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Lebanon secures new submarine cable

Lebanon secures new submarine cable

Lebanon’s CADMOS-2 submarine cable promises stronger links to Cyprus, renewing questions about state control, cybersecurity and the country’s parallel networks.

By Michael Al Andary | November 09, 2026
Reading time: 5 min
Lebanon secures new submarine cable

Lebanon’s efforts to modernize its telecommunications infrastructure are bringing renewed attention to the security of its international connections and the state’s ability to maintain control over critical networks.

An informed source told The Beiruter that all submarine cables connecting Lebanon to the international telecommunications network, including the newly deployed CADMOS-2, remain under the exclusive authority of the Ministry of Telecommunications through Ogero.

In an interview on condition of anonymity, the source stressed that no unauthorized entity could access or exercise control over any of Lebanon’s submarine cable systems, whether existing or newly installed.

“Strict physical and technical security measures are in place. Access to submarine cable landing stations is exclusively restricted to authorized personnel, while multiple technical monitoring and security mechanisms continuously safeguard the integrity of the cables and associated infrastructure,” the source added.

The source made clear that these installations were strategic national assets that remained entirely under the authority of the Lebanese state, “with no exceptions.”

The assurances come as the French cable-laying vessel Sophie Germain, operated by Orange Marine, arrived off the coast of Nahr Ibrahim–Oqaiba on Sunday, November 8, to begin installing the CADMOS-2 submarine cable connecting Lebanon to Cyprus, according to a statement by state-owned telecommunications operator Ogero.

 

A new connection to Europe

The project will replace the original CADMOS cable, which entered service in 1995 and has exceeded its expected operational lifespan. It is the first new international submarine cable to reach Lebanon since 2010.

The new connection will have two landing points along the Lebanese coast and is expected to become operational following the completion of installation and technical testing.

The agreement was signed between Lebanon’s Ministry of Telecommunications and the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (Cyta) in December 2022. It aims to strengthen connectivity between the two countries and improve Lebanon’s access to international telecommunications networks.

For a sector that has endured years of financial crisis, underinvestment and deteriorating infrastructure, the project represents an important step towards improving the country’s digital connectivity.

However, the arrival of the Sophie Germain also comes against the backdrop of longstanding questions over state authority in the telecommunications sector, particularly given Hezbollah’s separate communications network.

 

Question of parallel networks

Hezbollah has maintained its own telecommunications infrastructure for years, operating alongside Lebanon’s civilian network. The issue triggered one of the country’s most serious political confrontations in May 2008, when the government of then Prime Minister Fouad Siniora declared the group’s private telephone network illegal and moved to dismantle it.

Hezbollah rejected the decision, arguing that its communications system was necessary to protect its members from Israeli surveillance. The dispute escalated into armed clashes in Beirut and other parts of the country, eventually ending with the Doha Agreement. While the agreement brought an end to the fighting, Hezbollah’s communications network remained in place.

The system has continued to form part of the group’s security infrastructure. A Reuters report in July 2024 described Hezbollah’s reliance on private landlines, pagers and couriers to reduce its exposure to Israeli electronic surveillance, particularly following the escalation of hostilities along the Lebanese-Israeli border.

However, the existence of Hezbollah’s parallel network does not establish that the group has access to or control over Lebanon’s public telecommunications infrastructure.

According to Freedom House’s 2024 assessment of internet freedom in Lebanon, the state retains control over the country's internet backbone, fixed-line and mobile telephone services. Ogero operates the international gateways through which submarine cables connect Lebanon to the wider world, while private internet service providers rely on its infrastructure.

 

Modernization and cybersecurity

Beyond the question of parallel networks, Lebanon faces considerable challenges in protecting its telecommunications infrastructure from technological and security threats.

In July 2024, former Ogero director general Imad Kreidieh warned that the country's national telecommunications network was highly vulnerable to Israeli penetration. He said approximately 95 percent of the network consisted of outdated copper infrastructure, while limited funding was hindering maintenance and cybersecurity improvements.

The government has since made modernization and institutional reform central to its plans for the sector.

Telecommunications Minister Charles Hajj said in July 2026 that authorities were moving forward with the implementation of Law 431, adopted in 2002, which provides the framework for restructuring the telecommunications sector. The measures include strengthening the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority and preparing for the establishment of Liban Telecom.

Hajj has also outlined plans to expand fiber-optic coverage, modernize mobile infrastructure and improve cybersecurity, while encouraging private investment under regulatory supervision.

Nevertheless, upgrading equipment will not, by itself, address the sector's institutional and security challenges. Effective oversight, technical safeguards and clear accountability remain essential to protecting critical infrastructure.

 

Beyond connectivity

For Washington, the question of telecommunications security also intersects with its broader policy towards Lebanon. The United States has repeatedly called for stronger state institutions and supported the Lebanese Army, while advocating that the Lebanese state exercise exclusive authority over weapons and security decisions.

Although CADMOS-2 is primarily a civilian project intended to improve Lebanon’s international connectivity, its installation highlights a wider debate over sovereignty and control of national infrastructure.

The government’s assurances that submarine cables remain exclusively under state authority offer a clear position. The challenge will be to maintain that control, strengthen cybersecurity and ensure that Lebanon’s telecommunications networks remain protected as the country expands its connections to the outside world.

    • Michael Al Andary