The long shadow of February 6, 1984 over Lebanon

On February 6, 1984, the late Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad took the decision to bring down the agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, known as the “May 17 Agreement,” through a military move targeting the then Lebanese legitimate authority. The implementation of this decision in Beirut was entrusted to Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt, via the armed groups affiliated with the Amal Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party.

Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt constituted a key pillar in consolidating the influence of the Syrian regime under Hafez Al-Assad in Lebanon, through the overthrow of the “May 17 Agreement”. In doing so, this political duo prioritized sectarian and factional calculations, as well as the pursuit of internal influence, over Lebanon’s national interest. This contributed to driving the country into a prolonged cycle of wars, instability, and destruction, leaving thousands of casualties. Southern Lebanon and its population were among the most affected by the repercussions of the February 6 upheaval, both in terms of human losses and social and economic hardship.

Since the events of February 6, 1984 which cemented the dominance of the Syrian regime led by Hafez Al-Assad in Lebanon, the Lebanese political authority can be described as the “February 6 authority.” This power structure, sponsored by Hafez al-Assad, relied primarily on two pillars: Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt.

The influence of the “February 6 authority” gradually expanded within Lebanon’s state institutions, administrative, military, security, and judicial and extended into the private sector, where it secured extensive privileges across various industries through its own companies or partnerships with others. This led to the emergence of an interconnected network of influence within state institutions and between them and the private sector, a configuration that can be accurately described as a “deep state.” Nabih Berri emerged as the principal architect of this internal Lebanese equation and of the “deep state” system, while Walid Jumblatt represented one of its main pillars.

The “February 6 authority,” which embodied the political extension of Hafez Al-Assad’s influence in Lebanon, later provided political cover for the military system of Hezbollah, and consequently for the expansion of Iranian influence in the country. This was reflected directly through Nabih Berri’s steadfast alliance with Hezbollah under the label of the “Shiite duo,” and indirectly through Walid Jumblatt’s approach of coexisting with Hezbollah’s armed presence under the pretext of preserving civil peace.

Despite changes at the level of the presidency and the government following the rise of Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam to office, Lebanese citizens have not yet witnessed a fundamental transformation in the performance of state institutions or in the approach to corruption and reform dossiers. Nor have any serious steps been taken toward addressing the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons or restricting the decision over war and peace to the state.

The persistence of this reality reflects the deep entrenchment of the “February 6 authority” within state institutions and apparatuses, and its control over the “deep state.” It also indicates that the political influence established since February 6, 1984, continues to dominate key state mechanisms, making any serious attempt at change or structural breakthrough highly complex.

The same political duo, Berri and Jumblatt that led the political and military confrontation on February 6, 1984 to overturn the “May 17 Agreement”, is today similarly positioned against any path that could lead to a peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel.

The “February 6 authority” continues to provide political cover for Hezbollah’s military apparatus, whether through rejecting direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, opposing any path toward a peace agreement, or refusing any solution that would lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah. Nabih Berri provides direct political cover for Hezbollah’s weapons, while Walid Jumblatt adopts a different approach, based on addressing the issue through dialogue with the party rather than open political or security confrontation. Jumblatt is aware that Joseph Aoun engaged in direct dialogue with Hezbollah over recent months regarding the issue of arms, but that this process has yielded no tangible results and has reached a dead end.

In this context, a political paradox emerges: those who brought down the “May 17 Agreement” under the pretext of rejecting any settlement with Israel later reached the maritime border demarcation agreement between Lebanon and Israel, which included concessions on parts of the rights related to the Karish gas field in favor of Israel, whereas the “May 17 Agreement” had secured this field for Lebanon.

It has become clear, according to this political narrative, that Berri and Jumblatt’s rejection of any radical solutions is linked to their conviction that any substantial change in the approach to Hezbollah’s weapons or in Lebanon’s relationship with Israel could lead to the dismantling of the “deep state” that emerged after the events of February 6, 1984, and which continues to control key levers of the Lebanese state.

In conclusion, pulling Lebanon out of its cycle of recurring wars and crises requires ending the legacy of the “February 6 authority” and overturning the political framework that has governed public affairs for decades. What happened on February 6, 1984, constituted a “historical mistake” that must be corrected by supporting President Joseph Aoun’s orientation toward a new approach in relations with Israel, one that could lead to a peace agreement ensuring the protection of Lebanon’s interests, stabilizing the south, and securing a more stable future for its people.

Any such transformation would weaken the structure of the “deep state” and dismantle the system of corruption and public fund misappropriation, while also undermining the mutual interests that have bound the “February 6 authority” and Hezbollah over many decades.