits. Most of the long-standing rules that had governed this conflict for decades effectively collapsed. For the first time on such a wide scale, Israelis felt they were facing a direct existential threat, not merely another contained military round whose tempo could be managed or absorbed.

This fundamental shift was quickly reflected in the nature of Israel’s response, which in turn dismantled the traditional approaches long adopted by Tel Aviv. The policy of “containment” toward Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran’s other proxies, as well as the bet on managing Iran’s nuclear file through diplomacy, economic pressure, and sanctions, was no longer seen as sufficient or acceptable by Israel’s security establishment.

In this context, Israel moved to deliver heavy blows across Iran’s entire network of influence in the region from Hamas to Hezbollah, from the Houthis to direct strikes on Iran itself. The attacks on centers of Iranian influence and on the nuclear project marked an exceptionally dangerous moment, not only because of the material damage inflicted, but because they struck at the prestige of the Iranian regime and its deterrent image, domestically before internationally.

The scene did not stop there. The war continues with the aim of eliminating what remains of Hamas’s capabilities, while the Hezbollah file has returned to the top of Tel Aviv’s priorities. This return has been accompanied by serious warnings conveyed to Beirut through international envoys, indicating the possibility of a new war if the issue of Hezbollah’s remaining weapons is not addressed.

At the same time, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime dealt a fatal blow to the so-called “Shiite Crescent” Iranian influence stretching from Tehran to Beirut via Baghdad and Damascus. With Assad’s fall, Hezbollah lost its main supply line.

In parallel, talk is growing about the possibility of a second round of direct confrontation between Israel and Iran, this time under far more fragile internal Iranian conditions, shaped by domestic unrest and deepening rifts within the regime itself. Any future confrontation, therefore, is likely to be decisive, potentially placing the very future of the Iranian regime at stake.

In sum, Iran’s project suffered a severe blow after October 7, one that largely crippled the effectiveness of the proxies into which Tehran had invested billions of dollars over four decades. The debate is no longer confined to the limits or tools of regional influence; the Iranian regime itself has become an open question, amid regional and international shifts that do not appear to favor it.

Sunni Political Islam, for its part, was not spared the earthquake that followed October 7. On the contrary, the blows it sustained shook its foundations, politically and militarily, and raised harsh questions about its regional future. The devastating blow dealt to Hamas from the assassination of most of its leadership to the near-total destruction of its military infrastructure did not affect the movement alone. It effectively struck the most important military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. For decades, this arm had served as a political and popular asset for the organization in the Arab imagination, as the spearhead of confrontation with Israel.

This shift deprived the Muslim Brotherhood of one of its most important sources of symbolic legitimacy and weakened its ability to invest in the rhetoric of “resistance” that had formed a cornerstone of its popular appeal especially in the absence of viable military or political alternatives capable of filling the void.

In the same vein, the authority in northern Syria led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, and primarily backed by Qatar and Turkey, has come under pressure and strikes aimed at curbing any military or security capacity that could pose a threat to Israel. This cannot be separated from the fact that Doha and Ankara are among the states closest to the Muslim Brotherhood. It also fits into a broader Israeli strategy aimed at preventing Turkey from translating its political influence into security and military expansion inside Syrian territory, in an effort to fill the vacuum left by the retreat of Iranian influence following the fall of Assad’s regime.

The clearest message, however, came with the targeting of Doha, the capital that hosts Hamas leaders. This strike carried a direct political signal: the red lines that once existed have fully collapsed since October 7, and states that sponsor Hamas or provide political cover for the Muslim Brotherhood must seriously reassess their calculations.

Yet the most symbolic and far-reaching blow came from Washington, with the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. The implications of this step extend well beyond the group itself, affecting parties and movements that adopt its ideology across the region, and sending direct messages to the states that have provided it with support and patronage chief among them Qatar and Turkey.

It is therefore not surprising to see relations between Turkey and Iran regaining warmth. Equally notable is the increase in visits by Hezbollah envoys to Ankara, a clear indication of converging interests between the Sunni and Shiite wings of Political Islam. This has coincided with reports following a visit by a US Treasury delegation to Beirut, suggesting that Hezbollah has managed to secure more than $1 billion in funding through various channels and methods, including the use of Turkish facilities and airports.

What unites both sides today is the unprecedented rise of Israeli influence in the region an influence imposed through military force, a fait accompli policy, and broad international backing, capitalizing on the collapse of most of the red lines that once regulated the conflict before October 7. At the same time, Political Islam faces an equally serious challenge in the form of the renewed Arab role, particularly that of Saudi Arabia, through the Palestinian cause whether by mobilizing growing international support for recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations, or through Egypt’s pivotal role in managing de-escalation efforts and reaching ceasefire agreements in Gaza.

In conclusion, both Sunni and Shiite Political Islam have emerged from the post October 7 phase burdened with deep wounds. They have shifted from the position of actor and initiator to that of the defeated and targeted militarily and politically within a new regional landscape that offers them far less room for maneuver than in previous decades.