President Joseph Aoun’s push for direct talks with Israel, examining whether negotiations alone can secure peace without resolving internal sovereignty challenges.
The Lebanese presidency dual imperatives
President Joseph Aoun is to be credited with making a decision of profound importance, one marked by considerable courage and a strong sense of national responsibility, when he opened the door to direct negotiations with Israel. Such a step, given its timing and context, can only be understood as part of an effort to fortify Lebanon and put an end to the series of wars that have devastated it, and in which Hezbollah has entangled the country in service of the Iranian regime.
Following a ceasefire brokered directly by U.S. President Donald Trump, and subsequent preparatory meetings between Lebanese and Israeli representatives, a notable statement emerged from the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. It amounted to what resembled a clear commitment: to guarantee Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanese territory, ensure border security, and contribute to the reconstruction of areas devastated by the confrontations.
However, according to the American proposal, these guarantees remain contingent upon a pivotal step, namely, a direct meeting between President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Here lies the crux of the debate: would the mere convening of such a meeting suffice to open the door to peace between the two countries and secure all promised American guarantees? Or are there additional conditions that must be fulfilled for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories and for these assurances to materialize?
In addressing this question, it is essential to return to a fundamental point often overlooked in domestic debate: Lebanon, as a state, has never taken an official decision to go to war with Israel. Since the establishment of the Israeli state, major wars have primarily involved neighboring Arab countries—Egypt, Jordan, and Syria—while Lebanon has remained, at least officially, outside the framework of direct confrontation.
Yet this reality does not negate the fact that Lebanese territory has repeatedly been transformed into an open arena of conflict. The wars Lebanon has experienced were less the result of sovereign national decisions than reflections of others’ conflicts played out on its soil: beginning with armed Palestinian presence, deepening during the period of Syrian tutelage, and extending to the current phase shaped by regional calculations led by Iran.
From this perspective, the question becomes more complex: can Lebanon transition from being a “battleground” to becoming a “decision-maker” through a major political step such as a meeting between Aoun and Netanyahu? Or does achieving genuine peace first require the restoration of sovereign decision-making domestically, including addressing the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, so that any such meeting becomes the culmination of a comprehensive process rather than an isolated initiative?
Lebanon appears to have little luxury of options at this critical juncture. The negotiation track proposed by President Joseph Aoun may represent the only viable path to shield the country from the cycle of open-ended wars. This approach enjoys the support of a majority of Lebanese citizens, exhausted by prolonged conflicts and viewing negotiations as a historic opportunity to achieve lasting stability.
In parallel, Washington remains the only party capable of acting as a guarantor for the implementation of any potential agreement between the two countries, particularly with regard to Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanese territory, the establishment of border security arrangements, and the launch of a comprehensive reconstruction effort in the south, as pledged in the U.S. Embassy’s statement in Beirut.
Nevertheless, despite all of the above, this approach remains incomplete if it fails to address the most complex internal challenge: the issue of Hezbollah’s arms. Without tackling this problem, negotiations are unlikely to advance seriously toward a peace agreement, nor will Washington be able to uphold its commitments, even in the event of a meeting between Aoun and Netanyahu.
Accordingly, any potential meeting between President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—if not preceded by a clear internal and external process addressing sovereign decision-making and Hezbollah’s weapons—will remain more symbolic than transformative. Lasting peace and stability are built on deep settlements and fundamental solutions that restructure relations between the two countries on solid foundations, following the removal of all obstacles, foremost among them, Hezbollah’s arms.