On the ruins of Arab nationalism, political Islam rose

The defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war was not merely a fleeting military setback. It marked a pivotal moment that shook the intellectual and political foundations of what came to be known as Arab Nationalism an ideology in which the peoples of the region had invested their hopes for liberation, unity, and the recovery of Palestine. After the defeat they came to label as the Naksa (setback), it became clear that the regimes which had raised the banner of Arab Nationalism had failed to deliver on their promises, and that their mobilizing rhetoric far exceeded their actual capacity to achieve results.

At the heart of this project stood Nasser’s Egypt, the backbone of Arab Nationalism, alongside the Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq. Accordingly, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s defeat in 1967 was not simply a military event, but a profound moral and political blow that struck at the very core of the nationalist project. The impact was compounded by Nasser’s subsequent death, which deprived the movement of a powerful symbol and immense popular momentum.

With Anwar Sadat’s ascent to power, Egypt entered a new phase. The October 1973 war was waged not as a comprehensive war of liberation, but as a political gateway toward a settlement with Israel. This approach was soon translated into a historic visit to Tel Aviv, culminating in a peace agreement that effectively removed Egypt from the Arab–Israeli conflict. The event amounted to a political earthquake that dismantled what remained of the nationalist center of gravity and dealt a decisive blow to the very idea of Arab Nationalism.

In Syria, meanwhile, the 1973 war resulted in the consolidation of the loss of the Golan Heights under Hafez al-Assad. From that point on, the primary concern of the Syrian Baath regime became the consolidation of power at home rather than the pursuit of a battle to reclaim occupied land. The Golan front was effectively closed, and military confrontation was replaced by high-pitched rhetorical posturing unaccompanied by any meaningful action on the ground.

Thus, the frontline states that had formed the pillars of Arab Nationalist ideology exited the equation of conflict: Egypt through a peace treaty, Syria through the freezing of its front. Iraq, geographically distant from Israel’s borders, was preoccupied with its regional and internal struggles most notably the rivalry between the Baathist wings in Baghdad and Damascus contenting itself with rhetorical grandstanding that rarely went beyond the media.

In the final analysis, Arab Nationalism, as practiced by the regimes and parties that claimed it, was reduced to a matter of sound rather than substance. Lofty slogans without coherent strategies, and mobilizing discourse detached from reality, hollowed out the idea and stripped it of both meaning and impact, leaving behind a vast political vacuum.

And as in nature, politics abhors a vacuum. It did not take long before that void was filled. As Arab Nationalism receded and withdrew from its traditional role in the confrontation with Israel, Political Islam stepped forward to inherit it not merely as an alternative ideology, but as a new monopoliser of the Palestinian cause, after nationalist regimes and parties had appropriated and emptied it of its content.

In this context, forces of Political Islam began to expand, foremost among them the Muslim Brotherhood, which viewed President Anwar Sadat’s trajectory as a departure from what it considered the “immutable principles of the Islamic nation.” This path ultimately ended with his assassination. Equally telling was Iran’s decision, following its Islamic Revolution, to immortalize the name of Sadat’s assassin, Khaled Al-Islambouli, by naming one of Tehran’s main streets after him a clear political signal of the symbolism and direction it sought to embrace.

In parallel, the various offshoots of Political Islam across the Arab world grew and filled the vacuum left by the collapse of nationalist ideology. These groups succeeded in presenting themselves as the spearhead of resistance against Israel, making them a powerful magnet for popular support across Arab and Islamic societies searching for a credible discourse of resistance after the repeated failures of nationalist regimes.

The rise of Ayatollah Khomeini to power in Iran also marked a decisive milestone in the ascent of Political Islam. The Iranian Revolution became a source of inspiration and attraction for Islamists and jihadists alike, particularly the more radical among them. Since then, the Palestinian cause has been deployed as a political and emotional lever not solely in the context of liberating Palestine, but as part of a broader project aimed at consolidating the influence of Political Islam and exporting the Islamic Revolution.

From that historical moment onward, Political Islam, in both its Sunni and Shiite forms, has continued to expand, investing in the Palestinian cause as a unifying banner and a reservoir of popular legitimacy for its expansionist project. Thus, Palestine shifted from being the cause of Arab Nationalists to a tool within a new ideological project invoked whenever there is a need to mobilize the street or justify political agendas.

In conclusion, it is impossible to address the future of our homelands seriously without confronting the ideological experiments that have dominated the public sphere for decades chief among them Arab nationalism and political Islam. Despite their differing slogans and rhetoric, both share one essential trait: the subordination of national interests and the treatment of states as instruments rather than ends in themselves.

Historical experience has shown that these two projects have delivered little to societies beyond dictatorship, repression, and intimidation, along with deeper backwardness and violence. Ideology became an absolute priority, while the individual human being the citizen, with their dignity, rights, and value was systematically marginalized. Both stand in direct opposition to the national interest, and there can be no genuine state-building without breaking free from these destructive ideologies.