The simmering struggle across the horn of Africa

Earlier this month, the Houthis seized the Yemeni port of Mokha and claimed control of Yemen's Red Sea coastline. It was their first major military advance in nearly five years, and it ended a UN-brokered truce. With the Strait of Hormuz already effectively closed by the war with Iran, the group now holds the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, including the island of Perim, putting a second vital shipping route at risk.

The consequences stretch across the strait into the Horn of Africa, a region that has long been an arena for regional and global power struggles. Andrew Leber and Lesley Anne Warner of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argue that rising insecurity in the Red Sea has made Somaliland's coastline more valuable, fueling calls in Washington to follow Israel in recognizing it.

Long a melting pot of competing ports and bases, the Horn is now seeing a new tool of influence emerge: recognition, which is paving the way for fresh competition over those very ports and bases.

What can recognition do?

The outside powers competing in the Horn have so far avoided direct confrontation with one another. Instead, they are exploiting gaps in the region to advance their interests, and secessionist movements are one such gap. States extend recognition in the hope that it will yield military and economic advantages, and this is precisely what Israel is counting on with its recognition of Somaliland. The driving incentive is strategic gain, not international law or norms.

From Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb

Israel's recognition of Somaliland signaled that the region was heading into a power struggle, and subsequent military action in Yemen has pushed it to the forefront. The war on Iran has gradually become a wider contest for maritime dominance. While the Strait of Hormuz remains the center of gravity, the conflict is steadily moving toward Bab el-Mandeb.

Over the past two years, the Houthis have turned maritime coercion into an effective instrument of geopolitical influence. With Iranian-supported anti-ship ballistic missiles, drones, naval mines and advanced surveillance, they have repeatedly targeted commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Israel's recognition of Somaliland adds yet another layer to this contest.

Djibouti's concerns

Israel's move has heightened tensions between Somaliland, Somalia and, above all, Djibouti. Djibouti is a small country with no significant natural resources, yet it hosts the densest cluster of foreign military bases in the world, with American, Chinese, French, Japanese and Italian forces operating within miles of each other along its coastline. President Ismail Omar Guelleh has publicly warned that Israel's recognition could trigger major geopolitical shifts, including a possible Israeli military base at the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. Djibouti argues this would increase instability in the Horn of Africa and around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Why the US might recognize Somaliland

Samir Bhattacharya, an associate fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, argues that the US could benefit from recognizing Somaliland. It occupies one of the most advantageous positions in the region. Its coastline stretches more than 850 km along the Gulf of Aden, overlooking one of the busiest maritime corridors linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. Its greatest asset is the Port of Berbera, which has been modernized over the past decade into one of the most capable deep-water ports on Africa's eastern coast.

Berbera's value grows further when set against China's expanding influence. Beijing has steadily strengthened its position through its base in Djibouti, extensive infrastructure investment and deepening political engagement with Somalia. For Washington, Berbera could offer a counterweight.

However, US policy has long rested on a "One Somalia" approach that backs the federal government in Mogadishu, particularly in the fight against al-Shabaab. Recognizing Somaliland could be seen as a betrayal of that partner and might encourage regions such as Puntland and Jubaland to seek independence, which is why Washington remains cautious.

Turkey

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Turkish Foreign Ministry condemned Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland, calling the move illegal, illegitimate and unacceptable. This is mainly due to Ankara’s vast interests in Somalia.

In early 2024, Turkey secured a deal to explore Somalia's oil and gas, estimated at around 30 billion barrels, on terms heavily favoring Ankara. As Matthew Chandler de Waal notes in a commentary for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Turkey can recover up to 90% of its costs before profits are shared, while Somalia's royalties are capped at 5%. Despite criticism that the deal was rushed through parliament, the Turkish drillship Çağrı Bey arrived in Mogadishu in April 2026 to begin exploratory drilling. Turkey's military presence has grown in step, with Turkish jets, drones and warships now supporting operations against al-Shabaab.

Turkey's influence also reaches into Somali domestic politics. In March 2026, Ankara was accused of backing the ousting of a regional leader who opposed the government's electoral agenda. Chandler de Waal adds that regionally, Somalia has become Turkey's platform in the Red Sea contest. Following Israel's recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, Turkey and Somalia agreed on a Turkish base at Laas Qoray on the Gulf of Aden, widely seen as a counter to the Israeli and Emirati presence in Somaliland.

Don’t poke the horn

Competing global and regional powers are becoming increasingly entrenched in the Horn of Africa. Each power seeks its share of influence over one of the world's most important maritime corridors.

Israel's recognition of Somaliland has added a new point of strain to this landscape, particularly in the emerging power struggle between Turkey and Israel. Ankara's response, a planned base at Laas Qoray alongside its deepening military and economic footprint in Somalia, shows how quickly recognition can be converted into strategic competition. Beyond this rivalry, recognition is also intensifying local tensions between Somaliland, Somalia and Djibouti. These divisions give outside powers further openings to intervene, and each new intervention deepens the competition.

The most dangerous flashpoint, however, lies at sea. Hostilities around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the disruption of maritime shipping could become the point where indirect competition gives way to open military action. The recent Saudi strikes on the Houthis suggest that this threshold may already be approaching. If the powers gathered in the Horn of Africa begin to treat the waterway as a battlefield rather than a shared interest, the region's fragile balance may not hold.