Powerful governments often behave as though they are under constant threat, using fears of instability to justify tighter political control even when their hold on power appears secure.
Why do powerful governments govern as if they are in crisis?
Why do powerful governments govern as if they are in crisis?
In July 2016, Turkey's government survived a violent attempted coup. What followed was a two-year state of emergency during which more than 152,000 civil servants were dismissed, over 4,200 judges and prosecutors were removed, and 166 media outlets were liquidated, according to the United Nations. Although emergency rule ended in 2018, measures introduced to confront an immediate threat became instruments of lasting political control. The Turkish experience exposes a paradox at the heart of contemporary governance. Across political systems, governments commanding considerable authority continue to operate as though their survival remains uncertain. In China, President Xi Jinping has concentrated power within the Communist Party while elevating national security into an organizing principle of political and economic policy. In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's government has repeatedly invoked emergencies to govern by decree, circumvent ordinary legislative procedures and consolidate executive discretion. “All political regimes worry about security,” Olivia Cheung, a lecturer at King's College London, told The Beiruter. Yet the persistence of insecurity among politically dominant governments presents an interesting paradox. Why does the concentration of political power so often coincide with an enduring fear of losing it, and when does governing against potential threats become a means of consolidating power itself? Political dominance does not necessarily guarantee legitimacy. Governments may command powerful security institutions and face limited electoral competition while remaining vulnerable to economic deterioration, bureaucratic dysfunction, and declining public confidence. Xi Jinping's consolidation of power has left him without an obvious challenger within the Communist Party, but it has done little to insulate Beijing from the economic, demographic and geopolitical pressures threatening the foundations of the party's legitimacy. China's population declined by 1.39 million in 2024, according to its National Bureau of Statistics, while economic growth has slowed considerably from earlier decades, threatening employment and living standards. “Economic challenges and significant demographic decline make it more costly and difficult for the CCP to deliver a better future to the Chinese people,” Cheung explained. Political control introduces another source of uncertainty. In a 2025 study, Is There Really a Dictator's Dilemma?, University of Chicago political science professor Scott Gehlbach and his coauthors examine how repression can make public expressions of political support less informative. When dissent carries substantial risks, apparent loyalty becomes an unreliable indicator of genuine approval. Greater authority can therefore strengthen a government's capacity to suppress opposition while weakening its ability to assess public sentiment. The anticipation of political instability can influence institutions long before a recognizable emergency occurs. Governments seeking to prevent future threats may concentrate decision-making authority, restrict internal competition, and incorporate security considerations into routine administration. China's May 2025 white paper, China's National Security in the New Era, places political security at the foundation of national security and incorporates economic, technological and social concerns into an integrated framework. “There is a preference for a pre-emptive approach to address potential threats before they materialize or as soon as any signs that could be a threat materialize,” Cheung said. “It nourishes a crisis mentality in governance.” Under Xi, this philosophy has reinforced Communist Party leadership over state institutions, consolidating both personal and organizational authority. Historical experience has also influenced Beijing's understanding of political survival. Rather than interpreting the Cultural Revolution, the 1989 Tiananmen protests and the Soviet Union's collapse solely as warnings of vulnerability, Xi has emphasized the importance of party cohesion and ideological discipline in overcoming periods of instability. For the leadership, preventive governance is intended to strengthen long-term resilience. Yet treating economic difficulties, administrative weaknesses and ideological disagreement as potential security concerns risks making the anticipation of political danger a permanent feature of government. The failed coup against Erdoğan's government presented an immediate security threat, but the political consequences of Turkey's response reached far into institutions that had little connection to the military confrontation. A March 2018 United Nations investigation documented the closure of 1,719 organizations alongside extensive dismissals across the judiciary and civil service.A 2026 study published in the Cambridge University Press journal New Perspectives on Turkey examined 37 decree-laws containing 1,783 articles, documenting how emergency legislation facilitated changes across the bureaucracy, military, media and other state institutions. The emergency also provided the political context for Turkey's 2017 constitutional referendum, which approved a presidential system concentrating executive authority. Measures introduced during a period of exceptional insecurity consequently contributed to a more centralized political order. A comparable process has occurred in Hungary, where successive emergencies have enabled Orbán's government to issue decrees with limited parliamentary scrutiny, including measures unrelated to the circumstances initially invoked to justify extraordinary authority. Genuine crises can create opportunities for political consolidation without requiring governments to manufacture the original threats. Emergency powers can weaken institutional constraints, restrict opposition and concentrate executive authority, gradually normalizing exceptional government. The political advantages of centralized crisis management carry potential institutional costs. Suppressing dissent can deprive governments of reliable information about public sentiment, while concentrating authority may weaken the institutional checks needed to correct policy failures. Measures intended to prevent instability can therefore create new vulnerabilities, particularly when political loyalty becomes more important than independent scrutiny. For powerful governments, security is therefore both a legitimate responsibility and a potential justification for accumulating authority. When political survival becomes an overriding measure of effective governance, the identification of new threats can become inseparable from the exercise of power itself, leaving governments with ever greater authority but no clear point at which they can consider themselves secure.The insecurity of power
When vigilance becomes policy
The political advantages of emergency
The limits of permanent security
