The real challenge to the Tehran-Washington talks

Differences within the various power centers of the Iranian system have begun to emerge gradually into the public sphere, albeit within carefully controlled limits. One of the clearest indicators of these divisions is the position taken by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, regarding the recent understanding with Washington.

In a noteworthy statement, he said: “In principle, I held a different view. However, in light of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s commitment, in his capacity as Chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, on behalf of himself and the other members, to safeguard the rights of the Iranian people and the Resistance Front, and given his explicit acceptance of responsibility for this matter, I approved the agreement.”

This position carries political implications that go beyond a simple endorsement of the understanding. It suggests that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is seeking to distance itself from the consequences of this course of action, placing full political responsibility on Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council. In this sense, the IRGC remains outside the framework of direct accountability for the outcome of the negotiations.

Should the negotiating track produce results aligned with its interests and expectations, the achievement will likely be credited to the Iranian system as a whole. However, if the outcome falls short of expectations or proves unsatisfactory from the IRGC’s perspective, it will be able to dissociate itself from any political responsibility for failure. It may even use such an outcome to launch an internal challenge against Pezeshkian, the Supreme National Security Council, and the broader political establishment that embraced the path of engagement.

The first indications of these messages from the IRGC have already appeared on the domestic front. Groups of demonstrators were mobilized to protest the understanding outside the offices of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The message was not confined to Iran’s internal arena. It also extended to the regional stage through activity on the Lebanese front, where rockets were launched toward Israel after the announcement of a ceasefire and just one day before the first round of negotiations between Tehran and Washington was scheduled to begin in Switzerland.

This development led to the cancellation of the meeting that had been planned for Friday, June 19, before political and diplomatic arrangements were restructured through intensive efforts by several regional states, most notably Pakistan. These efforts ultimately succeeded in containing the repercussions and bringing both the Iranian and American delegations back to the negotiating track, paving the way for their arrival in Switzerland, where the first session of dialogue was held on Sunday, June 21.

Washington’s primary objective in pursuing this understanding and entering a sixty-day negotiating process is to address two key issues: ensuring freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and reaching a settlement on Iran’s nuclear file, particularly regarding its stockpile of enriched uranium.

While tangible progress appears to have been made on the Strait of Hormuz issue, the enriched uranium file remains the most complex and sensitive aspect of the negotiations. The central question today is whether Tehran is genuinely prepared to relinquish this card or whether it is merely seeking to buy time and maneuver politically while waiting for circumstances to change.

Even if President Masoud Pezeshkian who bears direct political responsibility for the outcome of the talks demonstrates a willingness to make concessions on this issue, questions remain regarding the position of the IRGC. Will it accept such a course of action, or will it seek to derail the negotiations and overturn the process altogether, especially given its deliberate efforts from the outset to distance itself from responsibility for this track?

Most indicators suggest that the Iranian leadership is not prepared to give up its enriched uranium stockpile, viewing it as one of the last remaining strategic assets at its disposal following the significant erosion of its regional influence and the weakening of its allied networks across the Middle East. From Tehran’s perspective, this issue is not merely a bargaining chip; it is regarded as a fundamental pillar of the regime’s survival and continuity in the face of external pressure.

Until the coming days and weeks provide clearer answers to these questions, attention will remain focused on Switzerland, where the future of the negotiating process between Tehran and Washington is being tested. At the same time, southern Lebanon will remain under close scrutiny as one of the most important indicators of the IRGC’s stance toward the negotiations.

The success or failure of the understanding will not be determined solely at the negotiating table. It will also depend on the conduct of Iran-aligned forces across the region, foremost among them Hezbollah. Consequently, developments both in Switzerland and on the southern Lebanese front will remain critical indicators for assessing the direction in which this crisis is likely to evolve in the coming period.